290. Telegram From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State and Multiple Central American Diplomatic Posts1
3148. From Bowdler. Subj: Meeting with Carazo and Latin American Foreign Ministers.
1. (S-Entire text)
2. This afternoon after it became clear that Urcuyo was trying to change the rules of the game, President Carazo asked Marv Weissman and me to come to his office to discuss the situation. I reviewed Larry Pezzullo’s unsuccessful efforts to get Acting Foreign Minister Bodan and interim President Urcuyo to follow the agreed transition program. [Page 707] During this exchange Carazo again surfaced his lingering doubt as to what the real U.S. motive in this exercise is. He insisted that he believed us but that more and more he was encountering grave doubts on the part of most of the GRN Junta and the visiting Foreign Ministers with whom he has been in contact today. I took sharp issue with this questioning of our intention.
3. I told him that behind Urcuyo’s stand there was probably an effort to parlay Somoza’s departure into a new negotiation where the position of the GN and Liberal Party would emerge reinforced. I also mentioned that the cause of the GNR was not advanced by the FSLN attack last night on Lapazcentro and the hard stand taken on security arrangements and the transfer ceremony. Leaving these mistakes to one side, the important thing now is how to mobilize USG and La Persuasion to influence Urcuyo to change. One step which had occurred to us was to have several of the Foreign Ministers now in town make a quick trip to Managua today to lean on Urcuyo. President Carazo and his Foreign Minister were very receptive to the idea and immediately asked the two Foreign Ministers waiting at the airport and the Andean Group Foreign Ministers to come to the Presidential Palace right away.2
4. Once assembled, President Carazo made a strong presentation in favor of the trip to Managua and asked me to reinforce it. The response was disappointing. Uribe, Colombian FonMin, was worried how the Ministers would look if the demarche failed. The Bolivian FonMin said he could express no opinion until the Andean Group had met and decided on a common stand. Garcia Bedoya found difficulties in the Andean Group speaking on behalf of the seventeen supporters of the OAS resolution. Jimenez said domestic opinion would not understand involvement in what would appear as another effort to negotiate with a Somocista regime after the failure of the mediation last year. The Venezuelan, Panamanian and Ecuadorian distinguished themselves by their silence. The meeting broke up with the Andean Group saying that they are going to gather at 1800 hrs local time to discuss the proposition and reach a decision.
5. After they left, Marv and I remained behind with President Carazo, Vice President Alyero, and Foreign Minister Calderon. Alfaro [Page 708] summed up the FonMinisters’ reaction best when he said they want to be in on the victory celebration but don’t want to work toward achieving it. Carazo said that he would make a last ditch effort to try to bring them around when they got together for their confab.
6. During the course of this latter rump session, Alfaro, who has been the principal negotiator for the GOCR with the GRN Junta, briefed the President on the GRN Junta plans. He said that the Junta had decided that they had no choice in the face of Urcuyo’s obstinacy but to transfer this very night to Nicaraguan territory to carry on the struggle. Their reasoning went something like this: as in the case of the mediation last year, they had negotiated in good faith with the US only to find that Somoza had frustrated the effort to find a peaceful solution; if they continued efforts to work the peaceful track they stood to lose all credibility with the rank and file within Nicaragua; therefore in order to maintain standing as the GRN they had to act dramatically in a way that would retain public confidence. Alfaro reported that they greatly feared a shift toward more radical elements within the FSLN were they not to act in this manner. He also stated that they could not bear the thought of Managua awakening tomorrow to a dawn under Urcuyo that was peaceful.
7. I assured Carazo that we were as disturbed as he over the turn of events in Managua and that we were doing our best to change Urcuyo’s position. In this respect Pezzullo had been instructed to make a strong demarche.3 I urged Carazo to try to discourage the GRN Junta from proceeding to Nicaraguan territory since this might well close off all hope for a peaceful settlement. He said he would make the effort, but was not sure how long he could get them to hold off departing.
8. Comment: In response to Deputy Secretary Christopher’s query about our evaluation of the impact of events on the safety of our people in Managua, I must conclude that if the Junta tonight takes up residence in Nicaraguan territory the chances of getting peaceful negotiations back on the track are drastically reduced.4 Indeed such action will polarize the situation to such a degree that there would be little chance for us to make a third effort at a negotiated solution; fighting would renew and increase, and radical elements would be greatly strengthened. Our failure to turn Urcuyo around would be widely interpreted not so much as lack of ability as a lack of will to do so. To the degree [Page 709] that this interpretation gains currency, the safety of our personnel in Managua is increasingly jeopardized.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133–1874. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent Flash to Managua. Sent Niact Immediate to Panama City, Santo Domingo, Caracas, Bogotá, Quito, Lima, and La Paz.↩
- Telegram 3150 from San José, July 18, included the text of a communiqué on Nicaragua issued during the evening of July 17 by the Foreign Ministers of the five Andean Pact countries and received by the Embassy the next day. The Embassy noted that the communiqué “hails Somoza’s departure, calls on Francisco Urcuyo to carry out his obligation to transfer power, expresses concern about the interests that might be behind Urcuyo’s action, states that the five will return to their countries to carry out an intensive campaign ‛to free the Nicaraguan people,’ and calls for a new MFM to deal with the situation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133–1884)↩
- See Document 289.↩
- In telegram 3151 from San José, July 18, Weissman reported that he and Bowdler had spoken with Alfaro who stated that three GRN Junta members had flown to Leon, Nicaragua, and that Costa Rica planned to recognize the GRN Junta “as soon as their presence in Leon is confirmed.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133–1879)↩