Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

453. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 16, 1980

SUBJECT

• Assistance to El Salvador (C)

Attached is a memorandum from Ed Muskie to you recommending that we go forward to inform the El Salvador Government that we will resume economic assistance. This is in response to your instruction to David Aaron this morning. The memo makes clear that we will still be able to control the actual disbursal in order to have a lever on the performance of the El Salvador Government in meeting its self-proclaimed objectives which we also consider to be very important. (S)

Last week, the SCC also recommended to you that military assistance be resumed.² However, since the result of the negotiations between the junta and the Christian Democrats have proven to be ambiguous on several key points—in particular, transfer of officers responsible for the terror—the Ambassador and the Department strongly believe that we should not turn the military assistance tap on full. Defense, on the other hand, is anxious to go forward with a complete program which would include the dispatch of military training teams, follow-through on the helicopters, and signing of a new FY 81 FMS Credit Agreement. (S)

State believes that we should inform Duarte that we are prepared to go forward with these steps if the government, and particularly the military, fulfill the terms of the agreement between the Christian Democrats and the military, as well as the general objectives we have established. (In addition to the transfer of officers, this would include serious pursuit of the investigation of the murder of the nuns, reduction in right-wing terrorism, and the Land Reform Title Program.) (S)

Defense wants the whole military package to go simultaneously with the economic package but is willing to settle for sending the initial military training team of 24–36 men which would be assigned to the three brigades of the El Salvador army. Duarte, on the other hand, has said that the most important bargaining chip for him is the helicopters. (S)

I believe it is important, in principle, to inform Duarte that we are not only resuming economic assistance but that we are prepared to resume all military assistance. However, I agree with State that this should be phased so as to give both Duarte and ourselves the greatest possible leverage on the El Salvador Government and the military to perform. (S)

Accordingly, I recommend that, in addition to the economic steps, Ambassador White be authorized to inform Duarte that

—we are prepared to proceed with military assistance;

—non-lethal materiel in the pipeline would continue to be delivered;

—the helicopter program, with attendant in-country training by MTT’s, will go forward promptly as soon as the military has made significant progress in implementing the agreement with the Christian Democrats;

—with further implementation, we would go forward with the $5 million FY 81 FMS Credit Agreement and purchase of $2.3 million in non-lethal equipment; and

—this could be followed by further MTT training of El Salvadorian armed forces. (S)

(I would rank the MTT’s for the El Salvador army last because they are the most visible and will require significant political justification both in Salvador and elsewhere.) (S)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you authorize informing the El Salvador Government of our economic assistance plans along the lines of Secretary Muskie’s memorandum.³ (S)

2. That you authorize the Department to instruct Ambassador White to inform the El Salvador Government of our willingness to resume military assistance contingent upon their meeting their own commitments along the above lines.⁴ (S)

Attachment

Memorandum from Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter⁵

Washington, December 16, 1980

SUBJECT

• Assistance to El Salvador

With the restructuring of the Salvadoran government announced, we need to address our assistance programs. Our announcement of last Friday following your approval of the SCC’s recommendation indicated that the rationale for our hold-up on assistance shifted from the killing of the American women to the anticipated restructuring of the government—a step designed to get at the underlying problem of terrorism originating with the security forces.⁶

We know that the Christian Democrats, especially their leader Duarte, pushed hard in the last week’s negotiations to bring the security forces under control. The Christian Democrats have accepted a deal with the military. But we do not know all the elements of the deal, nor do we have any guarantee that commitments of the security forces will be carried out.⁷ On the civilian side the changes announced strengthen the most capable civilian administrators and should improve implementation of the reform program. On the military side, no major changes of personnel have yet been announced except dropping one officer from the Junta.⁸ We are told that two of the officers of the High Command associated with violence will be transferred and as many as a dozen middle-rank officers involved in violence sent abroad. The timing is unclear, but not immediate. Transfer of these officers is key to reducing violence from within the military. For the first time the military has publicly accepted implied responsibility for some of the terrorism and agreed to improving its professionalism.

Our economic assistance is more critical, at least over the next few weeks, than our military assistance. The economy of El Salvador is winding down rapidly as violence destroys confidence and all credit from abroad is withdrawn. Without approval of our assistance now, there will be major food shortages (flour, vegetable oil) next month. Without approval of a major Inter-American Bank loan ($45 million) this week there will not be time to import fertilizer for the next growing season. On the military side additional training in the US is essential before helicopters could be used (and 30 days notice of the lease must be given the Congress). The equipment proposed under FY–81 FMS is needed but not essential. We have not stopped procurement of the trucks under the FY–80 FMS although shipment is not planned for several weeks.

Thus we recommend that we immediately resume our economic assistance including signing the $20 million ESF loan, negotiating the PL–480 and CCC agreements and voting for the IDB loan. We would announce that, because the restructuring of the government gives promise of reduced violence originating in the security forces, we are resuming this much needed economic assistance without which all the people of El Salvador would suffer. We would announce that military assistance is not being resumed pending further assessment of progress in reducing violence. Our announcement would be appreciated by the Venezuelans—the other major donor—who feel exposed by our hold-up.⁹

Our economic leverage would continue to be large even over the next couple of months. The PL–480 will not be signed for 5–15 days even if negotiations are pushed. It could be stopped any time. In January there is a requirement for more AID development assistance for several community upgrading projects which employ over 15,000 people. By February additional funding for land reform is planned. Thus we can increase economic pressure later if the military related reforms do not develop satisfactorily.

We would also have an early private conversation with President Duarte to explain our position on assistance emphasizing the need for the military transfers to take place to permit resumption of our military assistance. We would work out with him a phased program in which some military assistance would be resumed on transfer of a number of officers and as there is tangible progress in reducing the level of violence and proceeding with the murder investigation. Other items such as the helicopters would be held until further progress is made.

RECOMMENDATION

In short we believe backing Duarte and the Christian Democrats is still the best hope for a reasonable outcome in El Salvador. We believe we need to release economic assistance quickly to indicate that support and avoid economic collapse. Our military assistance would be made available only on a phased incremental basis, as tangible and steady progress is made on military reform and the investigation. We would announce the economic restoration today if you approve.¹⁰

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 22, El Salvador: 12/13–19/80. Secret. Sent for action. Carter wrote at the top right-hand corner of the page: “Zbig. J.” An unknown hand wrote: “12/17/80 p.m.” below Carter’s initial.
2. See Document 449.
3. Carter indicated his approval and wrote in the margin: “I agree w/ State.”
4. Carter indicated his disapproval and wrote in the margin: “When I’m reasonably sure that they will meet the commitments, military assistance will be approved. J.” For the final instructions to White, see footnote 3, Document 452.
5. Secret.
6. See footnote 4, Document 449.
7. Carter underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with “nor” and ending with “out.”
8. Carter underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with “no” and ending with “announced.”
9. Carter drew a line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph and wrote “ok.” in the left-hand margin.
10. Carter indicated his approval and signed his initial.