Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

332. Telegram From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State¹

San José, December 7, 1978, 2120Z

5215. For Asst Secy Vaky from Weissman. Subj: What Makes Rodrigo Run. Ref: State 308126.²

1. In reply to para 5 reftel, it was precisely because of the subject report that I asked Carazo directly, December 5, in the presence of Ambassador Bowdler and FonMin Calderon, about “reports” of recent shipments of arms from Panama to the FSLN in Costa Rica. My immediate cue was Carazo’s statement that Torrijos had become disenchanted with the Sandinistas two months ago, but I also had in mind his earlier assertion that Carlos Andres Perez calls the shots re the FSLN in Costa Rica, as well as Carazo’s frequent insinuations in the past that Venezuela is the major source of FSLN arms. Carazo’s reply that there have been no shipments “in the past four weeks” may be as much an admission that the FSLN has, with GOCR knowledge, been supplied in the past, as it can be interpreted as an effort to dissemble. His response to a similar query from me December 7 does not change that view.

2. We have from time to time found reason to doubt that most GOCR officials, including Carazo and Echeverria, have been totally candid about the extent of the GOCR’s relations with the FSLN and Eden Pastora. Even Carazo’s suggesting to Bill and me that the most recent FSLN communique³ doesn’t reflect Pastora’s true attitude toward us and the mediation falls into a familiar pattern. Impulsive and emotional about most things, and almost blinded by dislike and distrust of Somoza, most GOCR officials, with the probable exception of Calderon, could be expected to show misguided sympathy for anybody, particularly a naturalized Costa Rican, who can stick it to Somoza. Eden Pastora’s successful attack on the Congress made him almost an untouchable folk hero in Costa Rica, and earned him a certain amount of respect among the machos in the GOCR. Beyond this lingering romanticism influenced by the Don Pepes and other holdovers from Caribbean legion days, just plain fear obviously plays an important part in conditioning the GOCR attitude toward the FSLN movement into, around, and out of the country as a key factor in determining what they can or should do with respect to the FSLN. Even where some capability exists, they aren’t too good at security matters, with their training appearing to come mainly from watching re-runs of Kojak. Recall that they freely admitted it was fear of possible FSLN reprisals that caused the Carazo administration to release Plutarco Hernandez last June.⁴

3. While I find largely credible frequent GOCR assertions of inability to control FSLN in Costa Rica, I suspect that such accommodation of the FSLN as has taken place has been helped along by a combination of strong Venezuelan and some Panamanian persuasion, plus a marked tendency of Carazo’s to play to the domestic gallery. Carazo’s statements to Bill Bowdler and me re Perez’ control of FSLN in Costa Rica was his most candid admission to date of impotence, as well as an honest revelation of who Carazo recognizes as the grand strategist on this side of the Nicaraguan fracas. I believe that the round of shooting was threats in September, aided and abetted from the South, made him begin to realize he was caught up in something he could influence but not control, and that this is sinking in deeper all the time.

4. The subject report may be accurate, but I do not discount the possibility that it is overdrawn or not totally exact, especially in the light of the GOCR’s difficulties in communicating within itself on overt matters. Nor do I completely rule out the possibility that there is some free-lancing going on at or below the ministerial level.

5. Whatever the assistance or accommodation the GOCR has extended to FSLN, by or through whom and for whatever complex of reasons, it is unlikely that this has come as a straight-line flow from a conscious, deliberate, or well thought out top-level policy decision, e.g., to support Pastora as the best, viable future prospect since all else will fail or be worse. Rather, the GOCR under Carazo continues to have high points and low points, stops and starts and jerks and reverses, and the operational consequences of Carazo’s highly emotional and often erratic perspective of the Nicaraguan problem remain a fact of life. No doubt he omits to mention things to us, and at times is oblivious to transparent contradiction. He is now busy taking on the press for reporting, admittedly in grossly exaggerated form, that there are FSLN camps here, at the exact same time he is telling us they have found them. I sometimes think it is less a lack of candor, than frenetic inconsistency, that makes Don Rodrigo run.

Weissman

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2322. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Managua, Panama City, and Caracas.
2. Paragraph 5 of telegram 308126 to multiple posts, December 6, instructed Weissman to comment on reports of arms deliveries by Panamanian aircraft with the knowledge and approval of Costa Rican authorities. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840139–1685)
3. See footnote 2, Document 158.
4. In telegram 2390 from San José, June 2, the Embassy reported that the Costa Rican Cabinet had issued a pardon on June for Costa Rican citizen and FSLN leader Plutarco Hernandez. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780232–0784)