Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Nicaragua and Costa Rica¹

Washington, July 15, 1979, 1714Z

183735. San Jose for Ambassador Bowdler. Subject: Transition Scenario. Ref: A. San Jose 3081,² B. Managua 3190.³

1. (S-Entire text)

2. For Ambassador Bowdler: You should tell the GNR:

—We find the additional clarifications and commitments very positive.

—Based on our present understanding these, together with the OAS letter⁴ and previous “plan of government,”⁵ appears to constitute a workable basis for implementing a transition.

—We are prepared to contribute as we can to this implementation, and we would like to continue in contact with the GNR as the implementation moves along.

We have provided Ambassador Pezzullo the outlines of the total scenario and proposals as submitted to date, and he will immediately explore implementation from that side.⁶ We believe that a transition process could begin within the next 48 hours.

—In the meantime we would like to reiterate a few points to be sure we are both clear on them:

A) It will be up to the Nicaraguan Congress to designate the successor. We take the point of trying to persuade them to designate someone not closely associated with Somoza, but that decision as a practical matter is going to be made there.

B) We understand that the interim President would immediately name a new GN Commander (or Chief of Staff;) will call for a ceasefire and standstill; announce or set up sanctuaries; and call for no reprisals.

C) We believe that a ceasefire and standstill should be put into effect immediately upon Somoza’s departure. We suggest that the GNR parallel the interim President’s call with one of their own. Thus both sides would put forward the orders to its combatants at the same time. We assume that GNR can take responsibility for their troops in this period.

D) We understand that within the 72-hour period the interim President would contact the GNR to arrange for the transfer of power. How do they see the procedural scenario? We assume that they would travel to Managua on an agreed upon given time and date, and a ceremony would transfer power.

E) We assume that both the GNR and the interim President would and could extend invitations to the Foreign Ministers and IAHRC to witness and follow the transition. We understand that Ministers may go to Managua at the time of Somoza’s departure to observe and witness that first step.

F) We understand the GNR clarifications to you to mean also that the Foreign Ministers could observe the military standstill and restructuring.

G) We reiterate the recommendation that outside experts should be invited to assist and advise in the restructuring of military forces; this will inevitably be a tense task and such experts could have a softening effect. We also believe it should give others besides Costa Rica and Panama a role. Perhaps two or three other countries such as Mexico and some of the Andean group could be invited.

H) The procedure and ground rules for the joint GN-Sandinista committee are not fully clear. How do they contemplate this would be developed? We would suggest that the Chiefs of Staff contact each other immediately upon Somoza’s departure to plan, even before the transfer of power fully takes place. (FYI: We would prefer that the “fusion” not be rushed to give the GN time to get its feet set. End FYI.)

I) We believe that GNR should take initiative with Archbishop to establish sanctuaries. Ambassador Pezzullo can follow up with him.

3. Sergio Ramirez has, as you know, publicly said we would recognize the GNR. You should explain to the GNR that recognition as such does not arise in our international practice. U.S. practice now (in a kind of Estrada doctrine) is to recognize nations, not governments. We simply continue relations when a new government comes in. Septel will provide you and Ambassador Pezzullo with a fuller legal explanation of this point.⁷

4. (FYI: In responding to the GNR as above we want a fairly precise nuance. We want to hold them to commitments but we do not want to create the impression we have formalized an agreement or “treaty.” We want to convey the idea that their ideas are a basis on which we are prepared to cooperate to implement, but again not an “agreement.” We also do not want to be perceived as the main or sole “midwife” of this. Therefore the Andean group’s role is important in that sense. End FYI.)

5. For Ambassador Pezzullo: You should outline to Somoza the scenario and begin to flesh out the specifics including names. We have asked Embassy Guatemala to fill in Colonel Mojica in the event he is chosen so he can begin to plan. Please confirm details to us as your scenario is worked out. We do not expect that Somoza will be happy with every detail. You should point out that this is a workable, if not ideal, basis especially given international participation by OAS members.

6. We agree with San Jose 3081 that we should not push the GNR to “go public” at least on all the understandings. Please explain this to Somoza.

7. You should immediately move also to contact moderates and explain that transition scenario is working out, that they should recognize the dynamics of the first week and move to reach out to the moderates in the Cabinet and the new GN Commander. You should also continue to explore the relief committee idea.

8. Please keep in close coordination with us and Bill Bowdler.

9. (FYI: For Ambassador Bowdler: Can we try to keep 72-hour limit a little flexible rather than a rigid maximum? End FYI.)

Christopher

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Caracas, Bogotá, Guatemala City, Panama City, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Tegucigalpa, and the White House.
2. In telegram 3081 from San José, July 15, Bowdler noted that during his July 14 meeting with the Junta, he had not addressed the issue “of/if when, and how” to make public the GRN scenario. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua: 7/15–17/79) Bowdler described his July 14 meeting and the GRN transition scenario in telegram 3080 from San José, July 14. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 8, Central America: SCC 7/20/79 Meeting: 6–8/79)
3. In telegram 3190 from Managua, July 15, Pezzullo reported that Somoza had agreed to resign during the morning of July 17 and asked Bowdler when the GRN transition scenario, especially regarding the creation of a new Nicaraguan army and a ceasefire, would be made public. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua: 7/15–17/79)
4. See footnote 4, Document 268.
5. See footnote 7, Document 262.
6. See footnote 5, Document 269.
7. Telegram 183742 to Managua, July 15, provided guidance regarding the “U.S. practice to recognize nations, not governments.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–1948)