211. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Guatemala and El Salvador1
148785. Subject: Guatemalan and Salvadoran Policy Toward Nicaragua.
1. (S-Entire text)
2. Throughout the Nicaraguan crisis, our objective has been to contain instability and to discourage actions by other countries that fuel the fires and internationalize the violence. Thus we have continuously lobbied the governments, especially Panama, Venezuela and Costa Rica, not to despatch arms and aid to the Sandinista insurgents.
3. There have been reports that El Salvador and Guatemala are sending arms to Somoza, Panamanian authorities have made this charge to our Embassy, and have told us that while they do not want to intervene, neither should Guatemala/El Salvador. Most recently we have received some intelligence reports indicating that the Guatemalan military might consider military intervention, including troops, if Somoza requests. Such action would clearly internationalize the conflict and lead to worse violence.
4. Although we have made similar demarches in the past, we believe it would be desirable once again to express to your host governments our request that they not either intervene or fuel the situation with arms traffic. Accordingly you should make the following points to the highest appropriate authority.
—We are very concerned about events in Nicaragua and are monitoring them closely.
—We do not believe that the solution of the Nicaraguan crisis can come through unilateral actions by neighboring states. The OAS is the proper body in which to consider whatever actions might be appropriate for the international community.
—An internationalization of the conflict would serve no one’s interests. Intervention by neighboring states would have untold consequences for the region, and would set off a chain of events whose course no one could predict or control.
—Intervention by another country would be the one excuse that Cuba could use to justify direct intervention.
[Page 545]—Military intervention by any outside power would almost certainly become public knowledge. It would be self-deceptive to imagine that such actions could be kept secret.
—We urge that your government continue to follow its policy of not intervening in the Nicaraguan crisis or extending military assistance to either side. For Guatemala, you may add, that we have noted the report that the Guatemalan Minister of Defense denied that Guatemalan troops are in Nicaragua and that the Ministry stated the Guatemalan Army would not intervene in that country, and we urge continuation of that policy.
—We are interested in your thoughts regarding the Nicaraguan situation, and would like to remain in close contact.2
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790262–0512. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Caracas, Managua, Panama City, San José, and Tegucigalpa. Drafted by Feinberg and Pfeifle; cleared in ARA/CEN; approved by Vaky.↩
- Telegram 3698 from Guatemala City, June 11, reported the delivery of the démarche to the Guatemalan Foreign Minister who responded that Guatemala “would never supply arms to Nicaragua.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790265–0431) Telegram 3260 from San Salvador, June 14, reported Romero’s statement that “since the inception of the Nicaraguan crisis, El Salvador’s position has been one of non-intervention,” and that “not one single person had been sent to assist Somoza.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790269–0607) Telegram 2554 from Managua, June 10, noted that the Embassy had “no information or credible reports that either El Salvador or Guatemala are providing arms, troops or even mercenaries to assist the Guardia Nacional.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790263–0943)↩