Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

412. Minutes of a Special Coordination Committee (Intelligence) Meeting¹

Washington, February 15, 1980, 4:25–5:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• US Policy to El Salvador and Honduras

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
  • William Bowdler, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
  • Robert White, US Ambassador to El Salvador

• OSD

  • Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
  • Frank Kramer, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Security Affairs

• OMB

  • John White
  • Randy Jayne, Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs

• JCS

  • General David Jones

• DCI

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • John McMahon, Deputy Director for Operations

• AID

  • Douglas Bennett

• Justice

  • Ken Bass, Office of Legal Counsel

• White House

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Henry Owen

• NSC

  • Robert Pastor

Minutes

Objectives in El Salvador

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting by reviewing the objectives of the United States in El Salvador. He said that he thought there was agreement on the objectives, but that it would be useful to review them in order that we send the clearest of messages. He said there were four objectives:

(1) To bolster the Junta by ourselves and with multilateral support. (S)

(2) Tactically, to try to split the left and neutralize the right. With regard to those who are supporting the left, we have been in touch with a number of individuals, including Archbishop Romero. Dr. Brzezinski said that he himself had personally conveyed a message to the Pope to try to seek his support with regard to Archbishop Romero. (S)

(3) To deter the right from staging a coup, and to use whatever leverage we have to prevent them from undertaking any measures which would destabilize the reform program of the Junta. (S)

(4) To try to persuade the military to submit to rule of law under the Junta in order to try to give the Junta the time and opportunity to implement its reforms. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether there was any disagreement with these objectives, and there was none. (Claytor said O.K.) (U)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we should move immediately to questions of implementing these objectives, and he urged the group to turn to the papers which were prepared by the task force, and to recommend decisions.² He suggested that we first consider the paper on Security Assistance to El Salvador. (S)

Security Assistance to El Salvador

Deputy Secretary Claytor said that we had just received word from the Salvadorean Junta that we could send our military training teams (MTTs) in as soon as possible.³ The question then is how to finance them. (S)

Mr. Kramer said that of the $7.5 million of additional materiel assistance, which we need for El Salvador, $6.3 million is for helicopters, and we could provide them on a no-cost lease to El Salvador so that they would not need any FMS credit for them. Therefore, we will only need $1.2 million of FMS credits, and these could be reprogrammed without any problem. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether there were any problems in sending the MTTs in at this point, and Amb White asked how many people do we envisage sending in right now. (S)

Deputy Secretary Christopher also asked Ambassador Bowdler to comment on the possible Venezuelan reaction. Ambassador Bowdler said that we had received the green light from the Junta, but the question is whether to go in before the Venezuelans have their act together. He said Ambassador Luers suggested that we wait until President Herrera returns from the Middle East on Sunday.⁴ He anticipates that the Cardozo group will go on Tuesday or Wednesday, unless the Karen DeYoung article, which has had a terrible press play in Venezuela and is causing the government very difficult political problems, makes it impossible for them to send it.⁵ Ambassador Bowdler said that we could send in an advance party of about 3 or 4, and then send the rest in after 10 days. (S)

Dr Brzezinski said, then in that case, we should wait 3 days and then send in the 3 individuals of the advance team. There would be no sense to our creating any additional problems for the Venezuelans just to be in there a few days sooner. (S)

Deputy Secretary Claytor said that we should go in right away. The Salvadoreans asked us to go in as soon as possible, and we should go now. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we should wait for the Venezuelans to go in ahead of us, but perhaps we should set a deadline for the remainder of the teams, and make this clear to the Venezuelans so as to encourage them to get in there before the deadline. (S)

Ambassador Bowdler concurred that he didn’t think there would be any problem for the Venezuelans if we sent the three advance people in first. The only question is the other 33 members. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski summarized by saying that we should send the three members of the advance team in soon after informing the Venezuelans, and tell the Venezuelans that we want to send the remainder in within ten days. Then we could see if they have any objections to that. (S)

Bass expressed concern that unless the MTTs are clearly instructed, it is possible that they may trigger the War Powers procedures. For example, if the MTTs fire, this might trigger the War Powers procedures. He asked that Justice be involved in drafting the guidelines for the MTTS. (S)

Deputy Secretary Christopher said that this is the first that he has heard of this method of no-cost leasing. He asked whether DOD feels that the helicopters are necessary for the interdiction effort. (S)

General Jones said that the helicopters are needed in order to increase their mobility to detect infiltration and to move quickly in response to such infiltration. (S)

Mr. Kramer said that the Salvadoreans could use helicopters and they have the pilots right now to man them. Mr. Christopher said that the issues paper suggests that a study is needed about whether the helicopters could be used effectively, and he suggested doing that first. (S)

Mr. Claytor said that we have already been waiting too long, and a study will only delay it. (U)

Deputy Secretary Christopher asked directly whether a study is needed in order to determine the best means for interdicting the flow of arms and guerrillas into El Salvador. Or could a study be done in conjunction with sending the helicopters? (S)

General Jones said that the helicopters alone will not stop the infiltration, but they will help. A study could be done in conjunction with sending in the helicopters. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether OMB had any problems in DOD’s reprogramming $1.2M of FMS, and Mr. White said that there were no problems. (S)

