30. Telegram From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State1
1084. Subj: (S) Whiter Guatemala—The GOG Fiddles While Troubles Multiply.
1. (S-Entire text).
2. Seven months into the Lucas regime, the experience of Nicaragua and the growing level of violence, along with the underlying economic, social and political trends, suggest a number of conclusions about how Guatemala is likely to fare over the foreseeable future. The most significant is that this government seems unable to recognize the basic problems facing the country and is therefore unlikely to take appropriate steps. Moreover, there is now no present prospect that a successor regime, probably military, will be any better.
3. The GOG mindset: Few Guatemalans see the situation as we do, and none of those who do seem to have any influence. One observer described the dominant view as the heritage of the captaincy-general of Spanish days. It may be characterized as superior, independent, self-sufficient, conservative, and often curiously at odds with the facts. Guatemala’s isolation and its strong Indian tradition may also account for or reinforce these tendencies. Finally, recent history, in particular the Arbenz period, has contributed by making the establishment fearful that any basic change would only benefit the Communists.
4. One example of Guatemalan thinking is the dominant GOG view of Nicaragua. It has jelled now to the conclusion that Somoza has both military and popular support. It sees his opposition as composed entirely of extreme leftists or their dupes, among whom no useful distinctions can be made. The GOG has undoubtedly given thought to military intervention to help Somoza, although we question whether its forces have the morale or the weapons to provide more than token support. Its membership in the mediation group, initially grudging, has been terminated and the GOG is seeking to end any further outside intervention which would weaken Somoza.2
[Page 83]5. The economy: Guatemala has an archtypical dual economy. A rich capital city and the highly capitalized and productive commercial agriculture on the Pacific coastal plain contrasts with the overpopulated and impoverished Altiplano and Oriente. The balance of the country could offer help but no solution to the large and growing problems of land and employment. Thus, the two most powerful components of a solution lie in land redistribution and labor intensive industry sufficient to provide a rapidly growing number of jobs. Yet, land reform is unmentionable to Guatemala’s establishment. Its laissez-faire economics so far also seems not to have grasped the idea that money can be made producing for export in labor intensive fields or that the rate of growth could be even higher than it is, with a larger pie to share.
6. Population pressures: Dominant elements in the establishment have also managed to prevent the GOG from mounting a significant family planning effort. Even if one existed, however, it will be time-consuming and difficult to change Indian cultural attitudes on family size when perhaps half the children born do not survive to the age of five and virtually all are malnourished. Hence, there is no prospect that the annual demand for new jobs will drop in less than a generation or two.
7. Indian population pressure has been partly relieved by seasonal employment on the Pacific coastal coffee and cotton farms, but additional jobs there are not likely and the conditions of such work are frequently so bad as to be deeply resented. Most roads into Indian areas have been built in the last 20 to 30 years. Conventional wisdom that Indian culture is self-contained and self-perpetuating ignores these facts, and concludes that while the GOG cannot crack their isolation, neither can the left, so at least there is nothing to worry about. Reports of Indian participation in the recent EGP raid on Nebaj and such evidence of mobilization and unrest as the Panzos affair should be cause for concern.3 A growing population drift out of Indian areas, under population pressure, will create new, much more severe urban problems than have already occurred after the 1976 earthquake.4
8. The plan: The GOG has been working on a four-year plan for more than a year. Scheduled for publication at the beginning of this year, it remains under wraps, as it generated significant opposition [Page 84] and had to be redone. Curiously, a second document of economic analysis was finished, but also remains locked up, possibly because it paints such a bleak picture of Guatemala’s poor as to be embarrassing. In any case, the GOG does not seem to be responding to the economic challenge and, indeed, seems not to have recognized it.
9. GOG administration: Like its predecessor, the Lucas government might hopefully have been expected to show a modest improvement in administrative effectiveness. The reverse has been the case. Decisions are only reached with great difficulty after long delay and implementation is weak at its best. Moreover, some signs suggest the level of corruption in the present government is at least an order of magnitude greater than in the past, further diluting the delivery of government services to a public which increasingly demands them.5
10. GOG leadership: Public discontent might be reduced or diverted by political leadership that could articulate a captivating vision of the future. Guatemala’s political process, however, has generated few with such abilities. The opposition has splintered and splintered again. In contrast, the military, with their chain of command, close personal ties, and system of rewards, have been and remain the most cohesive political party, regularly handing on power to a military successor. More and more, detached but still active members of the military are found throughout the GOG. The wealthy have so far managed to work with such an arrangement, growing rapidly wealthier as the GOG helped protect their monopolies and privileges and fostered the development of new opportunities. The growing middle class, which has benefited from disproportionately urban growth, sees its interests promoted by the same system. Professional politicians here, as in so many other places, seem caught in a personalism that really avoids issues but at the same time makes it very difficult for several politicians to work together. Thus, to most, Guatemala seems ill-served by democratic practices, which, lacking substance, have legitimated cynicism, corruption and violence.
