435. Telegram From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State1
5810. Subj: (S) Ambassador and COMUSMILGP Presentation of Helicopter Proposal to JRG and High Command, August 21. Refs A) State 210613 B) San Salvador 4575 C) COMUSMILGP ES 282100Z May (State Cite 3723) D) COMUSMILGP ES 081630Z July IP (State Cite 4680).2
1. (S-Entire text)
2. Summary. In a meeting with the JRG and the High Command August 21 the Ambassador and COMUSMILGP presented the USG offer to lease six helicopters to the GOES. The terms of the U.S. offer provoked some mixed reactions. The two month period during which progress in human rights would be measured was an especially difficult pill for the GOES. The goals of the U.S. proposals were lauded; the appearance that the GOES would be succumbing to USG dictates was deplored. Nevertheless, the meeting was generally positive and we expect a positive response to our offer. End summary.
3. The Ambassador, COMUSMILGP, and PolOff met August 21 with the entire JRG and the members of the High Command. The purpose of the meeting was to explain to the GOES the USG proposal for the lease of six helicopters to El Salvador.
4. JRG member Duarte opened the meeting, indicating simply that the Ambassador had requested it in order to discuss a military related subject. He turned it over to the U.S. representatives for their presentation.
5. In his initial remarks the Ambassador summarized the state of US–GOES relations complimenting the Junta and the military for their role in insuring that the general strike failed and stating his conviction that international opinion was changing in a positive fashion both for the government and for US policy. He indicated continuing U.S. support for the JRG and its policies of carrying out reforms and democratization. The Ambassador also noted the serious problems created in [Page 1112] that relationship by the continuing violence of the extremist right which is perceived internationally to be—and often actually is—condoned by elements within the military. The failure of the GOES to put an end to that violence is the principal obstacle to greater cooperation between the two governments.
6. COMUSMILGP followed by reading a statement which contained the USG offer to provide the helicopters, training and spare parts. His statement also contained the points made in ref A and the five USG conditions to the lease of the aircraft.3 He continued by suggesting a series of measures which the GOES could undertake and which would serve simultaneously as the means to limit violence and the means to measure the success of the GOES in meeting the five U.S. conditions. COMUSMILGP concluded by reading the timetable for implementation of the lease (see ref A). A document containing COMUSMILGP’s three statements, his suggested code of conduct and his assessment of the MOD and public security (see refs C and D) was given to each official present.
7. Duarte responded to the U.S. proposal. He indicated that in the U.S. document there are some good ideas on human rights; he also said that he saw no problem working with the U.S. to solve the human rights problem. However, some of the proposals made were unacceptable. The “trial period” of 60 days during which the U.S. would evaluate progress made was particularly galling. Duarte claimed that the U.S. was saying that only “if you are good boys will the helicopters be provided.”
8. Duarte continued by saying that “abuses of authority” existed and were destroying some of the JRG’s work. He said that the JRG and the High Command were currently working on improving the human rights picture in El Salvador. U.S. should not doubt that the GOES would comply with its part of the agreement. (Comment: In essence, Duarte was complaining not so much about the conditions themselves as the USG insistence on measuring performance over a sixty-day period. End comment.)
9. The Ambassador then indicated that he did not think that the two positions were that far apart. He repeated the five conditions and pointed out that those were the only requirements that came from Washington. (Duarte had taken issue with one of COMUSMILGP’s recommendations as if it also had been a condition.) The Ambassador noted the private nature of the accord between the two governments. He emphasized the need for progress in the five areas cited and said [Page 1113] that in his opinion the JRG and MOD were already committed to all of points listed but that in some of the areas progress was imperceptible.
10. Duarte responded by saying that he saw a political problem with the fourth condition, that one which requires that the High Command deal toughly with extreme right wing elements including those in the military. He said it was obvious who this referred to—the D’Aubuisson sort. He went on to say that no act of extremist violence, whether of the right or the left, should be tolerated. He seemed, then, to agree with the basis of the fourth point and, apart from the political problem that he saw with that one, he voiced no objections. (Comment: This was a deliberate tactic on Duarte’s part to point up the problem of right wing extremism in the military. End comment.
11. JRG member Morales Ehrlich asked whether the five conditions would be labelled as conditions when the proposal reached Congress. In response the Ambassador indicated that the JRG’s successes in the five areas would be emphasized over the conditional aspect of the agreement. What we want, he said, is to have a factual response to criticism when we agree to provide the helicopters.
12. Col. Majano spoke up saying that he saw Duarte’s preoccupation as centering around the political repercussions of the agreement. That problem could be obviated if this were to be a private, “gentlemen’s agreement.” Like Morales Ehrlich, however, he was concerned that the presentation before Congress would cite the conditions and acknowledge that the GOES had acceded to them. On the whole, however, Majano was favorable toward the proposal, saying, in effect, that he was in agreement with the goals and measures listed in the document.
13. Defense Minister Garcia had a different reaction. He claimed that while the human rights goals in the U.S. document were good ones Salvadoran “idiosyncracies” were not being taken into account. (By “idiosyncracy” Garcia means that all abuses of authority by the military are handled quietly and “in house”.) He agreed that there have been abuses but didn’t think it a good idea to “proclaim” the fact. He seemed to think that there was no point in it. Those that looked upon the JRG as repressive and the left as progressive, who cited as “casualties” the army’s dead but saw the dead on the left as “assassinated” were already convinced and the U.S. proposed measures would do little to change that.
