Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

333. Telegram From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State¹

San José, April 11, 1980, 0325Z

1888. From Bowdler. Subj: Conversation with President Carazo on Costa Rican Involvement With Salvadoran Insurgents. Ref: State 92916.²

1. S-Entire text.

2. Charge Binns and I met with President Carazo alone for over an hour this evening to discuss Costa Rican involvement in support of Salvadoran insurgency. We approached the subject delicately by drawing him out on the situation in El Salvador, particularly with respect to the strength and strategy of the far left and the prospects of the Junta.

3. Carazo thought that the JRG, having survived the Archbishop’s assassination,³ was now in a position to begin a dialogue with moderate elements on the right and left leading to agreement on an electoral process that would bring legitimacy to the government. He was under the impression that the two extremes had lost ground in recent weeks and that such a dialogue, while not acceptable to them, would tend to increase their isolation. He believes that Costa Rica can play a constructive role in encouraging the JRG (through his personal contacts with the PDC), moderate groups on left (he specifically mentioned FAPU), and on the right (he specifically mentioned his business and professional contacts).

4. Using the talking points contained reftel, I first expressed appreciation for what he had done, and enabled us to do, in supporting the JRG. I next told him that I shared his view that the two extremes had lost some ground in recent weeks, but that the state of the JRG remained fragile because of the high level of violence, especially that committed by the far right and the security forces, and its narrow base. I went on to explain our sense of the long range strategy being followed by the extreme left, as the indicators that it was following this strategy by playing for time, using political weapons to undermine the JRG, while at the same time building up its capabilities for armed conflict.

5. Stressing our common interest in seeing the JRG succeed and the serious consequences that would follow from failure, I led into the specific talking points in reftel, and followed these throughout, with the exception of sub-para two, of “Q”, which I left out because of the Embassy’s uncertainty as to its reliability.⁴ As I made the presentation, President Carazo interrupted frequently to ask for additional details or to express surprise and concern. His reaction appeared to be genuine.

6. The highlights of President Carazo’s response can be summarized as follows:

—He seemed most interested in the activities of the Soviet Embassy and the clandestine Cuban operations center, asking for additional information on both.

—He specifically asked for the location and other details concerning the Cuban OP Center, leaving us with the impression that he was prepared to act against it.

—He urged Charge Binns to pass to him personally and promptly any future information we receive regarding suspected support operations.

—He manifested a full knowledge of the identity and antecedents of Ponce De Leon, his association with Radio Noticias Del Continente and the orientation of that station, as well as his close personal ties with Public Security Minister Echeverria, a linkage which Carazo himself took the initiative in making. He specifically requested additional details regarding Ponce De Leon’s involvement with the Cuban Operations Center.

—He also asked Charge to provide him with the name of the Salvadoran insurgent who had been released following arrest by the Ministry of Public Security for being involved in arms purchases in Costa Rica so he could follow up.

—In commenting on Elio Espinar, he displayed deep hostility and indicated that he would personally look into his activities.

—He asked if we had any information linking Carlos Enrique Guerra (Pillique) with clandestine arms shipments/support activities. Charge indicated familiarity with the name but did not go beyond that since we have not been able to corroborate frequent rumors of his activity (when we spoke to Carazo we did not have the text of San Jose 1887 which reports allegations against Guerra).⁵

—Twice during the presentation I specifically referred to the fact that members of his Public Security Ministry had knowledge of, or were involved in, some of these clandestine activities. On neither occasion did Carazo pursue the observation. He appeared ill at ease, which we interpret as indicating awareness that we were referring specifically to Echeverria and some of his associates.

7. Comment: While we did not succeed in getting Carazo to commit himself to specific actions, we believe that the conversation was highly useful in putting him on notice that we are aware of what is going on, and the seriousness with which we view Costa Rican involvement. It was clear in making the point that we might have to go public—with all the consequences this would entail—that Carazo got the message. His response requesting additional information provides an opportunity for follow-up, giving us a means to test his performance and pursue the matter with even greater vigor. He is on the spot and now knows it. Follow up will be important to maintain the pressure.

Binns

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890003–0675. Secret; Immediate; Cherokee; Nodis.
2. In telegram 92916 to San José, April 9, the Department provided talking points for Bowdler’s meeting with Carazo, noting: “We are persuaded that high level officials of the Public Security Ministry are involved with direct collusion with Salvadoran insurgents and are allowing support operations to occur in Costa Rica.” The telegram also contained the observation that the levels of staffing of the Cuban and Soviet Missions in San José “are already beyond those required to conduct their legitimate bilateral relations with Costa Rica.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–0019)
3. See footnote 2, Document 429.
4. Reference is to Panamanian aircraft landing in northern Costa Rica to unload cargo.
5. In telegram 1887 from San José, April 11, the Embassy provided reporting about Costa Rican support for Salvadoran insurgents. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800180–1009)