Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

264. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, July 10, 1979

SUBJECT

• SCC on Nicaragua (U)

I chaired an SCC meeting on Nicaragua today, and Christopher, Duncan, Gen Pustay of JCS, Frank Carlucci, and others attended.² We discussed the Junta’s response to our proposal.³ Facing the prospect of indefinite delays negotiating that plan, we fear that our influence can only be diminished while others will increasingly blame us for the continued bloodshed. We understand that President Perez is planning to meet with Carazo, Torrijos, and the Junta in Costa Rica to try one last time to reach agreement on the plan. We will encourage him to make that effort. Ambassador Bowdler has also been dealing with the Junta bilaterally at their request, and he has been instructed to press for agreement urgently tonight and tomorrow. Nevertheless, we believe it is necessary to set a deadline in order to catalyze the negotiations and to bring an end to the bloodshed. (S)

Therefore, the SCC unanimously recommends, and these recommendations have been approved by Secretaries Vance and Brown, that within 24 hours if it looks like the Torrijos, Carazo, Perez (TCP) negotiations are not succeeding, that we implement the following plan:

1. To the Junta, we should indicate that we believe it is in their interest and in the interest of the people of Nicaragua to enlarge the Junta and make it genuinely representative of the Nicaraguan people. It should include people of the kind of prestige we have recommended. This reiteration of our sincere view should not be viewed as antagonistic toward the Junta, but rather as a logical continuation of their struggle for democracy. (S)

2. To Somoza, we should quietly inform him that he should begin to implement the plans already made for his departure because we fear that polarization and radicalization can only increase if he remains. He should therefore permit the Congress to select his successor, who in turn will appoint an interim Commander of the National Guard until such time as Col. Mojica, or someone acceptable to the PG and the US, can come and take charge. (S)

3. To TCP, we should inform them that we have reason to believe that Somoza will depart imminently, and they should bring all their influence to bear to get all parties to agree to an immediate ceasefire, standstill, no reprisals, an enlarged Junta, a cessation of all arms flow, a declaration of principles, and the designation of a new National Guard Commander. We should urge TCP to make a public call for a ceasefire and request the Junta to issue a declaration of principles. (S)

4. To the Junta, we should ask them to proclaim their principles on human rights, free elections, no reprisals, etc. (S)

5. As soon as Somoza leaves and there is a ceasefire, the US should inform all parties that the US is prepared to deliver substanital humanitarian assistance to relief organizations in areas under both National Guard and FSLN control. We would encourage the establishment of a Nicaraguan Relief Committee to take charge of this effort. It should include people like the head of the Red Cross, the Rector of the University in Leon, the Archbishop, the acting Commander of the National Guard, and other prominent people, thereby coalescing some of the moderates. (S)

In this approach, we would continue to rely on TCP and other Latin Americans, trying to encourage the US public and others to view their role as key to future subsequent developments in Nicaragua, and view ourselves as more in the background. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the approach suggested above.⁴ (U)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 35, Nicaragua, 7–12/79. Secret. Sent for action. Brzezinski did not initial the memorandum. Carter initialed the top of the first page of the memorandum. According to a covering note attached to a copy of the memorandum, Brzezinski authorized Pastor on July 10 to transmit the memorandum to Camp David for delivery to the President at the opening of business on July 11. Brzezinski wrote “OBE” on this copy of the memorandum. An unknown hand wrote “7–19–79” below Brzezinski’s comment. (Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 30, Meetings—SCC 175, 7/10/1979)
2. See Document 263.
3. See Document 262.
4. Carter initialed his approval. In telegram 178797 to Caracas, Managua, Panama City, and San José, July 11, the Department transmitted the results of the July 10 SCC meeting. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 36, Nicaragua, 7/9–11/79)