311. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1
1466. Subject: (C) Meeting With GRN/FSLN Leaders.
1. C-Entire text.
[Page 754]2. I called on Junta member Sergio Ramirez on March 25 to discuss the current state of our relations. I had talked to FonMin D’Escoto earlier in the week (reftel on the subject)2 and I thought it wise to also discuss general themes with Sergio Ramirez as well. Jaime Wheelock, who had spoken to AID Director Harrison earlier in the day, decided to sit in on the meeting and apparently induced Victor Tirado and Daniel Ortega to attend as well.
3. I opened by indicating that we had always spoken frankly to one another and I had come to see them to share some of my concerns on the state of our relations. I noted that, since my return following the House debate on the authorization bill, I sensed a new mood in the country.3 It could be best categorized as an orchestrated anti-American campaign which was poisoning the minds of Nicaraguans against the U.S. It was indiscriminate, lumping critics on the Hill with charges of CIA destabilization plots and was creating a climate in which I feared our bi-lateral relations were bound to suffer.
4. I recalled the excellent answer Tirado had given to Senator Hollings in Washington when the latter had asked what the consequences would be of congressional rejection of the 75 million dollar assistance package. Tirado told Hollings that our bi-lateral relationship, in his mind, was more important than any assistance package. I said I agreed. What bothered me now was that the anti-U.S. sentiment being fanned throughout the society could seriously impair the building of a long-term relationship, quite apart from any assistance effort. I did not identify any person making intemperate statements, Daniel Ortega—by far the worst offender—sat stonefaced.
5. I then reviewed the policy the Carter administration had followed; one of support for the GRN and of generous assistance to help in rebuilding the Nicaraguan economy. I emphasized that this was U.S. policy and that individual agencies, such as the CIA, were not conducting an independent policy running at cross-purposes. The heated debate in Congress and the close vote in the House of the authorization bill demonstrated that: (a) the opposition in Congress is strong and makes effective use of ammunition offered to it by gratuitous [Page 755] statements from GRN/FSLN spokesmen; and (b) the administration and our supporters in Congress are fighting hard and taking political risks in order to build a basis for relations of mutual respect and cooperation with Nicaragua.
6. Finally, I observed that intemperate and insulting attacks on the U.S. damage our efforts to gain broad support for our policy within the U.S., and the sowing of hatred toward the U.S. in Nicaragua can only result in ugly incidents that may undermine all of our best efforts. I cited specific recent examples of harassment of Americans (including last weekend’s incident with a group of yachtsmen) as the natural results of hate campaign.
7. Ramirez and Ortega said there was no concerted policy of anti-Americanism on the part of the GRN, but explained that they must contend with an unsophisticated but highly incensed public that is irritated at what it perceives as mistreatment by the U.S. The Nicaraguan public does not understand the complicated U.S. political and legislative processes. The secret session in the House of Representatives and reports that the CIA was consulted about events in Nicaragua, leads the Nicaraguan public to suspect secret destablization plans and to draw parallels with Chile under Allende. They also cited statements that had appeared in the Congressional Record alleging that Tomas Borge and Daniel had personally ordered summary executions in Nicaragua.4 These false accusations demand response and they asserted that their statements have been directed againt elements in the U.S. that are attacking them, and not against members of the Carter administration. I indicated that, if that was their objective, they were missing the mark. Ortega said that they would make an effort to control attacks on the U.S. Ramirez reiterated that there is no concerted policy of animosity toward the U.S. and that the GRN/FSLN wants to develop good relations with us.
8. Referring to Ramirez’s statement that the anti-American campaign does not represent an intentional GRN policy I observed that it would be a greater tragedy if we fall into an antagonistic relationship by accident. Ramirez, Ortega, and Tirado all made the point that the GRN and FSLN are still in a poor state of internal organization and cannot always control the actions of the many groups that want to be part of the revolutionary process. Many ultra-leftists who have joined the revolution are trying to push them into radical directions in which they do not want to move. Ortega said GRN has been obliged to repress these groups.
[Page 756]9. I then raised with them the issue of the joint communique which the GRN delegation had signed with the Soviets in Moscow, noting that the section on Afghanistan is a statement of the Soviet position and asked if this represents a change in Nicaragua’s policy.5 Ramirez said he had not yet seen the text and thought there was some misunderstanding because of faulty press accounts. I gave him the FBIS transcript of the TASS account of the communique. Ramirez said TASS distorts the news too. After he had read the section on Afghanistan, he said the GRN’s official policy on Afghanistan remains as stated during its abstention on the UN resolution. Ortega and Wheelock agreed. Ortega ephasized that Nicaragua fully intends to be a non-aligned country opposed [to] the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. They all cast about for explanations as to why their delegation had come to sign this communique but they were clearly perplexed over what had happened. (In this connection, I discussed the Moscow communique with Foreign Minister D’Escoto on March 24. He professed total ignorance of the new language on Afghanistan and said GRN policy remains as stated after the UN abstention.)
10. My demarche may get key figures in the GRN/FSLN to recognize the dangers inherent in a scatter shot antigringo campaign. Some, like Ortega, have been more guilty in personal terms, but all share some culpability in allowing the campaign to build. They promised to temper the indiscriminate attacks on the U.S. with the fabric of this society unraveling in their hands. I do not expect that they will be able to effect a dramatic turn-around. A convenient foreign scapegoat to cover failings is very attractive, but leaders in this government who genuinely want good relations with us have an obligation to work for this goal as hard as we are.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800155–0513. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Caracas. Sent for information Immediate to Guatemala City, Mexico City, Moscow, Panama City, San José, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, Havana, USSOUTHCOM, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense.↩
- Telegram 1424 from Managua, March 24, described the meeting with D’Escoto. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800151–0740)↩
- The House of Representatives debated Carter’s November 9, 1979, request for aid to Central America for 4 days before passing the bill with amendments on February 27 by a margin of five votes. The debate on February 25 included a secret session to discuss intelligence about Communist influence in Nicaragua. The Senate passed a similar bill on January 29. (Graham Hovey, “House Has Secret Nicaragua Debate,” New York Times, February 26, 1980, p. A4; “House, by 5-Vote Margin, Passes Bill on Assistance for Nicaragua,” New York Times, February 28, 1980, p. A4; and “House Approves Nicaragua Aid,” Washington Post, February 28, 1980, p. A16)↩
- See Congressional Record, vol. 126, February 26, 1980, p. 3843.↩
- See “Communique Issued on Delegation’s Visit to USSR,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service, March 24, 1980, p. 7.↩