US Policy Objectives to Honduras

Dr. Brzezinski then turned to Honduras, and pointed out that our policy objectives there were similar to those in El Salvador. He said we have three basic objectives:

(1) To hold the government to its commitment to hold free elections on April 20;

(2) To help the government develop an intelligence and interdiction capability to prevent its being used as a conduit for arms and guerrillas to El Salvador; and

(3) To assist the government to prevent the establishment of a guerrilla infrastructure there. (S)

There were no objections to that statement. (U)

Security Assistance to Honduras

Dr. Brzezinski then turned to the recommendations. Mr. Kramer said that DOD would not have any problems in reprogramming $200,000 IMET for border surveillance MTTs, and DOD could also provide helicopters on the same no-cost leasing basis, although he suggested that GAO might have some problems with that. (S)

Mr. Claytor said that he would be glad to deal with GAO if there were any such problems. (C)

Mr. Kramer said that the helicopters would cost $9.5M, and $530,000 would need to be reprogrammed for additional materiel. In response to a question from Dr. Brzezinski, Mr. Kramer said that the only step necessary to provide the helicopters on a no-cost lease basis would be for the Secretary of the Army to find that the helicopters were not needed for public use in the US. (S)

Mr. Claytor said that DOD will reprogram the $530,000 additional money and will work out any problems with the Secretary of the Army. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether there were any objections to the combined training between the US and the Honduran Navy. Mr. Kramer said that the purpose would be to help train the Honduran Navy for purposes of interdiction. Mr. Bass raised the same concern about War Powers; but, there were no other objections, and it was decided to go ahead with combined training. (S)

Mr. Kramer said that we could do the same thing for Salvador since they have boats. (S)

Mr. Claytor recommended that the SCC agree to working with both the Honduran and El Salvador Navies, and Dr. Brzezinski said that we should do that. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether there were any problems in providing FMS financing at the best and longest terms available. Randy Jayne asked Bob Pastor whether he had checked with Treasury, and Pastor said that he has spoken with Fred Bergsten and Bergsten said that if the SCC determines this as a high priority, Treasury will explore ways to be helpful. Mr. Kramer and Mr. Jayne raised a number of issues about the nature of the concessional financing terms, and Dr. Brzezinski summarized the discussion by saying that the SCC would recommend that Treasury be as flexible as possible with regard to FMS concessional financing to Honduras and El Salvador without creating insurmountable obstacles on precedents. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we should brief Capitol Hill on these matters soon since Congress should have a sense of involvement as we develop our strategy. He suggested that both DOD and State brief Congressional leaders, and also the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Kramer suggested that the briefing on these military items be done within the context of a general briefing on our strategy to the area. This was accepted. (S)

Economic Assistance

Dr. Brzezinski raised the issue of economic assistance, and Henry Owen said that there were a number of problems that had not been ironed out in this area, and he wondered whether these should not be worked on during the next week. Dr. Brzezinski asked whether it would be possible or a mistake to delay consideration of these matters for a week. Amb. Owen said that we don’t even know the needs in the area; how can we decide on our resources? Mr. Bennett said that we were already beginning to sign project loans. Amb. Bowdler said that he understood there were many who want us to move much more cautiously on ESF. Dr. Brzezinski asked whether Amb. Bowdler felt that we should be losing essential time if we waited a week. Since we will be moving in the security area, that will at least demonstrate our commitment and our desire to help. Can we wait an additional week on that? It was agreed that that could be done. (S)

Mr. Jayne recommended that when we do examine the ESF needs for El Salvador, that we do so by looking at it within the context of our ESF objectives in Thailand and the Sudan. Dr. Brzezinski said that we should have a paper which summarizes our needs and objectives with regard to ESF and other economic assistance, and examines ESF within the context of these other countries, and we should have this paper by the meeting next week. (S)

Personnel

Dr. Brzezinski said that we needed more personnel in our Embassies in El Salvador and Honduras and wondered whether we could reprogram people from low-priority areas to these two countries. He said that he felt this was really a Departmental matter, but he was raising it in this context because of the importance of reacting quickly. (C)

Deputy Secretary Christopher said that there is a real question of the quality and the morale of the 30 people who are already there. It is a very dangerous situation, and he asked whether we want to increase our Embassy to 76 in such circumstances. We have a new Ambassador who’s about to go down there; we should wait to let him judge how many people he can use effectively. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski said that there is a basic principle involved. If we are going to move to shore up the junta there, we will need more people than would normally be responsible for such a mission. Clearly the same number of people will not be adequate. (S)

Amb. White said this an issue in which the Secretary of State has overall responsibility. We shouldn’t have to deal with this in such a meeting. (U)

Dr. Brzezinski agreed, provided that we do not go on as usual with the same number of people in the mission. (C)

Deputy Secretary Christopher said that State does need more people in Honduras and El Salvador. Mr. Claytor [2 lines not declassified] Dr. Brzezinski asked for a report [1 line not declassified] within one week’s time about how they could beef up their respective missions. (S)

Admiral Turner [2 lines not declassified]

