Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

310. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 9, 1980

SUBJECT

• Report on Nicaragua (U)

Cy has prepared a brief status report on the situation in Nicaragua, which is simply not as bad as many feared. There are many built-in constraints which are impeding those who would want to radicalize Nicaragua rapidly. Among these constraints is the financial support of the US and the West. That is why rapid passage by Congress of the Nicaraguan supplemental is so important: to help them reconstruct and to demonstrate that we care, but also to show implicitly what they could lose if they pursued a different path. (C)

Cy’s assessment of Nicaraguan foreign policy is quite good, but perhaps a bit optimistic. Nicaragua has seemed to follow the Cuban lead on most UN issues, but I am asking State to do a systematic analysis.² If my preliminary observation is proven correct, I will suggest to Cy that we ask Ambassador Pezzullo to provide a briefing on a wide range of foreign policy issues and express our concern that their policies appear to tilt toward Cuba and the Soviet Union.³ That would also be an opportunity to raise the issue of the size of the Soviet mission in Managua. We have one report suggesting that the Soviets may be considering staffing the embassy with about 100 people which would make it their largest in Latin America, except for Cuba.⁴ (C)

Attachment

Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter⁵

Washington, January 7, 1980

SUBJECT

• Nicaragua: A Status Report

The new Revolutionary Government of Nicaragua (GNR) has consolidated power and remains popular, but still faces major political and economic uncertainties.

Reflecting its composition, which is a mixture of center-left and Marxist forces, the GNR’s behavior oscillates between pragmatism and radicalism. Lines of authority remain confused. Internal diversity and a desire to maintain Nicaragua’s independence have inhibited those Sandinistas who would press for rapid socialization.

The critical need for Western economic support has strengthened more moderate tendencies, and helped preserve a degree of political openness and a free press. However, the economy remains a shambles, and recovery is hampered by political uncertainty as well as administrative confusion.

In foreign affairs, Nicaragua’s orientation and rhetoric are militantly Third World, but its actual behavior is quite pragmatic. Though Cuban influence is strong and possibly growing, the GNR has nonetheless officially denounced Iran for seizing our Embassy in Tehran, and sought normal relations with the Salvadoran Junta.

There is evidence of some gunrunning and return of guerrillas to other Central American countries, but the available evidence does not support a conclusion that Nicaragua deliberately supports intervention in neighboring countries.

Our principal objectives are to strengthen Nicaragua’s ties to us and to other Western governments and institutions and offset Nicaragua’s dependence on Cuba. Support for moderate forces of pluralism within Nicaragua such as the private sector, free labor unions, the church, and the press, is also vital to this objective.

In working toward these goals, we have extended some $48 million in emergency humanitarian assistance and revitalized aid projects, and have requested a $75 million supplemental aid appropriation due to be voted on shortly in Congress.⁶ With our active encouragement, other Western nations have provided or pledged some $255 million in aid and the international institutions some $315 million. Cuba cannot compete with financial resources of this magnitude.⁷

To strengthen direct personal ties, our Embassy is encouraging stepped-up people-to-people activities through private voluntary organizations. We are also increasing government-to-government cultural, educational, and military contacts.

The GNR’s future policies, actions, and experiments are likely to be influenced by whether the Sandinistas perceive the United States as sympathetic or hostile. In particular, our ability to exert influence during this formative period is contingent on their believing that our policies are not aimed against them (hence, the importance of the good communication which Ambassador Pezzullo and his staff have established with the Sandinista leadership and of our willingness to provide assistance as represented in the Central American supplemental).

A more detailed analysis has been made available to the NSC.⁸

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 57, Nicaragua: 10/79–7/80. Confidential. Sent for information. Carter initialed the memorandum. Drafted by Pastor who sent it and Vance’s memorandum to Brzezinski under a January 9 covering memorandum requesting that Brzezinski sign the memorandum to Carter.
2. In the January 9 covering memorandum (see footnote 1, above), Pastor indicated that he had drafted a memorandum from Brzezinski to Tarnoff with this request. (Ibid.) A handwritten notation on Pastor’s covering memorandum indicates that Brzezinski signed the memorandum to Carter on January 9. Aaron added the following notation to the covering memorandum: “of interest. DA.” Tarnoff responded in a January 21 memorandum to Brzezinski that described the “foreign policies of Nicaragua and Grenada as shown in multilateral fora.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 37, Nicaragua: 1–3/80)
3. Carter wrote “ok” in the margin next to this sentence.
4. Not further identified.
5. Secret.
6. See Documents 484 and 485.
7. Carter underlined this sentence and wrote in the left-hand margin: “But Cuba will surely reap more benefits vs. their aid level.”
8. Reference is to an unsigned and undated memorandum entitled “Nicaragua, A Status Report.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 57, Nicaragua: 10/79–7/80)