438. Telegram From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State1
6248. Subj: (C) Duarte Describes Resolution of Political-Military Crisis.
1. (C-Entire text)
2. Duarte and I had breakfast morning of Sept 9, and I heard his description of how the crisis has been resolved, at least temporarily, that threatened the survival of the Revolutionary Governing Junta (JRG). He gave me a xeroxed copy of the document signed last evening by all five members of the Junta which vests authority over the armed forces in the Junta, names Gutierrez as the link with the Ministry of Defense and ratifies Order #10 of September 1.2 He said Majano resisted signing until two conditions were met: that “injustices” to his followers be rectified and that Colonels Garcia and Carranza be forced out of their posts in the Defense Ministry. The second condition was rejected but the first was accepted in that changes will be made in some of the assignments and the Junta will announce that “injustices” have been rectified. Col. Gutierrez accepted this compromise and both officers signed the document. Before signing, Majano announced that he would resign thereafter. Following a long series of entreaties and much persuasion, he retracted this statement but reserved his right to take future action as he saw fit.
3. I spoke to Duarte about the possibility of sending some of the young officers to the United States for training courses. He was grateful for the offer but said that frankly he was opposed to such a move because some 30 officers are involved and Majano wants all of them to go to the U.S. for three months or so. Duarte said that moving them all out of the country would constitute a golpe, in fact as well as in perception. He felt it was important for most of them to be assigned to posts here where their drive and expertise would make them useful to the political and military aims of the JRG. Duarte said he would have no objection to several of them going abroad but that to lose all 30 would be a serious reverse for the government. I told him that we [Page 1122] were thinking of not more than five or six. (Col. Gutierrez called later to ask if four young officers could be accepted for training—see septel.)3
4. The plan now is for all five JRG members to visit each major cuartel and military unit, to explain the understandings reached and to call upon all officers to subscribe to a new line of action for the armed forces. Duarte believes that this move is critical. All officers of the armed forces must be persuaded to suscribe to a new role for the Salvadoran military that would put them squarely on the side of democratization, human rights and honesty. In order for the military to survive as an institution, repression, excessive violence and corruption must be eliminated from the armed forces. The October 15 manifesto must be made meaningful to the officer corps and each officer must subscribe to its goals and objectives. The Junta as a whole will now appeal to the officer corps to assume the obligations in the October 15 proclamation, to bring an end to official violence and to root out corruption in the armed services.
5. Duarte expressed deep reservations as to whether Majano will participate in this endeavor even though Majano is totally identified with the course of action proposed. He is stubborn and unpredictable, almost innately unsuited to cooperating in a team effort, and sufficiently opportunistic to be reluctant to over-identify with a Junta that may not last. If Majano backs out or if the officer corps does not suscribe to the new line policy proposed, the Junta will convoke a general assembly of officers (“congreso military”) and present the issue squarely: subscribe to the philosophy of democratization or the civilian members of the Junta will resign. Clearly this will bring on a new crisis with unpredictable consequences. That the very survival of the military as an institution is at stake must be made clear to the officer corps. It will be impossible for civilians, or at least for the PDC, to remain in a government backed by undisciplined, corrupt and violent military forces. The excesses of some elements of the military must be ended or the government cannot survive.
6. Duarte made it very clear that he was prepared to press this issue to a resolution even if a crisis should produce a right-wing regime of conservative military officers with a fig-leaf representation of rightists businessmen. That such a regime, a reincarnation of the Romero gang, would have no chance of survival in a radicalized country is a threat he is prepared to face. Thus the compromise which has ended the latest crisis in the JRG may prove a temporary respite because the underlying issue—who will control the armed forces and to what end—has still not been decided. The next several weeks will be as critical in [Page 1123] El Salvador as October 1979 when the first steps were taken on the road toward basic social, economic and political change. That journey must be completed.
7. I am meeting with Col. Majano this evening and Col. Gutierrez tomorrow morning to explain the importance of their participating wholeheartedly in this new endeavor to fulfill the promises of the October 15 declaration.4
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800430–0219. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Telegram 237975 to San Salvador, September 6, instructed White to support the imposition of civilian control of the Salvadoran military. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 21, El Salvador: 8–11/80)↩
- Telegram 6257 from San Salvador, September 10, included an informal translation of the decree. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 21, El Salvador: 8–9/80)↩
- Not further identified.↩
- In telegram 6284 from San Salvador, September 10, White reported on his September 9 meeting with Majano and his September 10 meeting with Gutierrez, writing in summary: “The Revolutionary Governing Junta (JRG) has survived another great crisis and our hopes for a moderate outcome in El Salvador have been reinforced, not by the crisis itself, which only evidences the internal strains within the JRG, but by the decisive performance of the civilians in the Junta.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800435–0984)↩