11. Violence: Although fewer in per capita terms than Detroit, violent deaths are common and even celebrated in Guatemala. The difference lies in the use of murder by both the left and the right to remove and intimidate political opponents. The GOG seems rarely to be involved as an institution but individuals in authority are, and such behavior is at least tolerated, and at times encouraged. Politically motivated violence is frequently almost impossible to distinguish from the more casual variety with certainty, but those in public life seem to have little difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the level is currently [Page 85] rising. Union leaders, newspapermen and the politically liberal presently feel threatened and are modifying their behavior accordingly. Businessmen and government leaders remain generally fearful of leftist violence; although little has occurred in the capital in recent months, growing guerrilla activity could occur at any time in both the countryside and the city and will provoke right-wing retaliation.
12. US influence: The ability of the US to influence the Guatemalan establishment has progressively declined in recent years. We are perceived as wrong, and inconstant, at best. Our human rights reports are seen as not only incorrect, harmful and hypocritical, but also as inspiring the left while hurting America’s traditional friends here. Our refusal to supply arms or the long delay in responding to requests has raised suspicions about our motives, while Nicaragua has underscored the possible consequences of relying on one source. The cases of Iran and China (i.e. that we have curried Chinese favor to offset growing Russian strength) have shaken faith in US power, even in areas vital to US. US economic aid has declined but matters little. GOG attitudes on borrowing are conservative, and the balance of payments is strong, so that if our aid disappeared tomorrow, reserves would simply not increase so rapidly and programs of help to relatively small groups of the poor might be allowed to expire. It was perhaps an illusion that we did or could continue to control the direction of events here (although some Guatemalans retain a curious ambivalence on this score, and at time want us to intervene, if it is on their side of the question, in the belief that we can determine the outcome). Nevertheless, the dominant Guatemalan world view, always somewhat independent, has shifted as they conclude we are unable to control ourselves and are acting against our own interests and theirs.6
13. Conclusions: Although seemingly confident of today, Guatemalans are worried about the future. Few seem to understand the processes at work, yet have little faith in their leaders or in any proposed solutions they have heard. The US, they see as unable or unwilling to help them in an increasingly threatening world. The long-term underlying forces have clearly begun to eat at the structure of Guatemalan stability, although it would be ridiculous to predict its fall any time soon. For example, the October rioting, which began over a bus fare hike, reflected the deterioration.7 GOG intimidation, as well as lowering the bus fare, worked and, without a more effective opposition, probably will continue to contain protest against such popular issues as inflation. However, as the undermining continues, behavior that is already occa[Page 86]sionally bizarre seems likely to become both inappropriate and anti-social. The major manifestation we expect to be a slowly growing level of violence, some obviously politically motivated, but much only vaguely so, or entirely mindless. When the establishment, particularly the military, sees itself as more clearly threatened, we are likely to see more unequivocal evidence of GOG involvement. The left will respond in kind. Americans will certainly continue to be a favored target for the left and may become one for the right.8
14. The growth of violence seems likely to be accompanied by a deterioration in democratic practices, already often more form than substance, because of manipulation by interested parties. Thus, the effort to broaden particularly among the Indians, have begun to emerge from their isolation and will be seeking a share of power.
15. If, as we expect, Guatemala becomes more violent, the impact on the economy could become quite significant even over the next few years. Foreign businessmen have taken a growing interest in investing and, for example, tourism is likely to become a major employer. More violence, more widely advertised, will certainly frighten the foreigner and slow, if not halt, this source of economic growth. US investors are likely to be hurt in the process.
16. US influence, already at low ebb, probably will decline further. US views on violence and democratic rights here now seem likely to be articulated more and more strongly in public. With a hardening perception among the Guatemalan establishment, the frictions in this field bode well to become the leitmotif in our relationship.9
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Lot 81D113, Box 16, Human Rights—Guatemala. Secret; Exdis. Oxman forwarded the telegram to Christopher under cover of an undated note which reads: “I recommend this cable, especially the circled paragraphs. He’s taking about Guatemala, but his comments actually have a much broader applicability.” Christopher wrote on Oxman’s note: “Dark clouds.” (Ibid.)↩
- An unknown hand circled this paragraph. See Chapter 2 for coverage of the mediation effort for Nicaragua.↩
- Central Intelligence Agency information cable [cable number not declassified], January 30, reported that a source of undetermined reliability indicated that the EGP had raided the town of Nebaj to influence the local populace and impress a visiting Cuban advisor. (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, Nicaragua—Misc. Memoranda, Feb. 1–Mar.16, 1979)↩
- For coverage of the earthquake, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976, Document 221.↩
- An unknown hand circled this paragraph.↩
- An unknown hand circled this paragraph.↩
- See footnote 8, Document 29.↩
- An unknown hand circled the last four sentences in this paragraph.↩
- An unknown hand circled this paragraph. Oxman underlined “US influence,” drew a line from it to the margin, and wrote: “With whom: the ‛establishment’ or the ‛people’?”↩