160. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
SUBJECT
- Nicaragua: Factors Affecting Sandinista Military Strategy (U)
1. The principal Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) guerrilla faction has sufficient strength to launch major attacks independently and, given the flow of new armament and other preparations, a new offensive could still come at any time. Guerrilla leaders, however, are evidently weighing potential constraints, several of which appear to recommend a policy of hit-and-run attacks, at least as long as the international mediation effort continues. (S/NF)
2. The guerrillas’ major offensive has been expected, and in fact repeatedly announced, for weeks, and preparation continues unabated. The Terciario faction in particular has the advantages of substantial [Page 421] foreign backing—the latest arms delivery from Panama two weeks ago was sufficient for 500 men—and success in recruiting—the armed force in Costa Rica alone may number 700 or more. (S/NF)
3. A number of factors, however, currently seems to favor an FSLN policy of hit-and-run attacks rather than an all-out offensive. The principal Terciario faction reportedly has denounced the mediation and the proposal for a national plebiscite, but the bulk of Terciario leader Pastora’s rank-and-file followers—newer recruits presumed to be motivated more by anti-Somoza sentiment than revolutionary ideology—may prefer giving the plebiscite a chance. Certainly Pastora needs active popular backing inside Nicaragua, which would be less forthcoming if his offensive were perceived to be undermining a promising and peaceful alternative means to oust Somoza. Moreover, among the Sandinistas’ international backers, Fidel Castro and perhaps Venezuelan President Perez, for different reasons, are counseling against a major attack. (S/NF/NC/OC)
4. The guerrillas also are certainly weighing military factors. They have greater numbers and better arms than ever before, but so does the National Guard. The FSLN may have 2,000 armed followers, while the Guard probably has over 10,000 men. Moreover, the Guard has reinforced the Costa Rican border area, and within the next few weeks, the Organization of American States could post observers along the border as well. The Terciarios, who operate largely out of Costa Rica, are not for the most part suicidal fanatics. They recognize that another drubbing like the one suffered in September could demoralize anti-Somoza forces of all stripes and strengthen the government’s overall position. (S/NF)
5. The military balance is unlikely to change significantly unless the guerrillas acquire aircraft or receive much greater, direct foreign military support. Several vague reports have suggested that the FSLN has acquired some planes, but we have no details or corroboration. (S/NF/NC/OC)
6. Tomas Borge, the Popular Prolonged War (GPP) faction leader, opposes Pastora’s strategy of uniting various anti-Somoza forces to promote immediate popular insurrection, because he believes it is premature and non-ideological. The GPP favors an authentic revolution achieved through prolonged guerrilla action beginning in the mountains and culminating in a general insurrection to establish a socialist state. Fidel Castro evidently has counseled Sandinista leaders, including Borge and Pastora, to pursue this course. (S/NF/NC/OC)
7. A generally reliable source reports that the GPP faction will engage in continuing small scale hit-and-run attacks against National Guard units rather than participate in Pastora’s major offensive. The GPP also is reportedly attempting to compound the economic squeeze [Page 422] on the Somoza government by destroying some of the harvested cotton and coffee crops. On 5 December they set fire to coffee stocks in Diriamba and San Marcos, reportedly causing considerable damage. Another source reports that 200 members of the GPP faction recently crossed from Honduras—the new base of operations for the faction’s national leadership—into Nicaragua to begin military actions. In fact, there have been several skirmishes in the past week between the Guard and guerrillas in the mountains of northern Nicaragua not far from the Honduran border. (S/NF/NC/OC)
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00634A: Production Case Files (1978), Box 13, Folder 90: Nicaragua: Factors Affecting Sandinista Military Strategy. Secret; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon.↩