Office of the Historian

413. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1

Washington, February 16, 1980

SUBJECT

  • SCC Meeting on El Salvador and Honduras, February 15, 1980 (C)

I chaired a very productive SCC meeting to discuss US policy to El Salvador and Honduras.2 We reached complete agreement on the objectives and remarkable unanimity on the tactics, instruments and resources we will use to pursue these objectives. (S)

Since the January 28 SCC meeting,3 we have been working hard to build multilateral support for the Junta. State has been in touch with [Page 1047] the Vatican and I sent a message to the Pope, who then called Salvador’s Archbishop Romero to Rome for talks. Romero has been partial to the left, and the Pope is trying to encourage him to take a more balanced and peaceful approach.4 (S)

Your letters to the heads of state in the region were extremely helpful.5 In Caracas, your letter stimulated President Herrera to overcome his own reservations and his government’s bureaucratic problems; he immediately sent a military mission to El Salvador. We expect he will send a second mission unless the domestic fallout from a Washington Post article proves so serious that he decides to delay it.6 Colombian President Turbay was reluctant to consider helping the Junta until he received your letter; now he has expressed enthusiasm with the idea. The Ecuadoreans promised to follow the issue closely, and we have not yet heard from the Peruvian President. (S)

General Torrijos immediately sent a message through Gabriel Lewis that he wants to help, and he wants to set up a meeting between Bowdler and Pastor and leftist groups from El Salvador. Cy and I feel that Torrijos has given us the opportunity we need to try to neutralize the extreme left and extreme right so as to bring peace long enough to El Salvador to give the Junta a chance to implement its reforms. (Torrijos has relatively greater influence over the left, and we have greater influence with the right.) We have informed Torrijos that we are prepared to send Bill Bowdler and Bob Pastor down to meet with him to explore a way to carry out this goal of giving the Junta time to implement its reforms. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Summary of Conclusions.7 (U)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 109, SCC 274, 2/15/80, El Salvador. Secret. Sent for action. Carter wrote at the top of the page: “Zbig—a) Without active involvement of Venezuela & others, our own efforts will likely be counterproductive. b) Does the press attend SCC meetings? J.C.” McMahon’s February 19 memorandum for record is in Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 11: (SCC) Central America.↩
  2. See Document 412.↩
  3. See Document 406.↩
  4. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph: “It didn’t work.”↩
  5. See footnote 5, Document 408.↩
  6. See footnote 5, Document 412. In the left-hand margin, Carter drew an arrow to this sentence.↩
  7. Carter indicated his approval, initialed, and wrote: “Subject to above comment.” The Summary of Conclusions is attached but not printed.↩