Office of the Historian

159. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1

Washington, December 5, 1978

SUBJECT

  • Nicaragua Update

Somoza is obviously engaging in some fast contingency planning. He instructed Ambassador Sevilla-Sacasa to query the State Department yesterday on the likelihood of U.S. support for him should he win the plebiscite and establish a government of national unity. Posing the question to Vaky, Sevilla-Sacasa received the assurance that we would respect the result of the plebiscite. Vaky emphasized that it was important for Somoza and the FAO to agree on the precise arrangements of the plebiscite so that everyone will know exactly what will happen given either eventuality. (C)

Simultaneously Somoza sent his cousin and confidant to speak with Bowdler in Managua. Somoza wanted the answers to three questions:2

—Will the USG “guarantee” that it will respect the results of the plebiscite in the event that Somoza wins and will resume normal relations, aid, etc.?

—What assurances could he receive that an orderly transition take place if he resigns the presidency following a defeat in the plebiscite?

—How would the U.S. respond in affording legal, economic, and other protection to Somoza and his family in the event he lost the plebiscite and had to depart the country?

Bowdler referred the first and last questions to State; and responded to the second by saying that the NG’s proposal offered the necessary framework whereby a viable transition government could be formed should Somoza lose and be forced to step down. (C)

Two important leaders inside the FAO met Bowdler yesterday to request the exclusion of questions relating to the transition government from upcoming negotiations with Somoza. Only the plebiscite should be discussed, they said. They also set three conditions before meeting with Somoza: end to the state of siege, amnesty, and reform of the [Page 420] radio censorship code. Bowdler and his colleagues on the NG will try to obtain Somoza’s positive action on them before the face-to-face negotiations begin Thursday.3 (C)

On another front, the OAS fact-finding commission returned from Costa Rica and Nicaragua and is drafting its report on the border incident.4 We understand that the document, which will probably be presented next week to the OAS, will recommend an OAS border observer mission for the frontier between the two countries. (C)

Conversations with Costa Rican officials reveal that Costa Rica is finding its influence with the FSLN reduced as a result of the increased presence in the border areas. It is also faced with the reality that its public security forces are too inexperienced and ill-equipped to be able to risk a forceful showdown with the FSLN. (C)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 56, Nicaragua: 12/78–6/79. Confidential.↩
  2. In telegram 6297 from Managua, December 4, Bowdler wrote to Christopher and Vaky that Somoza had requested answers from the United States about three questions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2336)↩
  3. December 7.↩
  4. See Document 148.↩