Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

265. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State and the Embassy in Costa Rica¹

Managua, July 10, 1979, 2210Z

3089. Subject: (S) The Urgency of Decision. Ref: Vaky-Pezzullo TelCon July 10.²

1. S-Entire text.

2. It is heartening that Bowdler’s conversations indicate that the Junta agrees in general with the transition formula raised with Torrijos. The invitation to Col. Mojica to come to San Jose is excellent news. But we have very little time.

3. The TCP process began a week ago. Since then the FSLN has made gains and GN has been debilitated further. Our latest information is that FSLN units are being infiltrated into Managua in increasing numbers. If the action in Leon is any model, they will move on signal and exert maximum pressure in a concerted manner. I estimated yesterday that the GN could only hold out three days or more under such an attack.

4. Our contacts in the GN reveal a mood change toward U.S. Two weeks ago, on my arrival, the middle guard officers in the GN quickly acclimated to the idea of serving in a post-Somoza security force and saw some future therein. Our latest information indicates they are frustrated by our inaction and by the continuing military pressure from the FSLN. They saw the removal of Somoza as a key element in relieving the pressure on the GN and also offering the GN an opportunity to separate itself from Somocismo. They now see themselves slowly being reduced to their last redoubt in Managua, with Somoza still in place, low on supplies and the prospect of being destroyed as an institution. What little faith they had in the USG has been seriously eroded these past two weeks. We may be close to the break point for any remnants of the GN to survive.

5. Our contacts with GN officers have been difficult. Overt contacts by the DAO officers result in requests for immediate material assistance or in suspicion or charges that we are coup-plotting. (Recall Congressman Murphy charge that Datt Col. McCoy was plotting a coup.)³ To avoid both problems, I have asked Col. McCoy to restrict his contacts during this sensitive period. We have concentrated our efforts and information gathering on SRF sources. Our message to the GN via these sources has been to encourage GN officers to think in terms of adapting and surviving as a viable institution; that the U.S., and other LA countries are interested in seeing a disciplined security force preserved to prevent a breakdown in order leading to a takeover by the left; that during the transition period, the remaining GN officers have to be flexible and receptive to negotiations with the Sandinistas to keep the peace and eventually to a new armed forces structure in Nicaragua. That message was getting positive responses until very recently. Now with the delay in getting Somoza out, coupled with the continued FSLN advance, the GN officer corps is getting very depressed and their confidence in U.S. is seriously eroded.

6. If the negotiations can be wrapped up in 24 hours, perhaps we still can preserve the salvageable elements in the GN. The Mojica card would be an excellent one in bucking up GN morale, but only if it is played quickly. But time is running out, while we go from TCP negotiations with the FSLN commanders to direct negotiations with the Junta.

7. The history of the period will show that Somoza has already stated publicly, that he was prepared to step down at our request two weeks ago. The fact has already hurt us with the GN and with a large segment of the Nicaraguan people who believe we allowed the bloodshed to continue while seeking a “diplomatic solution”. If we allow the negotiations to delay reaching d-day in a day or two, we will soon lose the ability to extract any advantage from the only action we ever had fully in our hands—the resignation of Somoza. Once the attack begins on Managua, even that is gone.

Pezzullo

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for information to Panama City and Caracas.
2. A memorandum of conversation for the July 10 Vaky-Pezzullo telephone conversation has not been found.
3. In telegram 169040 to Managua, June 30, Vaky reported to Pezzullo that Murphy had called Christopher on June 29 and “alleged that DAO McCoy was talking to Guard officers and seeking to instigate a coup,” an action which “could result in Somoza’s assassination.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–1817)