14. Garcia personally vouched for the efforts that are being made by those present (i.e., the JRG and the High Command) on behalf of human rights. He claimed that the U.S. recommendations are being carried out. However, it was one thing to carry out these things voluntarily and another to have them enforced by another country. The country’s dignity was offended and while they—the JRG and High Command—might be able to overlook the offense the rest of the country might not.
[Page 1114]15. At this point the Ambassador pointed out that some progress has been made in human rights in El Salvador. However, the reality is that much more needs to be done. Concentrating their efforts on the five areas mentioned would demonstrate to the U.S. that the government was serious about bringing violations under control. He pointed out that while the military is entitled to its special idiosyncracies, putting the JRG into international disrepute by condoning acts of violence seemed extreme.
16. Col. Gutierrez continued the conversation by saying that they understood the motives for the conditions. All of the proposals, he said, “are things which we should be doing”. He especially liked the COMUSMILGP’s code of conduct. But Gutierrez went on to say that he would like to consult with his officer corps. The risk of misinformation and misinterpretation is great, he said, and so before agreeing to the proposal he would like to inform them and ask for their reactions.
17. Gutierrez ended by saying that they (the GOES) would have much preferred a “more frank assistance” and “a vote of confidence in them by the U.S.”
18. Col. Vides Casanova asked why the U.S. was so insistent on dealing toughly with the right extremists and not with those of the left. He indicated that some people of the right have done more to resolve the country’s problems since the October coup than those on the left.
19. The Ambassador told Col. Vides that there was a misunderstanding. Liberty of expression is not at issue; people should have the right to think in any way they choose and to act within the law. What they do not have a right to do is to commit acts of terrorist violence. For example, he asked when the last time was that an ORDEN militant was punished. No one came up with an answer.
20. Duarte then used the occasion to do some straight talking to the military. He said that what was under discussion were those individuals who are part of the military and who are committing terrorist acts. He thought that it was understood by the High Command that they should put a stop to these unjust, violent acts.
21. Duarte went on to make four points. He said Col. Gutierrez’ idea of consulting the officers was a good one. That discussions were necessary to develop the means to make the “points”—the U.S. conditions—realizable. He suggested a public act in El Salvador with a U.S. General present to announce the agreement. Finally, he said that he still saw a danger in the interpretation of the agreement. He said that this conditional assistance, with its suggestion of U.S. interference in the internal affairs of another country, could be negative for both the U.S. and El Salvador.
[Page 1115]22. Duarte summarized. Two things were necessary: measures to put the proposals into practice and measures to deal with the political problems faced by both governments.
23. Col. Majano pointed out that in October 1979 the military had publicly stated that there were faults in its own institution. Majano was in effect responding to MOD Garcia and to the need to reform the military as stated in the October 15 revolution. Any member of the armed forces who has unauthorized dealings with extremist groups of either the right or left should be disciplined, said Majano. The problem is one of balance (“Equilibrio”).
24. Majano made a second point. Everything presented he viewed as “correct” but he noted that the public presentation could be a problem. He viewed the crucial question as how to solve Washington’s problems while at the same time not giving the appearance that El Salvador succumbed to a political set of conditions.
25. Air Force Col. Bustillos reflected on the offer and compared it with a previous U.S. offer of 5.7 million dollars of military assistance. The international reaction, he said, was very bad. The reaction to the helicopter agreement would be as bad or worse and would provoke increased assistance to the left from Cuba or the Soviet Union. Implicit in Bustillo statement was the view that the U.S. was giving little and demanding a lot.
26. Duarte ended the meeting by saying that Bustillos’ thesis was valid but that it was less important now than it was two or three months ago. In the interim the JRG and the armed forces have gained the backing of the people. Whatever aid the left receives will be of little use to them as they have lost the people’s support.
27. Duarte continued by saying that the problem that the U.S. sees is that the process of democratization and program of reforms will stop short of its goals. He sympathized with the U.S. concern. He thought that to ensure that those goals are realized the military should rededicate itself to the political definition of October 1979. He said that political conscience must be developed throughout the armed forces. The High Command may see things clearly but clear signals must be sent to all elements of the military.
28. Comment: While we did everything we could to soften the presentation, there was no way to disguise that the deal consisted of helicopters in exchange for a measurably improved performance in determined areas over a fixed time span. Duarte has no real objection to this and in fact assured me later that the whole problem would be worked out satisfactorily. Duarte led off as he did in order to preclude a stronger reaction from the conservative members of the High Command.
[Page 1116]29. The real danger here is that as the military discuss our proposal the whole matter will become public and interpreted in such a way that it will appear that the United States is imposing conditions and affronting the sovereignty of El Salvador. On the other hand, at this point just about any meeting on any subject that involves the entire military will probably benefit our overall policy. It is past time that progressive and conservative officers met on a subject that does not have directly to do with causes of internal dissension and will provide the opportunity for a full airing of views. Our hope, of course, would be that this would result in some reconciliation between the various factions.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880137–1480. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to Bogotá, Caracas, Guatemala City, Managua, Mexico City, Panama City, San José, Tegucigalpa, USCINSCO Quarry Heights, and the Secretary of Defense.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 434. In telegram 4575 from San Salvador, July 3, White provided further explanation of his recommendation to provide six helicopters to the Salvadorans. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800320–0746) References C and D had not been found.↩
- See Tab A, Document 434.↩