Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

440. Telegram From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State¹

San Salvador, October 19, 1980, 1600Z

7224. Subject: Meeting Between Colonel Garcia, Salvadoran Minister of Defense, and NSC Staffer. Ref: (A) Blacken/White Secure TelCon 10/17, (B) Dion/Blacken Secure TelCon 10/18.²

1. S-Entire text.

2. The uncoordinated and wrongheaded decision of NSC staffer Robert Pastor to meet with Minister of Defense Garcia threatens to undo what we have gained in El Salvador over the last six or seven months. I insist that the meeting be cancelled immediately and I request that the Secretary be informed of my views.

3. The political history of El Salvador over the past year is in large part the struggle of the civilian-military government representing the forces of change to gain control over the military establishment and specifically to force Colonel Garcia to end the violent repression of the security forces against non-combatants. I find it incredible that the first White House audience conceded to a Salvadoran Government official is to the Minister of Defense who, fairly or unfairly, has come to symbolize repression and military continuismo in El Salvador.

4. As is clear from our reporting (SS 7066 and others)³ we are at a tense and delicate stage here with coup plotting from the right taking on dangerous proportions. We are doing our best to move with tact, discretion and skill to diminish this threat and I believe we are making progress but if the Pastor-Garcia meeting takes place it will be interpreted here as Carter administration backing for a move to the right.

5. What progress we have made in El Salvador over the last months can be attributed in large part to the impact of the U.S. Government speaking with one voice. For Garcia and his coup-plotting friends in Miami to gain entry to the White House behind the back of the American Ambassador will seriously undercut my ability to influence events at this critical juncture.

6. I also find it bizarre that Pastor feels entitled to respond to my careful objections with the casual announcement that his decision is irreversible and he will be incommunicado for the weekend. Moreover, I am unimpressed by Pastor’s statement that the meeting will be secret and that he will take a hard line with Garcia.⁴ The objective of the coup plotters in Miami who are behind this initiative is to get Garcia a meeting at the White House. What is said at the meeting is irrelevant. The day after the meeting the word will be all over El Salvador that Garcia bypassed the Embassy and got a hearing at the White House. Garcia’s Washington visit must be cancelled. If, after Garcia returns to El Salvador, there is a considered policy decision to bring Garcia to Washington, then I will of course follow instructions and arrange the meeting.⁵ But to have Pastor decide on his own to give Colonel Garcia a great political boost on the eve of what may be a right wing bid for power is just plain crazy and I have the obligation to say so.⁶

White

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 21, El Salvador: 10/80. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Brzezinski wrote to Pastor at the top of the page: “RP Reply sent? ZB.” Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. No records of the telephone conversations between Blacken and White and Dion and Blacken had been found.
3. In telegram 7066 from San Salvador, October 10, the Embassy relayed reports of a possible right-wing coup timed to “capitalize on the expected (by the right) election of Ronald Reagan November 4.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800485–0286)
4. In his October 20 memorandum to Brzezinski, October 20, Pastor wrote: “I drafted a response to White’s intemperate cable, but was then persuaded by State to delete my expletives. I understand that White’s deputy felt that it would be good idea for me to meet with Garcia as did most people in State.” Pastor also noted White’s concern about sending mixed signals to El Salvador and that Menges “told a group of Salvadoran businessmen that he was a White House adviser and that he eliminated the left without concern about human rights.” Pastor added a handwritten note: “The reply to White should be sent tonight. [See footnote 5, below] One person in State said he thought I was right not to go ahead with the meeting as White would have leaked it.” Brzezinksi wrote at the bottom of the page to Dodson and Pastor: “CD/RP We should drop Menges, if he is a consultant.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 21, El Salvador: 10/80)
5. In telegram 280504 to San Salvador, October 21, the Department wrote to White explaining that decision for Pastor to meet with Garcia “was not uncoordinated, it made by Pastor and Cheek after consultation with Jim Cheek and John Bushnell, and they agreed to consult you.” The Department also noted that “although State and NSC agreed that the meeting could be useful it was cancelled at Pastor’s initiative because he thought a leak concerning it would be unnecessarily harmful at this time.” Finally, the Department instructed White to meet with Garcia and to stress U.S. concern about “right-wing violence and abuses coming from the military” in El Salvador. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880137–1411)
6. In telegram 7321 from San Salvador, October 22, White noted that he would see Garcia “as soon as I believe it prudent to do so,” and commented that “it is the wildest kind of self-deception to think that we can influence importantly events here until after our election outcome is determined.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880137–1415) In telegram 7470 from San Salvador, October 27, White reported that he had met with Garcia and Carranza that morning and “they protested that the military are not connected with rightist terrorism and insisted that everything possible was being done to reduce violence from the right as well as the left.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800515–0163)