Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

414. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 21, 1980

SUBJECT

• El Salvador—Update (S)

El Salvador. The Junta continues to feel strong pressures from the extremes, while we are trying to dampen support for it. Jim Cheek, who is substituting as our Ambassador in El Salvador, is meeting with the Archbishop today. Yesterday, he met with Major D’Aubuisson, former Vice Director of Intelligence under Romero, and apparently the chosen candidate of the extreme right. With money provided by the 14 families, D’Aubuisson has waged a sophisticated, well-financed, anti-Communist, anti-Junta television campaign. He met with Cheek, seeking the slightest indication of U.S. support for a coup. Cheek did his best to dissuade him.² (S)

The Junta remains deeply divided, and the announcement of U.S. military assistance continues to cause both sides problems.³ (S)

International. Luers continues to try to pry an answer out of President Herrera, but everyone has been too busy with the President’s return to meet with him. In addition, the entire Copei government is going into a 2-day closed door session to evaluate the government’s activities over the past year. They are moving so slowly that it is driving us nuts, but Bowdler and I still believe that we ought to delay sending in the advance team until we have some indication of Herrera’s views.⁴ We are particularly hesitating because of the President’s comments on the SCC meetings, that without Venezuelan and other support, our efforts will be counterproductive.⁵ (S)

I met last night with the Colombia military Chief of Staff, after General Jones met with him, and we both reiterated our hope that he will convey a message directly to President Turbay that some official Colombian military presence in El Salvador is essential if we are to keep the extremists from seizing power. He had planned to stop in Miami for a day, but after our conversation he promised to fly directly back to Bogota on Thursday⁶ to convey the message to the President. We have alerted our Ambassador to follow up immediately. (S)

I met with Lewis and Jordan today, and urged Lewis to tell Torrijos that we shouldn’t wait until Tito dies before we meet. I also explained to Lewis, who I believe will be a critical interlocutor, and who I hope will replace Selamin as Torrijos’ adviser on El Salvador that Torrijos’ initial response to our message was disturbing. I suggested that he repeat the points we have asked Ambler to make: That Torrijos should not touch base with the Nicaraguans or the Cubans and not try to unite the Left; he should wait until we get down there. Lewis conveyed these points to Torrijos, who agreed to see us as soon as we get down there (this weekend). Torrijos also said that he did not intend to involve the Cubans, but he asked the Nicaraguans to “locate” several Leftist leaders. Torrijos said that the Left is so disorganized that it is difficult even to find them. I will work on a memo this evening, suggesting the strategy we should take in our conversation with Torrijos.⁷ (S)

Domestic. Bob White went up for confirmation hearings for the fourth time today, and the Foreign Relations Committee voted it out, 8 to 2. There is still a strong possibility that Helms will try to prevent White’s nomination from going to the Floor for about 10 days. In the meantime, a Helms aide, Carbaugh, is reportedly going down to El Salvador to try to get the government to PNG White before his arrival. I recommend that you call Senator Byrd and urge him to bring White’s nomination to the Senate Floor as soon as possible.⁸ (S)

SCC. I believe a SCC meeting next Monday would be useful, as we expect a response from the Venezuelans by then, and as we should have something to work on from the task force (economic package) and from the trip to Panama.⁹ (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo at Tab I in order to convey one of the decisions of the SCC to the Treasury Department.¹⁰ (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 32, Meetings—SCC 282: 2/28/80. Secret. Sent for action. An unknown hand wrote “urgent” at the top of the page. Brzezinski wrote to Denend at the top of the page: “LD—Remind me to call Mon. ZB.” This is presumably in reference to Aaron’s suggestion that Brzezinski call Miller; see footnote 8 below.
2. In telegram 1257 from San Salvador, February 20, Cheek reported that D’Aubuisson had given an “impassioned plea for us to give up on the Christian Democrats and to support an all military JRG with a Cabinet of ‛independents’ drawn from the right.” Cheek indicated that he and other Embassy officials had replied “with a firm reiteration of current US policy supporting the JRG and warning against action from the far right.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800090–0368)
3. See footnote 5, Document 412.
4. Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote “OK” in the margin.
5. See Document 413.
6. February 21.
7. In a subsequent February 21 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor proposed a strategy to “get Torrijos to help the Junta gain time to implement real reforms.” Brzezinski approved the overall approach, but noted that the case for the Junta would need to be more specific to be convincing, and he warned against putting Torrijos off. Aaron commented that the plan was “not very realistic” and noted: “let’s not permit this to deflect us from action in El Salvador.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 20, El Salvador: 2/12–24/80) In a February 26 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor referred to a press report, based on an official Panamanian source that the United States was promoting a right wing coup in El Salvador. Pastor stated that either Torrijos would have to give “an explicit and public denial” or Moss “should tell Torrijos that we can no longer communicate with him because he does not respect the confidentiality of our exchanges.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 21, El Salvador: 2/25–29/80)
8. An unknown hand drew a line in the margin next to this sentence and wrote “Madeleine concurs,” referring to Albright. Another unknown hand wrote below: “YES!”
9. Brzezinski wrote in response to this sentence: “Good idea. White should be there.” For the summary of conclusions of the February 27 SCC meeting, see Document 419.
10. Aaron added the following at the bottom of the page: “It’s an odd thing to sign; shouldn’t you just call Miller? DA.” Attached but not printed at Tab I, is an undated, unsigned memorandum from Brzezinski to Miller noting Carter’s approval of the January 28 SCC recommendation to prioritize FMS financing for Honduras and El Salvador. Brzezinski signed a copy of the memorandum dated February 22. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Freedom of Information/Legal, Kimmitt, Arms Transfers/Country File, Box 18, El Salvador, 1–3/80)