180. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State and the White House1
7272. NSC for Pastor. Department for Secretary Vance and Vaky. Subject: Nicaraguan Mediation 276: Further Thoughts on PLN Counterproposal. Ref: Managua 6804.2
1. (Secret-Entire Message)
2. In the message I sent from Managua during the short interval between seeing Somoza and emplaning for Miami (reftel), I summarized the difficulties I saw in the PLN counterproposal, both with respect to its acceptability as a viable solution and the problems it poses for us in the OAS and with U.S. public opinion. The purpose of [Page 460] this message is to elaborate these points and suggest where we go from here on the mediation.
3. On the first point of acceptability, the document needs to be analyzed not only for what it says, but also the context in which it was prepared and how it will be perceived from a Nicaraguan standpoint. To someone not familiar with the Nicaraguan milieu, the counterproposal is a reasonable document which has the PLN and FAO working jointly in management of the plebiscite with a strong OAS input to monitor and verify different aspects of the process. The procedures look good and the safeguards adequate. What is not evident to the outsider is how 44 years of Somoza monopoly of power transforms what to all appearances seems fair and reasonable into a decided PLN advantage. Practical politicians will understand this aspect. Four decades of Somoza dictatorship have left the opposition, including the traditional conservative party, divided, leaderless and ineffective as political organizations. This gives the government and its political instrument—the PLN—a great advantage in organizing for a political contest both with respect to above-board operations (e.g. registration of voters) and electoral slight-of-hand (e.g. chain voting). Another significant aspect are public perceptions of the political process resulting from 44 years of Somoza rule. During this period, the Somozas have resorted to so many constitutional and electoral tricks that any process in which they or their surrogates are involved is automatically suspect. The history of pacts, deals and understandings between opposition leaders and one or another of the Somozas have invariably led to the Somozas coming out on top, to the embarrassment and discredit of the opposition which entered the trap, the track record on this score has been so dismal that there is an acute psychosis among the opposition about entering into any kind of venture with Somocismo, no matter how noble the cause.
4. The content of the PLN counterproposal, looked at through the prism of those realities and perceptions, has four major drawbacks from the standpoint of the opposition:
A) The joint PLN–FAO electoral authority: this is seen by the opposition, as reflected in Robelo’s comments to me this morning (Santo Domingo 7270),3 as a dangerous adventure in which the FAO shares the responsibility of a co-participant without a corresponding ability for making an input into management of the plebiscite process.
[Page 461]B) The question to be put to the voter: The over-riding issue in the crisis which envelopes Nicaragua is the continuation of the Somoza dynasty in power, heightened by the fear—if not the fact—that Somoza is grooming his son in the National Guard to continue the family’s control. The question presented in the PLN counterproposal is cast in terms of Somoza’s constitutional period and the holding of a constituent assembly, concepts which are difficult to understand for the average unsophisticated voter. Phrasing the question in this manner tends to confuse the basic issue, complicate the campaign effort, and reduce the inclination of the voter to go to the polls.
C) The prior registration of voters: requiring prior registration of voters favors the party with the organization to mobilize those who are eligible. The GON–PLN has such an organization based on the bureaucracy and the party cadre. The FAO has no such organization and is not in a position to develop such an apparatus on short notice. Registration also works against the FAO in a subtle psychological way. It inhibits the campesino from voting because past experience has taught him that registration is one of the devices used by Somocismo to know who voted and how. The fear of reprisal is a strong disincentive to vote. The fact that the PLN counter-proposal drops the NG condition about recall to Managua of “Jueces de Mesta” on voting day reinforces the belief that the plebiscite will follow past patterns.
D) The organization of voting districts: the PLN counterproposal provides for the present Cantonal system (some 2300 Cantons) to serve as the basis for establishing polling places. This again follows the old electoral pattern which in rural areas is associated with manipulation of the vote. It too will work to the detriment of FAO in discouraging rural voters.
5. Mindful of the history of electoral fraud under Somoza and the negative attitudes this has engendered among the electorate toward the political process, the NG in its plan sought to neutralize the practical and psychological advantages which adherence to previous electoral patterns would give Somoza. We regarded it as basic to have a plebiscite which inspired voter confidence by breaking with past procedures. This is the rationale for proposing: PLN and FAO acceptance of international supervision and control; changing the pattern of voting districts; no prior registration but tight control through use of effective marking techniques; complete control of ballot printing, distribution and counting; and a simple, easily understood question which summed up the central issue in Nicaragua’s crisis. The introduction of this special process to deal with a special situation is what Somoza found unacceptable because he fears that he would lose in such an open, free system.
6. In assessing the PLN document, the Department should also keep in mind the tactics employed by the PLN negotiators at Somoza’s [Page 462] instructions. It will be remembered that they did not play a constructive role. They could well have advanced some of the ideas contained in their counterproposal as a positive contribution to the discussion of our Dec. 2 plan, but they did not. Instead they were dilatory and obstructive. Only after the NG refused to permit these tactics and they found themselves on the defensive as a result of the NG plan and the FAO acceptance, did they come forward with their proposals.
7. With respect to how we should handle the PLN counter-proposal, I have these suggestions:
A) From Robelo’s reaction this morning and the views expressed to Embassy Managua by his two FAO/PC colleagues, I do not believe it fruitful to reopen the talks. The gulf between the FAO and Somoza’s position is too wide. Further efforts to bridge it at this stage works more to the advantage of Somoza than the FAO. Indeed, there is the danger that if we attempted to push the FAO into accepting major elements of the PLN plan, it could lead to the break up of the FAO which would be to Somoza’s advantage and would put FAO’s collapse at our doorstep.
B) Instead, I think it would be better for the NG to answer the PLN, with a communication that would also be made public, that it has carefully studied the counterproposal and finds that it would not create “the conditions necessary for a peaceful solution” as contemplated in the OAS Resolution of September 23.4 We would have to explain non-polemically why this is so in the historical psychological context described in earlier paragraphs of this message. The NG communication would also restate the belief that its plan is fair and workable and regret that the PLN was not able to accept it in principle as the FAO had done.
C) The NG would next proceed to prepare a status report to the MFM, explaining its efforts over the past three months, noting the lack of success to date, and leaving the door open to assist the parties whenever the two of them believe it would be useful.
D) The MFM might then meet to receive the IAHRC report and the NG report. This would afford individual states an opportunity to address the problem of violation of human rights in Nicaragua. I assume it is not in the cards to obtain the necessary votes for a condemnation of the GON, but there might be enough for a collective expression of concern. This translates into pressure on Somoza. On the NG report, the MFM might note with regret that the efforts at conciliation have not been successful and echo the NG’s availability to assist the parties when they so request.
[Page 463]E) The specific steps discussed in the PRC meeting last Tuesday could then follow.5 Care would be taken to make clear that the actions are protective measures to safeguard the welfare of U.S. official personnel who might be caught up in the strife between the FSLN and Somoza. This would sidestep responsibility for the impasse in the mediation, but at the same time convey a clear message to Somoza and help maintain our credibility with the moderate opposition to Somoza in Nicaragua.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780537–0731. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Caracas, Managua, San José, Panama City, and USSOUTHCOM Quarry Heights.↩
- See Document 179.↩
- In telegram 7270 from Santo Domingo, December 29, Bowdler reported that Robelo had read the PLN counterproposal and “observed that the FAO could not accept a plebiscite under the conditions proposed by Somoza.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780537–0670)↩
- See footnote 4, Document 107.↩
- See Document 178 and footnote 2 thereto.↩