309. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1
5401. Subject: U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua. Ref: State 281786.2
1. C-Entire text.
2. We face in Nicaragua today what six months ago had been considered the worst case situation: complete victory and domination by the Sandinista forces, the elimination of the National Guard and, with it, the loss of counter-balancing military force to assure moderates an opportunity to play a political role. Yet, the Sandinistas have been restrained and we are able to maintain a position of influence despite our long and close association with the Somoza dynasty. From this experience it is clear that the worst case scenario (bloodbath, etc) was overdrawn, and that the influence of the United States, especially in Central America, is more pervasive than we often estimate.
3. Having said this, we also recognize that there are disconcerting signs. Despite their professed commitments to a pluralistic, democratic society, the Sandinistas have during their first four months in power here:
—Retained over 7,000 political prisoners, most of them former members of the Guardia Nacional;
—Prolonged the state of emergency, delaying the return of due process of law;
[Page 748]—Established a network of Sandinista mass organizations which could serve as the foundation for a controlled, one party state;
—Shown a high degree of sensitivity to press criticism and activity by non-FSLN political groups which has inhibited free expression; and
—Adopted an anti-imperialistic rhetoric.
4. Nontheless, the Sandinistas appear to recognize the predominant political, economic and military role we play in the region. They credit withdrawal of U.S. support as a major cause of Somoza’s downfall. They acknowledge and probably inflate our influence with their neighbors. They realize the U.S. provides the natural market for most of their agricultural exports (meat, sugar, bananas, coffee); that the U.S. Government and U.S. private banks hold the bulk of their public and private debt; that the U.S. Government or agencies in which the U.S. exerts substantial influence are most likely to prove the major donors of concessional lending for the reconstruction of the economy and that U.S. security policies in the region affect their own security. The Sandinistas are actively engaged in working out a new relationship with us in these key areas.
5. The revolutionary leaders are also attempting to work out a new relationship with the rest of the world. The new government’s “non-aligned” foreign policy parrots Cuban positions on issues remote to Nicaragua’s interests such as Southern Africa and Kampuchea, but the GRN is more pragmatic and nationalistic on issues closer to home such as the recent coup in neighboring El Salvador.
6. Most of the Sandinista leadership trained in Cuba have been—and continue to be—cultivated by Fidel Castro and are wed to the Marxist-Leninist theory which permeates the LA revolutionary mystique. Executive authority in the new Government of National Reconstruction nominally is exercised by a five-member Junta. In practice, however, the Junta shares leadership with and in some cases is dominated by the nine-man Sandinista Directorate. This collegiate leadership, loyal to Sandinista tradition, is the antithesis of Caudillismo. It avoids the concentration of power which has plagued Nicaraguan history under the Somozas, but it has the effect of diffusing executive authority and slowing decision making.
7. Despite a rapid settling-in process, public order still remains a problem and arbitrary actions are more the norm than the exception. As a consequence, there has been an erosion of the government’s prestige and the near bankrupt private sector is hanging on by pure grit. The big question is whether the GRN can manage the myriad of problems facing the country. The economy is in a state of collapse, unemployment is near 60 percent and revolutionary zeal and expectation is out-racing the government’s capacity to deliver. What sustains the [Page 749] current state of affairs is the capacity of the Nicaraguan people to carry on under difficult circumstances.
8. The political perspective is cloudy. On the positive side, moderate forces in the private sector, Catholic Church, the media and political parties, hardened under years of opposition to Somoza, remain on the scene and speak out courageously. Their long-standing opposition to Somoza give them the credibility to claim a part in the overthrow of Somoza and a stake in governing the new Nicaragua. On the negative side, the GRN is demonstrating an intolerance toward dissent of any sort, labeling it “anti-revolutionary” or “Somosista”. In the process, they are intimidating the people and driving the timid to silence or out of the country.
9. Although Cuban influence and political radicalization are significant factors, in the short term administrative failure is the greatest danger. If the government is unable to manage a recovery and reconstruction program, radicalization is almost inevitable. If that were to occur, Cuba can be expected to help the “real” revolutionaries clear away the “counter-revolutionaries” who will be held responsible for the earlier failures.
10. Individually, many members of the Junta and FSLN Directorate are talented and dedicated. [garble] OMIC team in the Cabinet probably is the most illustrious in Nicaraguan history. The greatest weaknesses are found among middle level administrators and technicians many of whom have fled or have been dismissed. A fractionalized bureaucracy lacking institutionalized discipline, clear lines of authority and firm direction further complicate policy implementation. On top of this is a layer of doctrinaire Marxism-Leninism which confuses rather than helps. It makes good propaganda copy but does little to solve the grave economic and social problems the country faces.
11. U.S. objectives
What we are dealing with in essence, is a situation where continued U.S. presence in Nicaragua can have a constructive, if not decisive, effect in keeping moderate elements alive and active and in preventing a radicalizing slide into an oppresive regime. Our specific objectives should be the following:
A. To help the Nicaraguan revolution succeed in reaching its own stated objectives: pluralistic democracy, a free and open society which brings development and a more equitable distribution of income and opportunity to all Nicaraguans;
B. To develop cordial relations with the GRN based on mutual respect;
C. To help build a Nicaraguan [garble—order?] for social change in Central America which would have a moderating and liberalizing effect on its northern neighbors; and
[Page 750]D. To demonstrate that the USG can work constructively in a revolutionary environment and help in the development of stability and prosperity within a democratic framework.
12. To meet the above objectives, we must pursue the following courses of action:
A. Contribute liberally to the Nicaraguan reconstruction effort through loans and grants and technical assistance. Our contribution thus far, includes:
—Emergency assistance (food, money, medicines) of approximately $13 million;
—Reconstruction/financial assistance totaling about $14 million thus far;
—Pipeline loan and grant projects (agriculture, health, nutrition, education, earthquake reconstruction) of about $30 million;
—$10 million approved for Title I PL–480, hopefully another $10 million late this year, plus about $5 million for Title II;
—The pending $75 million supplemental.
B. Offer modest military assistance in the form of IMET training, and the grant and sale of military equipment.
C. Support the private sector using non-governmental U.S. private sector resources as well as AID programming;
D. Maintain a close and supportive relationship with key moderate elements in the society to include the media, democratic labor movement and the Catholic church; and especially those working contrary to our interests and seeking to subject moderate forces to radicalize the revolution, or to conspire against other governments in the area.
E. Expose the young and provincial Sandinista leadership to the U.S. by means of official and non-official visits, thereby hopefully destroying some of the myth they hold about our society and replacing them with greater realism.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790511–0587. Confidential; Immediate; Stadis; Exdis.↩
- In telegram 281786 to Managua, October 27, the Department requested that Pezzullo draft a cable to “set forth your perception of key policy elements and implementation measures” for Nicaragua. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790492–0989)↩