277. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State and the Embassy in Costa Rica1
3209. Dept for Vaky. San Jose for Bowdler. Subject: New GN Commander. Ref: San Jose 3088.2
1. We must recognize that many of the officers such as Blessing and others on the list we earlier considered have been retired by Somoza [Page 687] in his measure to rid the Guard of old leadership. Though I did not raise name of Guerrero, I am convinced his name is on that list.
2. We are in the quandry of having the one man acceptable to the Junta (Mojica) be a man who probably does not have the capacity to hold a traumatized National Guard officer corps together following the departure of Somoza, and the names we have considered are Guard officers most likely unacceptable to the Junta. The choice becomes one of selecting a man who holds the Guard or a man who is acceptable to the Junta and cannot hold the Guard.
3. I believe Somoza is sincere in attempting to help select a man that can hold the Guard. Whatever else he is, Somoza is a military commander who has spent a great deal of his life building a National Guard which is disciplined and has maintained its discipline even under difficult conditions and facing a very determined foe.
4. We began this venture aware of our limited knowledge of the Guard. Even the individuals we selected, Mojica included, are not people we know that much about. That includes General Sanchez, as well. Sanchez is an air force officer who, to our knowledge, has had no association with either the Guard’s recent activities or any of its notorious actions in the past. That is something Bowdler should raise with the Junta.
5. We should also recall that, under instructions from the Department, two days ago I gave Somoza the option of leaving within 72 hours, and leaving behind a successor President and anyone he chose for a Guard Commander.3 The actions he took were consistent with that, retiring officer with over 30 years service and selecting Sanchez as Commander. So we cannot accuse him of having gone contrary to what we expected of him. At this late stage I am very concerned about changing signals. The Guard must survive, or all is lost. Somoza has spent the last two days working very diligently with them. I suggest we accept Sanchez, and live with the fact that the Junta may have some problem with him.
6. Somoza, his son and his advisors have become adamant that Sanchez is the man to take over the National Guard and we now risk losing Somoza’s cooperation in this matter if we delay further. His cooperation is essential if we hope to maintain any portion of the National Guard as an institution. While we recognize that Somoza is trying to continue his influence in the Guard with the selection of [Page 688] Sanchez, we must also recognize that the Guard is an instrument of Somoza and we are not going to remake it in the next 24 hours.4
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua: 7/15–17/79. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- Bowdler reported in telegram 3088 from San José, July 16, that he would test the GRN’s reaction to Sanchez as soon as he could and that the Junta “showed no particular interest” in Guerrero, “focusing instead on Mojica as acceptable.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133–1502) In telegram 3206 from Managua, July 16, Pezzullo reported that he had not been able to convince Somoza “that Col. Mojica would have the kind of acceptability as GN Chief of Staff to best safeguard the long term interest of the GN.” Somoza proposed General Heberto Sanchez as a possible Chief of Staff of the National Guard. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua: 7/15–17/79) In telegram 183759 to Managua and San José, July 16, the Department instructed Pezzullo that he should not proceed with endorsing Sanchez without specific instruction from the Department. He should instead “urgently try out the name of Guerrero.” Bowdler received instructions to test Pezzullo’s proposal with the GRN Junta: “We must have some reasonable acceptability on both sides to avoid continued conflict.” (Ibid.) Pezzullo responded in telegram 3208 from Managua, July 16, that “Guerrero’s name has never come up” and that it would be “unwise to introduce another name” at “this late date.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])↩
- See footnote 5, Document 269.↩
- Bowdler reported in telegram 3090 from San José, July 16, that he and Weissman had met with the GRN Junta, whose members were “very firm in opposing General Sanchez.” Bowdler quoted the Junta’s comment that Sanchez “is a very bad candidate—the worst that we could have thought of—his appointment would break the understanding,” regarding the transition of power in Nicaragua. Bowdler wondered: “If Somoza is adamant on Sanchez what are the chances of ignoring Somoza and getting Urcuyo to name Mojica?” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133–1503)↩