210. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to Secretary of State Vance1
Nicaraguan Scenario
Two recent events give us a significant—but passing—opportunity to mount a major OAS effort to resolve the Nicaraguan crisis:
—The Andean Group (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia) issued a declaration June 8 calling for a peaceful democratic solution in Nicaragua (a copy is attached),2 The Foreign Ministers of Venezuela and Ecuador are travelling to Costa Rica and Nicaragua on behalf of all five countries to meet June 10–11, with Somoza and Carazo, separately, to probe for a solution.
—Senator Zorinsky has told us he would be willing to marshal support in the Senate, including Senator Lugar (and through him Senator Baker) for decisive measures to end this crisis. He said he believed Somoza should go and/or we should “take over the opposition.” He urged close cooperation with Mexico.
The Andean Group initiative is still vague and unformed. It does provide, however, a perfect opening for reconvening the 17th Meeting of Foreign Ministers (MFM) and using that as a vehicle for a major international effort to end the crisis.
We believe the 17th MFM (which originated last September presided over by the Dominican Foreign Minister and is technically still in session), provides a very suitable format, and one preferable to the OAS Council or a Rio Pact meeting. The 17th MFM was convoked under the Charter, and therefore involves the Caribbean countries whose vote would unquestionably support us. (The Caribbean countries are not members of the Rio Pact.)
As we envisage it, a call to reconvene the MFM would be made by the Andean Pact countries, joined by ourselves, Mexico and the Dominican Republic. The purpose would be to create the opportunity for and to oversee a political transition process in Nicaragua. To be successful and accepted, such a process would have to involve the following elements:
[Page 543]—Somoza’s withdrawal from power.
—An immediate transitional government.
—Preservation of existing institutions such as the National Guard.
—Negotiation involving all elements including the Sandinistas for a transition formula leading to democratic elections.
The preconditions for getting such a process off the ground, i.e., having it accepted, would have to be:
—Somoza’s conviction that he has no choice but to step down and therefore cooperate in the transition.
—That the arms flow to both sides be stopped so that the parties can negotiate; the Sandinistas tasting victory are not likely to put down their arms if they think they can win.
—The OAS system would have to involve itself in some way in a good offices/mediation effort and in supervision of the process.
The MFM would have to address itself to all these points.
We therefore propose a series of measures as follows:
—Ambassador Bowdler left for Costa Rica this morning (June 9) to talk with the Venezuelan and Ecuadorean Foreign Ministers. He will brief them on his mediation effort, explain the Nicaraguan situation as we see it and seek to find out what they plan; he will consult with them on the idea of an MFM and what that might entail.
—Ambassador Bowdler will go to Mexico June 11 to talk with Castaneda and Lopez Portillo for the same purposes.
—We have already communicated with the Dominican Foreign Minister who has indicated his support for an MFM and his willingness to preside over it.
—Following all of the consultations outlined above we would have another round with the Andean countries, Mexico and the Dominican Republic to work out an MFM strategy. We would, in the course of it, work out the exact language of a resolution to accomplish our objectives.
—Parallel to the above we plan to send Bill Jorden to talk to Somoza with whom we have had no real communication in the past several months. The purpose would be to find out his mood and thinking. A question is whether he should also carry a “message” that the hemisphere countries want to end the situation and he must cooperate with them.