Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

439. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, October 8, 1980

SUBJECT

• Countering the Insurgency in El Salvador (U)

(S) The recent CIA assessment of the situation in El Salvador (attached) makes it clear that, while the radical left has recently been weakened in the political arena, progress in the armed struggle between insurgents and El Salvadoran military forces is less encouraging.² This trend is disturbing, for if our policy of support for the current government is to succeed, we must have a coordinated strategy that pursues military as well as political and economic success.

(S) To this end, the President has approved and we have provided non-lethal military equipment to improve the communications, mobility, and medical capabilities of GOES forces, and we have deployed several small technical assistance teams to assist in the related fields of logistics, vehicle maintenance, communications, medical service, and information and public relations. As you are aware, Ambassador White is working out terms for an offer of six UH–1H helicopters.³ Despite these measures, I have become increasingly concerned that we may not be providing enough of the right kind of security assistance. The attached report and other recent events reinforce my concern.

(S) For almost nine months, we have deferred the deployment of the military training teams (MTTs) which would train each of the El Salvadoran Brigades. These teams are already formed and are prepared to move on short notice. This training is essential to develop the military skills, professionalism, and confidence necessary to meet the growing insurgent challenge, and to enhance the prospect for cultivating the support of the civilian population. These teams would not serve as combat advisors and their assignment in-country would be of finite duration, probably no longer than two to three months.

(S) There are several other security assistance measures that would be especially appropriate now in response to the threat faced in El Salvador.

—We should provide specialized training in border patrol, intelligence collection, and special operations to help develop capabilities for disrupting the flow of arms and improve basic counterinsurgency techniques. (This would be similar to the teams successfully deployed to Honduras earlier this year.)

—We should replace ordnance and other equipment lost or expended in hostile action. An ordnance survey team should be dispatched to El Salvador immediately to determine the specific requirements and we should be prepared to respond with required materiel, especially that which will bolster the GOES armed forces’ quick-reaction capability.

—We should extend the small-scale, military technical assistance team concept to other areas in the public, nonmilitary sector. These civic action teams (of three to four men) could be formed to provide assistance in such areas as public health, road building, agriculture and, thereby, help to counter the rising influence of guerrilla groups in the countryside.

—We could commence covert action planning to expand upon that already authorized by Presidential Finding,⁴ and which provides specifically and selectively for:

—The interdiction of arms supply to and within El Salvador and region-wide.

—The identification, infiltration, and public exposure of the Cuban covert action structure, personnel and plans.

—An expansion of current efforts to infiltrate political and insurgent groups supported by the Cubans.

—A broadening of existing programs in the broadcast and propaganda area, to dramatize Cuban subversion in the region as a whole and in El Salvador in particular.

(S) All of these measures are designed to assure the success of a moderate outcome in El Salvador by containing the insurgency, so that the current government may consolidate its agrarian and other reforms. With the exception of the MTTs for the brigades, all can be provided on a low visibility basis, and even the MTTs could be reduced in size to limit somewhat their visibility. While the deployment of U.S. military personnel to El Salvador is a politically sensitive issue, visibility of U.S. personnel can be successfully minimized by restricting the size of any training teams deployed to six or fewer specialists and by ensuring that such teams avoid any activities which could be construed as combat advice.

(U) Frank Carlucci is aware of the substance of this letter and he joins me in urging your support for these initiatives and their review at an early SCC meeting.⁵

Harold Brown

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 24, Meetings—Muskie/Brown/Brzezinski, 10/80–1/81. Secret. Copies were sent to Muskie and Turner. Brzezinski wrote to Pastor at the top of the page: “RP review, comment for me, and place on SCC agenda. ZB.” An unknown hand dated these comments October 10.
2. Not attached. The intelligence assessment entitled “The Guerrillas in the Salvadoran Equation” is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 86, Sensitive XX: 10/16–31/80.
3. In telegram 6574 from San Salvador, September 23, White reported that he and Cummings had met with the JRG on August 21 “regarding human rights problems and the conditions for leasing six U.S. Army UH–1H helicopters to El Salvador.” White commented: “It seems to me prudent to set the plan in motion quickly to bring the six helicopters to El Salvador,” and added that the JRG’s “drafting committee will soon complete and the Junta will present us reworked conditions that I feel sure we can accept.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 21, El Salvador: 8–11/80) In his October 14 Evening Report to Brzezinski, Pastor noted: “State finally sent guidance to White instructing him to try to persuade the Junta to improve on the ‛Code of Conduct’ decree (punishing armed forces for human rights violations), but also at the same time informing them that helicopter training can proceed.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Subject Files, Box 55, Evening Reports: 4–8/80)
4. See Document 398.
5. In an October 16 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor suggested that, in response to Brown’s recommendation, a SCC was not necessary “at this time.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Subject Files, Box 55, Evening Reports: 4–8/80)