Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

266. Telegram From the Embassy in Costa Rica to Department of State and the Embassies in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Panama, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic¹

San José, July 12, 1979, 0128Z

3018. Subj: Meeting with the GNR Junta on Transition Scenario.

1. (S-Entire text)

2. The session with the GNR at 4:30 this afternoon was relatively short. In addition to the three civilian members of the Junta, Daniel Ortega Saavedra was also present. Marv Weissman accompanied me.

3. Before getting into substantive matters the Junta representatives reviewed the “fundamental statute” to indicate certain amendments which had been made.² These were all stylistic. I took the opportunity of this review to ask for clarification of two points. One had to do with the composition of the Council of State (Article 17), and the other with dissolution of the National Guard (Article 24). On the first point they gave us the following breakdown:

FSLN	—Six members
National Patriotic Front	—Twelve members
Broad Opposition Front	—Seven members
COSEP	—Six members
National University	—One member
Church	—One member

(Note: From this breakdown it is apparent that the Sandinistas would start off with an 18 to 15 advantage which could be expected to increase given the views of some of the component groups of the FAO and depending on whom the University names.) On the status of the Guard, they confirmed that the National Guard would be abolished forthwith as an institution. They argued that the Guard was a personal gendarmerie which had no national status and which had been repudiated by the people of Nicaragua for actions in the recent past. I inquired whether they contemplated the naming of a successor director of the Guard to which they replied that this was not necessary although they allowed that the new Minister of Defense could decide.

4. Ramirez then distributed the transition scenario and the names of the Cabinet members of the new government. Both documents are being sent in separate messages.³ Father D’Escoto read the scenario after which I observed that there were important differences between what we had discussed yesterday—and on which I understood there had been general concurrence—and this document. I noted that no provision was made for an interim president and the steps that he would take to launch an orderly transition process. No reference was made to the naming of a new director of the National Guard. Nothing was stated about the practical problems of discussions between the two forces on the establishment of a new military structure. The document made no provision for establishment of a sanctuary or for participation of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission in observance of guarantees. I tried to determine whether there was any willingness to consider inclusion of these points in the scenario and the answer I received was that there was really no need to do so although the Junta once in power could consider them. I also made another try at the question of expansion of the Junta and ran into a stone wall. At this point I said to them that I thought that the differences between our approach to transition and theirs were so different that I saw little possibility of our being able to make a positive contribution to an orderly transition based on the prior departure of Somoza as we had hoped. I wished to report back to my government before giving them any definitive response which I hope to be able to do during the course of the night.

5. Father D’Escoto interpreted my remarks as an expression of non-cooperation with the GNR. In the ensuing conversation I made clear twice that my remarks were addressed solely and exclusively to the transition process and I was making no observation whatsoever about our cooperation with the GNR and its program in the phase beyond the transition.

6. Toward the end of the conversation both Ortega and Father D’Escoto complained about American pressure on Costa Rica to block further assistance to the Frente. I told them that we were not involved in the recent actions of the Costa Rican Government in this regard although a halt to the flow of arms to both sides once Somoza had left was an important element of the cease fire/stand-still contemplated in our scenario. They obviously were not convinced and I anticipate that they may well distort my reply in order to suit their purposes.

7. The meeting was a polite but somber one. Ramirez practically did not participate leaving it to D’Escoto, Ortega and Robelo to carry the ball. As we left the meeting room and descended the stairs we could hear laughter in the background which I believe reflects their confidence that total victory is theirs and all they have to do is to wait for that outcome without making any concessions. D’Escoto in effect summed up their attitude when he said that it was for the GNR to decide on the political solution and this had been embodied in the documents handed to us.

8. Comment: In the light of the foregoing I see no alternative but to proceed with the next steps outlined in State 178797.⁴ There is no way of knowing at this stage whether the revolutionary glue will hold the component parts of the Frente together once Somoza is gone. We might begin examining how we could take advantage of schisms which might develop with a view to helping the moderates rally around one of the factions and support this component. In this connection the idea of a national Nicaraguan relief committee contained in para 4(D) of State 178797 is a good one.

Weissman

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua: 7/12–14/79. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. See footnote 7, Document 262.
3. In telegram 3031 from San José, July 12, the Embassy reported the GRN communiqué on its “scenario for a transition of power in Nicaragua.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790316–0249) In telegram 3013 from San José, July 11, Bowdler sent a list of the GNR’s proposed Cabinet members. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133–1918)
4. See footnote 4, Document 264.