Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

418. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 26, 1980

SUBJECT

• A Strategy for the Right (U)

I had two conversations on Thursday² and Friday with moderate leaders from El Salvador and Guatemala, which served to reinforce a strong feeling that I have, and which Bill Bowdler and the CIA share: the most immediate threat to US interests in Central America comes from the right, not the left, and that we have barely begun to utilize the influence we have with the right to persuade them to change their approach before it’s too late. If the right seizes power in El Salvador, there will be no way for us to prevent a bloodbath of unbelievable proportions (people there are talking about the need to kill 150,000 people) and ultimately a Communist victory. We must prevent the right from seizing power. In this memo, let me provide the reasons why I reached this conclusion, and then a strategy for dealing with this threat. (S)

Background

The violence of the left in El Salvador and Guatemala is either targeted on the military or it’s infantile (e.g. occupations). The violence from the right is targeted on the middle, like Mario Zamora of the PDC³ and I fear they may begin aiming for our people, although they will try to blame it on the left. Jim Cheek believes the right has become frantic because they fear that the Junta may finally begin implementing real reforms. In the past week, they have raised the level of violence and assassinations to an unprecedented level, and they tried to buy the army in order to promote a coup. It was only the firm message that we would withdraw all US support if they launched a coup that apparently side-tracked it. The right has not given up; they are waiting for another opportunity. (S)

A young Christian Democrat and businessman ([less than 1 line not declassified] from Guatemala) with superb contacts throughout the military came by for a long talk last Friday. He was one of the closest aides to the former President Laugerud and admitted that he was charged by Laugerud to make sure that Lucas won the last Presidential election, even though he lost. The irony, he said, was that he and Laugerud, thought that Lucas would be the most reasonable, moderate, and effective of the three candidates. In fact, he has proven to be unreasonable, stupid, volatile, and has surrounded himself with narrow reactionary brutal sycophants. Lucas himself gave the order for the police to assault the Spanish Embassy. (This, as well as most of his analysis, is confirmed [less than 1 line not declassified]). He said that Lucas is totally incapable of understanding the need to undertake reforms, and he despairs of Guatemala’s future. He believes the only hope is to replace Lucas or the people closest to him. (S)

He said, however, that the main reason he asked [less than 1 line not declassified] to see me was because he was confused about US policy because of our new Ambassador, Frank Ortiz. He said that he personally had been trying to persuade the Guatemalan Army Chief of Staff Rene Mendoza to accept the importance of change, and then in one conversation, Ortiz transmitted a different message to him. When I restated our policy to Guatemala, he was reassured, but left with a second recommendation: that we replace Ortiz. (S)

A Strategy

The right in Central America are driven by ideology and economic interest. An inequality in wealth is perhaps most marked in the region, and the rich appear unwilling to change even a little. The Junta estimates that if they only expropriate farms larger than 1200 acres, they will affect only 310 families, but 70% of the cultivable land. These are the families of the right, who are seeking a coup. They have found nothing but US support in the past, particularly when they scream “Communist.” Now, we don’t seem to be responding to their “red cape,” and they are growing frantic. Still, according to most people, they feel that there are sympathetic ears in the Administration (principally the Pentagon and you) and outside (business, in Congress, Republicans) and that eventually that side will come to their rescue. They also believe that Afghanistan and cold war-like tensions mean that the probability of an early rescue operation has increased dramatically. (S)

We must disabuse them of this illusion quickly. I strongly recommend that we bring up a half dozen civilian and military leaders from the Salvadoran right to Washington for a set of briefings by Vance, JCS, and you. Then, for extra emphasis, we should have another briefing in the Pentagon. We should also brief a wide range of leaders in Congress, the business community, and in the Republican party who they might seek out on their own. As long as the Junta is in power, we remain in a strong political position, domestically and internationally, and I don’t think we will have any trouble persuading any conservative Americans (short of total ideologues) of the correctness of our position. To the extent that we use these people on the Salvadorans before the Salvadorans try to use them on us, we will be serving two purposes: conveying a very strong message on the need to change to the Salvadoran oligarchy, a message all the more credible because it is being delivered by “people who understand the Communist challenge,” and secondly, we will be protecting our political ass by explaining to potential critics that we have a policy, which makes sense and which they ought to support now. (S)

I have tried this proposal out on Bowdler, Cheek and SOUTHCOM General Nutting, and all support it. (S)

RECOMMEND

If you approve, I will get in touch with JCS and ask whether they’d be willing to do it. If they are, I will try to set up a meeting for Thursday or Friday. I expect it would take one hour of your time, an additional hour for the Pentagon, and some time for fuller briefings by State. I will prepare talking points. Essentially, you will tell them that the only way to prevail over Communism is for them to support the Junta and reforms. They cannot count on us sending in the monies to save their coffee plantations.⁴ (S)

If this session works well, we will set up a similar session with the Guatemalan right.⁵ (S)

The Guatemalan Foreign Minister has requested a meeting with you on March 3 or 4. He is one of the small-minded reactionaries closest to Lucas. Although he is a bore, I believe it would be useful for you to tell him the need for change and the need for Guatemala to support the Salvador Junta and to use its influence to prevent a coup. Therefore, I recommend that you see him on March 3 or 4.⁶

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, Serial Xs—2/1/80–4/15/80. Secret. Sent for action. Pastor did not initial the memorandum. Copies were sent to Aaron and Owen. An unknown hand wrote “URGENT” at the top of the page and added “El Salvador” to the subject line.
2. February 21.
3. See footnote 2, Document 417.
4. Brzezinski neither approved or disapproved of this recommendation. Aaron placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin of this paragraph and drew a line from it to the bottom margin and noted: “ZB—I have misgivings about this. It will look like we are plotting with them = not trying to correct them. Still I have no better alternative. I generally agree with Bob’s analysis of the short run problem. But the longer range (6 week) problem is the left & Cuba. DA.” An unknown hand dated Aaron’s comments February 27.
5. Brzezinski neither approved or disapproved of this recommendation.
6. Brzezinski neither approved or disapproved of this recommendation.