Office of the Historian

263. Memorandum for the Record1

NFAC–3682–79
Washington, July 10, 1979

SUBJECT

  • SCC Meeting on Nicaragua, 10 July 1979, White House Situation Room2

PARTICIPANTS

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski, David Aaron, White House; Frank Carlucci, [name not declassified] CIA; Warren Christopher, Viron Vaky, Brandon Grove, State Department; Robert Pastor, NSC; John Pustay, JCS; Charles Duncan, David McGiffert, Department of Defense

1. Ambassador Vaky said Ambassador Bowdler had reported that the provisional junta refused this morning to expand its membership. The junta members insisted they had not proposed the names of Cesar Amador and Emilio Baltodano; Father D’Escoto, the junta’s roving ambassador, said he had only thrown out the names hypothetically. The junta had no other problems with the US scenario, new Guard commander (though they wanted Mojica to come to San Jose for a [Page 658] meeting and Bowdler agreed), cease fire, and the junta related that they would soon finish formulating their plan of government.

2. Given the failure so far to broaden the junta, the committee discussed the merits and drawbacks of preemptively urging Somoza to depart and bringing the transition issues to a head. Mr. Aaron opposed such action on the grounds that the US would be seen as the “midwife” of a radical regime in Central America. Mr. Christopher countered that the US would be blamed for leaving Somoza in power and prolonging the bloodshed, while some credit could be won by precipitating his departure.

3. Dr. Brzezinski proposed and, after discussion, the group accepted the following proposals to be confirmed with Secretaries Vance and Brown and presented to the President:

a) The US will tell the FSLN’s provisional government that Washington continues to insist on broadening representation on the junta.

b) The US will privately inform Somoza it sees no reason why he should not leave Nicaragua immediately.

c) The US will ask the junta and Torrijos-Carazo-Perez to call for a cease fire when Somoza departs, to identify a new Guard commander, and to declare publicly the junta’s support for such principles as no reprisals, free elections, etc.

d) The US will provide relief through existing Red Cross and relief channels and committees, perhaps suggesting that certain moderate leaders join in the effort.

4. An additional proposal that the US withhold recognition of the junta until it had added additional members was not approved.

5. Vaky urged, and the committee concurred, that before these steps were implemented, Bowdler should be instructed to make one last attempt to secure the junta’s acceptance of the original scenario. In addition, Perez had proposed that he pursue the same end with Torrijos and Carazo in Panama immediately. Failing this, the US would take the above 4 steps.

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 36: (SCC) Nicaragua. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on July 12. [name not declassified] sent a copy of the memorandum to Turner under a July 12 covering memorandum, indicating that [name not declassified] had drafted the memorandum.↩
  2. See Document 264.↩