Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

148. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, November 22, 1978

SUBJECT

• Nicaragua Today

Costa Rica broke diplomatic relations with Nicaragua last night after it said two of its Civil Guards were killed by the Nicaraguan National Guard in the border zone. Costa Rica introduced a resolution this morning at the OAS that a permanent commission of observers be sent by the OAS to the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border to maintain the peace. The resolution also calls for an ad hoc committee to investigate the incident, which occurred yesterday. Nicaragua, claiming that its territory had been violated, supported the resolution, and it is expected to be voted upon tonight.

The NG presented its plebiscite proposal to Somoza, who responded: “I am afraid I would lose the vote you propose.”² He said he would study the proposal further, but expressed strong negative initial reservations.

From Somoza’s bunker, the NG proceeded immediately to the FAO headquarters, where Robello said that it had been decided not to accept the NG proposal because to agree to consider a plebiscite—whether Somoza-style or an honest one—would be violating the will of the people who believe Somoza has “prostituted” the word “plebiscite.” To give consideration to the plebiscite idea, he said, would make it appear that Somoza was a “democrat.”

The NG responded that it had to deliver the proposal and hoped it would be seriously studied. After a break, the FAO leader returned with the statement that the FAO was “deeply disillusioned” by the proposal, but after considerable debate with the NG, the FAO accepted the proposal. They then caucussed privately for three hours and issued a vaguely worded press release that the mediation effort had failed to achieve its democratization objective. Nonetheless, the FAO promised a response.

The meeting with the FAO is well described in the cable which is attached at Tab A.³ The strain was very great. It does not appear that Bowdler has yet used the most important card that we gave him—that if the FAO accepted the plebiscite, we would tell Somoza that he should accept it as well, or risk losing our support.⁴ I spoke to Vaky about that, and he is confident that Bowdler will use it—if he hasn’t already—at the right time. I don’t like the idea of second-guessing either Bowdler or Pete, but I am nervous that this is the time, and we might lose the opportunity if we don’t seize it now. I think the FAO is going through an extremely difficult decision-making process, and they need our encouragement and some signs of the depth of our commitment to the idea of a plebiscite. I think we must be more certain that that message is being delivered. We should also not be reluctant to inform the FAO that Somoza has told us that he knows he would lose such a plebiscite. You may want to call Christopher on it.

At Tab B is a letter which Douglas Fraser of the UAW sent the President.⁵ It represents some of a growing number of calls by liberal groups in the US to withdraw our support from Somoza.

I hesitate to say that I believe we have reached a crossroads, only because we have said it so many times before, but I strongly believe in a plebiscite as a device which would facilitate and legitimate our objectives, and I fear that a final decision on the idea may be made before we have had a chance to bring to bear our full concerns. I do not fear Somoza’s rejection of the plebiscite, but I do fear the rejection by the FAO, because while I can understand the kinds of pressures and suspicions under which they are working, I don’t believe the American people will understand it.

Once we have played out the plebiscite idea, however, regardless whichever way it goes, we need to be prepared to take some of the steps outlined in Fraser’s letter; in his words, not giving Somoza an ultimatum but simply withdrawing our support.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 11/1–22/78. Secret. Sent for information.
2. See Document 147.
3. Not attached. Bowdler reported on the negotiating team’s meeting with the FAO in telegram 6026 from Managua, November 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) Telegram 6019 from Managua, November 21, contained an English-language translation of the Negotiating Group’s press communiqué. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780480–0163) Telegram 6025 from Managua, November 22, included the Spanish-language text and English-language translation of the statement issued by the FAO on November 21 in response to the Negotiating Group proposal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780481–0528)
4. See Document 139.
5. Not attached.