29. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to Acting Secretary of State Christopher1

SUBJECT

  • IMET for Guatemala

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to delete $250,000 of IMET funds for Guatemala from the FY 1980 budget submission.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

ARA supports a $250,000 level of IMET for Guatemala for FY 1980 on the following grounds:

—The Guatemalan military and central Guatemalan Government are not involved in most human rights violations, although there have been two or three incidents during the past year. The high levels of domestic violence are the direct result of endemic political warfare between extremist elements on both the left and the right and the traditional rural violence. The military, including the internal leadership which is from the military, has the key role in gradually controlling such violence and bringing to justice perpetrators from all sides. They are gradually doing so. IMET would serve to strengthen the professionalism of the Guatemalan military and to promote our objective of encouraging the military to move faster in controlling the endemic violence.

—The GOG has exercised considerable restraint in dealing with the current wave of protests and strikes. The Government has not employed military forces in dealing with the disturbances and has not imposed a state of siege despite the fact that this is the most serious challenge to the Government in several years.

—Denial of military items in the past has been construed by the Guatemalans as an attempt to pressure them on the Belize dispute despite our assertions that our concern was human rights-related. Denial now, when negotiations are again underway with the British [Page 79] and when the British have just presented them with an unacceptable proposal, would be similarly misinterpreted by the GOG.2

—Guatemala is lending full cooperation and support to the mediation effort in Nicaragua.3 This negative action now could inhibit Guatemalan cooperation in this vital matter.

—The FY 80 proposal already is reduced by half from the $500,000 FY 77 figure, our last IMET program before the previous Guatemalan regime rejected military assistance because of offended pride over the requirement of a human rights report.4

HA recommends that you not approve IMET funds for Guatemala. Its position on the Guatemalan human rights situation is as follows:

ARA’s characterization of the Guatemalan military as “uninvolved” in human rights violations directly contradicts our own human rights reports submitted to the Congress last year, a study by Amnesty International, and the reports of last year’s massacre at Panzos.5

From at least 1966 to 1976, the uniformed military, with the knowledge and cooperation of other government officials, was involved in death squad operations in both rural and urban areas of Guatemala. As many as 20,000 persons are believed to have been detained and killed in these operations.

Over the past two years, there has been a considerable decrease in death squad operations in urban areas. However, both our own report and that of Amnesty note that, in rural areas, disappearances in which military and other government officials are involved continue and may have actually increased.

[Page 80]

During the past several months, we have continued to receive reports of such disappearances. The most dramatic incident occurred last May in Panzos, when government troops reportedly killed at least 38 Indians.

The Minister of Government, Donaldo Alvarez, who commands the police, has publicly stated that death squads serve to clean the society. While there is also considerable left-wing terrorism in Guatemala, this does not and cannot justify identical, and often worse, excesses on the part of Government and military officials.

ARA characterized recent government handling of protests and strikes opposing the bus fare increase as “restrained”. Even if this characterization is correct, we do not believe it is relevant to the critical issue of continuing detentions and executions on the part of the military. In addition, we note that this “restrained” handling did result in an official death toll of 7 and unofficial toll of 12 or more.

Attached at Tab 1 is a report on the human rights situation from a member of the S/P staff, Richard Feinberg, who visited Guatemala about two months ago.6

Given the involvement of the military and government of Guatemala in violations of the integrity of the person, HA believes that an IMET program is not justified unless there are other compelling US interests at stake. What might those interests be?

ARA argues that not to approve the IMET program would “inhibit” Guatemalan cooperation in the Nicaraguan mediation effort. However, there already exist other instruments for inducing Guatemala’s continued participation. Guatemala looks to the US for several million dollars in FMS and munitions list purchases each year, including critical aircraft spare parts not readily available from other sources. The US was forthcoming earlier this year in responding rapidly to Guatemala’s urgent request for US tear gas.7 We also exercise leverage through our ability to veto Guatemalan applications for loans from the IDA soft-loan window.

It is difficult to see what significant addition the IMET proposal would make, especially since the mediation effort is likely to be concluded long before the FY ’80 IMET program can begin. Congress will not even act on the FY ’80 security assistance appropriation until about one year from now, and the administration’s FY ’80 security assistance [Page 81] budget will not be submitted to the Congress for at least five or six months.

ARA also states that “denial of military items to Guatemala in the past has been construed as an attempt to pressure them on Belize.” However the attempted analogy is less than exact. The past denials involved requests to purchase items which could be used in border operations and thus were directly relevant to the Belize border dispute. The IMET proposal involves grant aid and, in any case, lacks a direct connection with the Belize issue. Therefore, Guatemala is highly unlikely to read a decision not to propose IMET as an attempt to pressure them on Belize.

Against ARA’s affirmative arguments for how the IMET program would serve US interests must be balanced one other consideration. There was no IMET program for Guatemalan in FY ’79. A proposal to re-institute it for FY ’80 would identify the US with the Guatemalan military at a time of mounting and widespread opposition to the central government, evidenced by recent popular protests against the bus fare increase.8

S/P believes that the influence we are likely to exert via IMET programs will in practice be small while the existence of such programs identifies us with the subsequent actions of a particular military force. Moreover to begin a program or revive one which had lapsed, will be seen as an indication of support for a particular government.

Recommendations:

ARA recommends that you approve retention of IMET funding for Guatemala.9

HA and S/P recommend that you not approve IMET funding for Guatemala.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780166–2122. Confidential. Drafted on October 12 by Davis. Cleared by Schneider (HA) and Walker (S/P). Davis initialed for both Schneider and Walker. Tabs 1 and 2 are not attached. See footnote 6, below. Christopher was acting for Vance while Vance was in Geneva October 19–21.
  2. In telegram Secto 3831 from New York, September 27, Vance reported that Rowlands had informed Newsom on September 26 about the recent Anglo-Guatemalan discussions on Belize in New York during which Owen “proposed a three-part package” to Valdez: a security agreement permitting only U.K. and Commonwealth forces to serve in Belize, adjustment of the seaward boundaries to provide Guatemalan Caribbean ports with access to the high seas, and a British offer to pave the road from Flores to Belmopan. Territorial cession was not included in the offer. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–1589, N780008–0045) In telegram 5778 from Guatemala City, October 2, the Embassy remarked: “We believe the British are deluding themselves if they are banking on the GOG accepting a formula, even one sweetened with assistance projects, which does not give Guatemala land territory, however token it may be.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840166–1808)
  3. See Chapter 2 for coverage of the mediation effort for Nicaragua.
  4. See Document 1.
  5. The report for Guatemala is in Human Rights Practices in Countries Receiving U.S. Security Assistance, pp. 165–168. Oxman sent Christopher a February 14 report from Amnesty International on Guatemala detailing 113 death squad killings and disappearances from September to December of 1977. In his covering note, Oxman wrote: “A shocking AI report re Guatemala.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Lot 81D113, Box 16, Human Rights—Guatemala) For information on Panzos, see footnote 5, Document 28.
  6. Not attached. Feinberg’s September 1 memorandum to Walker stated: “In our deliberations on Guatemala, we should be careful before taking actions that would appear to signal USG approval of the direction of human rights practices there.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 24, Guatemala: 2/77–12/78)
  7. See Document 28.
  8. Public demonstrations in Guatemala City against an increase to the longstanding 5 cent bus fare lasted from October 2 to 3 and “produced extensive damage and personal injuries,” according to the Embassy’s report in telegram 5848 from Guatemala City, October 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780406–0167)
  9. Christopher indicated his approval of ARA’s recommendation on October 20.