Office of the Historian

313. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1

Washington, May 12, 1980

SUBJECT

  • Cuban-Nicaraguan Defense Agreement (S)

As I noted to you in my memorandum of May 8,2 I asked State to prepare a paper on the Cuban-Nicaraguan Defense Pact, and for CIA to try to confirm or reject the report. State is skeptical about it, as I am, and regrets, as I do, that the CIA has been briefing the Congress about a single sub-source report as if it is a fact.3 Nonetheless, we need to develop a policy response because it is virtually certain that the report will be leaked, and I believe that it is inadequate merely to say, as State would prefer, that “we have no confirmation.” (S)

State’s paper is at Tab A, and it is not bad, although clearly does not go far enough.4 I urged State to go out with instructions to our Ambassadors in neighboring countries, indicating that we do have such a report, and expressing great concern about the implications of the report and its inconsistency with Nicaragua’s supposed interest in a “zone of peace.” The idea would be to raise the region’s consciousness and the possibility of isolating Nicaragua if the report becomes true. State, however, preferred to go out with a different cable (Tab B) which asked our Ambassador to try to firm up the information, and warned him that a leak may be imminent.5 State agreed, however, to send [Page 760] Pezzullo in once the report is leaked. At that time, we should be quite blunt. (S)

State, CIA, and I agree that the most effective leak on this subject would be by a democratic newspaper from the area. Evans and Novak would be the worst possible sources, since their report will be discounted as CIA-inspired in the area while at the same time enraging our “home front.” Nonetheless, after speaking with Al Friendly, I agreed that it would be hopeless to try to turn Evans and Novak off long enough for the CIA to turn a Latin American newspaper on.6 (S)

Therefore, unless you object, our strategy is to wait for the leak, then go to the Nicaraguans for confirmation or denial, and then backstop that with a strong demarche to all friendly governments in the area. We should take a strong approach in our confidential demarches, but a concerned and questioning approach publicly. For example, the State Department spokesman should pose his statement as a question, of whether such a Pact means that the Nicaraguans have thrown in their lot with the Cubans, or whether it means that the Nicaraguans will be pursuing the same aggressive, interventionist strategy as the Cubans. The longer we ask questions publicly, rather than make demands, the more likely we will weaken the hands of the pro-Cubans in the Sandinista junta and strengthen the others. That is the strategy that I recommend. (S)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 57, Nicaragua: 8/80–1/81. Secret. Brzezinski wrote “ok” and his initials at the top of the page.↩
  2. See Document 312.↩
  3. An unknown hand replaced the word “is” with “were.”↩
  4. Attached but not printed is a paper drafted by Einaudi and dated May 8 entitled “A Cuba-Nicaragua Defense Pact? Preliminary Observations.”↩
  5. Not attached. Telegram 123160 to Managua, May 9, informed Bowdler that the Department had asked the intelligence community to seek confirmation of the possible Cuba-Nicaragua defensive pact. The telegram also noted that the CIA had briefed members of Congress on the issue and that the “temptation to inject this issue into forthcoming congressional debate on aid to Nicaragua may prove irresistible.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) In telegram 2245 from Managua, May 13, Pezzullo reported that he had questioned FSLN Directorate members about the Cuban/Nicaraguan defense pact without conclusive results: “I conclude that some form of military agreement exists, probably in writing, between the GRN and the Cubans. It may be something less than a mutual defense agreement, but might include that likelihood as well.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 57, Nicaragua: 8/80–1/81)↩
  6. On May 16, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak reported on a “possible Nicaragua-Cuban military accord.” (“A Sandinista Mission to Moscow,” Washington Post, p. A15) Telegram 130064 to Managua, May 17, included the press statement issued by the Department in response to Evans and Novak’s article. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 57, Nicaragua: 8/80–1/81)↩