Ambassador White said that they face a political problem in El Salvador, and this will not be helped if the Embassy looks like it is primarily a military mission. (S)

Other Issues

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether the SCC should recommend that the President meet with the Salvadorean junta when they come up here. Amb. Bowdler said that they would probably be here on February 28 and 29. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked where Romero was. Amb. White said that he thought he was in Mexico, and Amb. Bowdler said that Duarte was in Europe. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski said that Archbishop Romero had just gotten a message from the Pope, but Amb. White said that it is possible that such a message did not have a favorable impact on Archbishop Romero. In that case, Dr. Brzezinski said, he would probably get another message, perhaps Monday⁶ or Tuesday. (S)

Deputy Secretary Christopher said that he wondered whether we should recommend a meeting with the junta, given that it may not be there by the end of the month. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that the SCC tentatively recommend that the President meet with the junta as a courtesy visit, but the final recommendation would depend on the political circumstances in El Salvador and scheduling problems here. (S)

Mr. Pastor asked how we should respond to the question that was made on behalf of the junta for the meeting. (S)

Amb. Bowdler said that the Foreign Minister would be here first, and we can speak to him about that. (U)

Amb. White said that it would be very bad if the President did not meet with the Salvadorean junta, since everyone remembers his meeting with the Sandinistas.⁷ Dr. Brzezinski agreed with that. (S)

Amb. Bowdler said that the junta is likely to come to Washington for other business, but we should really try to make sure that that happens.

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether we shouldn’t get General Nutting to write letters to his colleagues in Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, to encourage them to play a larger and more supportive role to the junta in El Salvador. He asked whether we should not get General Nutting to use his leverage better on behalf of our political strategy. (S)

General Jones said that he is in favor of that; he is also very concerned that this may be too little and too late. Next in line after El Salvador are Honduras and Guatemala—perhaps Panama. He gets the feeling that things are being handled on a very fragmented basis by the missions down there. There is a greater need for joint intelligence involving Honduras and the other countries, and to get CIA and military intelligence involved. He believes that we should set up a multinational mechanism with the other Central Americans to deal with this intelligence problem, and Graham Claytor said that we should staff that. Gen. Jones said that intelligence should only be one piece of this coherent strategy; if it is successful, counter-inflation and insurgency will also be necessary. (S)

Mr. Pastor suggested that we should think of this in terms of three distinct steps. The first step is to encourage and to enhance the intelligence-gathering capabilities of Salvador and Honduras individually. The second step is to encourage them to exchange their information and to work more closely together. Then, in the third step, we should begin thinking about this larger, multilateral effort. (S)

Adm. Turner said that the CIA is already trying to create an intelligence serve in El Salvador. Dr. Brzezinski said that Gen. Jones was suggesting a more collective effort. Dr. Brzezinski suggested CIA and DOD, with CIA in the lead, develop a proposal for next week’s meeting which suggests ways to enhance and integrate the intelligence capabilities of governments in the Central American region.⁸ (S)

Dr. Brzezinski summarized that in addition to this intelligence and counter-intelligence study, papers should be prepared on: (1) economic assistance efforts that are necessary to help El Salvador, and (2) [less than line not declassified] DOD and State personnel—ways to increase their numbers and quality. He also said that we would inform the Venezuelans that three people would be sent as an advance team on the MTTs and the other 33 will follow within ten days. He said that we will want to do this in a way which will not create impediments for the Venezuelans. (S)

Amb. Bowdler said that Luers thinks that we probably will be able to go ahead with this, and Mr. Pastor asked Amb. Bowdler whether a letter from the President could help to spring this loose as it was able to spring the mission of Calvani loose. Amb. Bowdler said that he would ask Luers about that. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski also asked whether we could obtain a report from General Nutting on what he has already done to assist the political strategy and what more he could do. We should also ask whether there is anything more we can do with regard to getting the Spanish in to help. Amb. Bowdler said that as long as the Embassy is held, that will be difficult.

Deputy Secretary Christopher said that we can ask Torrijos to help the Spanish deal with their Embassy problem. Mr. Pastor said that Mr. Christopher’s remark was said in jest, but he may have a point there worth developing. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski closed the meeting by saying that we should meet one week from today. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 109, SCC 274, 2/15/80, El Salvador. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. For Brzezinski’s summary of the meeting, see Document 413.
2. See Document 411.
3. In telegram 1066 from San Salvador, February 15, the Embassy reported that the JRG advised the Chargé that it “had reached decision regarding dispatch of MTTS and response was positive, that teams should arrive as quickly as possible, and that Ministry of Foreign Relations would send a note to the Embassy confirming this decision.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Subject Files, Box 65, Special Coordinating Committee Meeting on El Salvador (2/15/80), 2/80)
4. February 17.
5. Feburary 19, 20. Reference is to Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Weighing a Military Role in El Salvador,” Washington Post, February 14, 1980, p. A1. In telegram 42247 to multiple posts, February 15, the Department sent press guidance about the news report: “There is currently under consideration an assistance program for El Salvador, which includes both economic assistance and a limited amount of military training and equipment.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800083–0019)
6. February 18.
7. See Document 308.
8. See Document 419.