275. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State and the Embassy in Costa Rica1
3204. For Assistant Secretary Vaky. San Jose for Ambassador Bowdler. Subject: (S) New Guard Commander.
1. (S-Entire text)
[Page 682]2. My early afternoon meeting with Somoza went well. I will be sending a separate cable later today on arrival plans and passengers in his party.2 He did not even raise the question of guarantees. We moved quickly to substantive issues in the scenario.
3. He has selected liberal Congressman Francisco Urcuyo as the interim President. I will meet with Urcuyo late this afternoon to go over his role during his short interim stewardship.
4. Based on our early demarche to Somoza which left in his hands the details of interim measures including the organization of the Guard, he presented me with a new reorganization formula, including the new GN Chief of Staff. I observed that the officer that filled that important position would be the principal instrument in assuring the survivability of elements of the GN. His role would be enhanced if he had creditability among GN officers as well as in the international community involved and the Junta. We thought that Col. Inocente Mojica was such a person. Somoza frowned and observed that Mojica was retired and might not be well known enough to the active officer corps to command their respect and support. He suggested either an old Somoza warhorse (General Humberto Sanchez) or a good soldier (LtCol Alberto Moreno) who lacks the prestige and policy of Mojica.
5. I broke the conversation at the point to consult further with my staff at the Embassy. [less than 1 line not declassified] DATT agree that Sanchez is a corrupt General who would seriously prejudice the survivability of the Guard. Moreno is a good soldier, but just that. We conclude that Mojica is the best choice, even more so given Somoza’s hesitation.
6. I plan to convince Somoza this afternoon that Mojica is the best candidate to protect the GN’s interests, and that he (Somoza) can help by preparing the ground with the GN officer corps to accept and support Mojica during this very sensitive transition.
7. Assuming I get Somoza’s concurrence, I plan to arrange for the DATT’s plane in Tegucigalpa to fly Mojica down from Guatemala tomorrow so that he can begin putting a supporting staff together. We will cable him some names through our DATT in Guatemala, Col. Fletcher. I will also make the plane availability to Mojica to fly to San Jose, if he desires. The more he can put into place in terms of building a new GN staff and in developing contacts with the FSLN leadership before Tuesday3 the better.
[Page 683]8. On that score, I question para 2h in State 183735.4 Early contact between the GN Chief of State and the FSLN is essential. Otherwise, we risk having some minor incident grow into a major confrontation. The Mojica/FSLN relationship would facilitate more rapid reaction in such an eventuality, even with the best of intentions on all sides, we can expect minor clashes or accidents. Dealing quickly to control such sporadic outbreaks will be almost impossible without early liaison.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua: 7/12–14/79. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- In telegram 3207 from Managua, July 16, the Embassy included information about Somoza and his entourage’s plans for arrival in the United States during the morning of July 17. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua: 7/15–17/79)↩
- July 17.↩
- See Document 276.↩