Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

312. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, May 8, 1980

SUBJECT

• Cuban-Nicaraguan Defense Agreement (U)

David asked that I immediately check with the CIA on whether a report we have received about a Nicaraguan-Cuban defense agreement is accurate.² The CIA informed me that we have received only one report, and that was from a middle-level official in the Foreign Ministry. The report suggested that the agreement involved a Cuban promise to send arms and troops to Nicaragua if the Sandinistas were faced with a genuine threat.³ There are also other reports of arms shipments by both the Soviets and the Cubans. (S)

Both the CIA officer and I question the existence of such an agreement for the simple reason that it does not make any sense, and could only invite our wrath and the suspicions of other Central American countries. On the other hand, there is no question that the Sandinistas may feel threatened by external as well as internal forces, and indeed, we ourselves have received an increasing number of reports of former National Guard officers, who are organizing to fight the Sandinistas. If the agreement exists, another possible explanation is that one faction of the FSLN close to the Cubans wants to firm up its relationship with Cuba. (S)

Overall, I am skeptical of the report. However, there is no question that if the report is true, it could have serious political and international ramifications. I therefore asked Bowdler to task one person in his Bureau to do a paper on steps we should take to try to turn this issue to our advantage. I believe that if we handle this information well, we could not only get the Nicaraguans to deny or reject any pact, but also to put those who are closest to the Cubans on the defensive. (S)

Unfortunately, Rollie Evans called me, and he has the same report. I tried to put him off by saying that there are thousands of rumors from both extremes, but he probably will continue to probe this story, and so we are dealing with a short fuse. I also learned that Carlucci highlighted this report in a briefing he gave to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday.⁴ So the issue will come out, probably at the most delicate time to get Congress to pass the supplemental, of $75 million. The only consolation if we lose the $75 million is that we can blame Congress for “losing” Nicaragua. But that’s no consolation. We need the funding desperately to get in the game. (S)

I will meet with Luigi Einaudi, who is doing the paper for Bowdler, today to develop our strategy on this.⁵ (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 35, Nicaragua, 1980. Secret: Sensitive. A copy was sent to Brement. A stamped notation indicates that Aaron saw it.
2. On an unsigned copy of the May 6 Daily Report from Brzezinski to Carter, Aaron responded to the possible Nicaraguan-Cuban defense pact: “Brement/Pastor this is very important if true. It extends Soviet security guarantees to Central America. We must find out the truth A.S.A.P. DA.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 35, Nicaragua, 4/80–8/80)
3. Reference is to a CIA Intelligence Information Cable, May 1, regarding the alleged defense pact between Cuba and Nicaragua. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 37, Nicaragua: 4–8/80) In telegram 2069 from Managua, April 3, the Embassy relayed the intelligence reporting about the possible Nicaraguan-Cuban defense pact, noting that the report “comes at a particularly critical period for Nicaragua,” and that “the private sector and other democratic elements have drawn a line against further radicalization of the revolutionary process and have induced the FSLN to engage in a serious discussion of the current situation and a negotiation over a possible domestic settlement.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 57, Nicaragua: 10/79–7/80)
4. May 7. Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the margin next to this sentence, drew a line from it to the bottom margin, and wrote on May 12: “he should tell them it was wrong. ZB.”
5. See footnote 4, Document 313.