Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

436. Telegram From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State¹

San Salvador, September 4, 1980, 1945Z

6122. Subj: JRG Member Duarte on Decisive Juncture for GOES.

1. (C-Entire text)

2. Summary: The three civilian members of the Revolutionary Governing Junta (JRG) have despatched a telegram to all headquarters and officers of the Salvadoran armed forces in effect conditioning continued civilian participation in the Junta on military acceptance of the principle that the Junta is the supreme political authority of the nation and that the Defense Ministry will clear its orders with the Junta hereafter. Cols. Majano and Gutierrez did not sign the telgram; Majano objects to its reaffirmation of order number 10 shifting his supporters out of command positions; Gutierrez has agreed to civilian rule only if a majority of his fellow officers signify their acceptance of the Junta’s supreme authority. A poll of the armed forces may be taking place; a general assembly of officers may be called to discuss this unprecedented civilian approach to the officer corps and its implications. End summary.

3. I met morning of Sept 4 at breakfast with JRG member Napoleon Duarte, who briefed me on developments of the last few days. The crisis is far from over. The three civilian members of the Junta recognize that this is a decisive juncture in the democratization process and that they must stand firm against all military factions which would disrupt the civlian/military cooperation that is the only solution to the country’s problems. The three civilian members of the Junta will insist that power be vested in the Junta once and for all.

4. To this end the civilians drafted a decree that embodied three points:

(A) That all general orders issued by the Ministry of Defense must receive prior approval of the JRG acting in its capacity as Commander in Chief of the armed forces.

(B) That the Junta appoints Col. Jaime Abdul Gutierrez as the Junta member who will exercise communication, coordination and control over the Ministry of Defense, and

(C) Ratifies General Order No. 10. (The order issued by Gutierrez at the instance of Garcia and Carranza transferring out of positions of power many of the supporters of Col. Majano.)

Col. Gutierrez refused to sign this decree because he objected to provision (A) which he believes diminishes his authority. He stated, however, that if his fellow officers support it he will agree. Gutierrez accepted points (B) and (C). Col. Majano refused to sign because he believes Order No. 10 to be politically motivated and prejudicial to the good order of the armed forces. Majano specifically accepts points (A) and (B).

5. The three civilian JRG members visited the Santa Ana military headquarters, i.e. a key Majanista unit, the evening of Sept 3 and called for its support of this decision. At 1:00 a.m. Sept 4 a telegram was dispatched to all military units in the country asking for full support of all officers behind a reaffirmation of the constitution, the armed forces proclamation of October 15th, the agreement of November 9 between the PDC and armed forces and a decision to vest all decision-making power, military and civilian, in the hands of the Junta as a whole. The telegram says that only by this means can parochialism be overcome within all sections of the government and threats to the unity of the reformist movement be overcome. Translation of the cable follows by septel.² Duarte stated that while the cable does not make threats, refusal of a majority of the officer corps to support this measure will result in the resignation of the three civilian members of the government with all that their departure would imply.

6. Duarte believes that a majority of the officer corps can be secured in favor of the decision embodied in the resolution above and that Col. Gutierrez will accept such an outcome. He is afraid that Col. Majano will not go along, however, and will thereupon resign from the Junta. If Majano resigns, the contingency plan is to dissolve the Junta and make Duarte President of the republic. At this juncture, all Cabinet Ministers will be asked to resign and a new Cabinet will be appointed by Duarte to implement the reforms in an atmosphere of discipline and professionalism and with clear civilian control over the military establishment.

7. Comment: Duarte is obviously “going for broke” and he believes that the survival of the military as an institution will demand that a majority of the officer corps accept civilian control. He recognizes that the Majano faction, perhaps some fifteen percent of all officers, will reject the proposal and may eventually depart. By the same token, the Carranza faction, perhaps including Col. Garcia, will also reject civilian rule but will probably not resign. They will have to recognize that a disciplined military establishment rules out the kind of repression they have practiced with so much damage to the reputation of the JRG. These conservative officers can expect to be transferred out of positions of authority unless their conduct changes. I agreed with Duarte that the civilian members of the Junta must act now to take control of the entire government and end the “parallel command structure” that has existed since October 15th. I cautioned him that my approval was tentative at this stage pending consultations with the Department but that I personally could see no alternative course of action that would not produce even worse consequences. Over the next months far worse would be Majano’s angry departure in the face of what will be seen abroad, and understood here, as a rightwing coup. The civilians could not continue as a facade for such a sharp shift to the right and eventual reversal of all the progressive measures instituted so far. If Duarte succeeds we will have a real government with authority over military as well as civilian matters.³

White

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800421–1088. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Bogotá, Caracas, Guatemala City, Lima, Managua, Mexico City, Panama City, San José, Tegucigalpa, USCINCSO Quarry Heights, and DIA.
2. Telegram 6127 from San Salvador, September 4, included the text of the telegram sent to the Salvadoran military commanders on September 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800422–0071)
3. In his September 5 Evening Report to Brzezinski, Pastor noted: “The junta is almost through its worst crisis, stronger than ever. After Gutierrez ordered the reassignment of Majano’s key supporters, Majano, who represents the progressive wing of the armed forces, retreated to his barracks, and a fight appeared imminent. Duarte, the leader of the Christian Democrats, formulated a proposal, which would unequivocally subordinate the military to the junta, and although both Majano and Gutierrez opposed the proposal, Duarte went over their heads and polled all the military officers. Unbelievably, 80% supported Duarte. Gutierrez has now accepted the proposal, and if Majano buys it, it will represent a dramatic breakthrough in El Salvador. White has done a superb job.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Subject Files, Box 55, Evening Reports: 4–8/80)