Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

145. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, November 20, 1978

SUBJECT

• Nicaragua Today

Although the FAO rejected the idea of a plebiscite as proposed by Somoza, they agreed to hold open the possibility of considering a fair plebiscite which posed the question of Somoza’s departure, but only after the Negotiating Group obtained Somoza’s acceptance of it.²

The mediators are working with the following schedule in mind: Today, they will meet with Somoza to relay the FAO reject of his version of the plebiscite, and to try to draw him out on the conditions he would be willing to accept for the type of plebiscite we have in mind. On Tuesday,³ they will prepare a proposal for a plebiscite with reasonable conditions and give it to the two parties. On Thursday, on the basis of comments they expect to receive, they will revise the proposal and make it public. We will then consider next steps.⁴

As the deadline set by the FSLN of November 21 (by which time they would begin hostilities unless Somoza agreed to step down) approaches, there are increasing signs of attacks. In demarches to the Costa Ricans, Panamanians, and the Venezuelans we asked that they restrain the FSLN to give the NG more time to promote a plebiscite that would be acceptable to both the FAO and Somoza. These three governments have agreed to intercede with the FSLN to postpone their planned attack. (C)

In our canvassing of Latin governments to obtain support for a genuine plebiscite in Nicaragua, four have indicated their support (Uruguay, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Guatemala) and two (Panama and Venezuela) have expressed misgivings about its wisdom. Others have yet to answer. (C)

Nicaraguan Vice Minister for Atlantic Coast Development Renner told Ambassador Solaun that the general feeling inside the Liberal Party was to repudiate Somoza, but they feared taking any actions. Renner indicated that if the US supported a pro-Liberal GN (National Guard) solution, the Liberals would rebel against Somoza. Renner also said that in a true referendum on Somoza’s tenure, ninety percent of the voting population would be for his resignation. (C)

Vice Mayor of Miami Reboso called to ask again if I would be willing to speak to Somoza in Managua. I said no. He asked if I would meet Somoza’s Assistant, Max Kelly, who is in Washington today, and I said that I would get in direct contact with Kelly. Unless I hear otherwise, I assume there are no problems meeting with Kelly. Especially since, at State’s request, I have met with opposition leaders, including Dr. Jerez, a brain surgeon who was here this weekend and who represents Robelo on the FAO. Jerez told me that the National Guard continues to kill moderate opposition people, including two leaders of his party, and continues to terrorize the population at night. He was quite explicit in asking us not to intervene, but at the same time he asked that we withdraw our Milgroup, which he sees as a sign of support for Somoza, and make a demarche to the Israelis, who are supplying arms to Somoza.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 56, Nicaragua: 1/77–11/78. Secret.
2. Bowdler reported this information to Christopher and Vaky in telegram 5954 from Managua, November 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2392) In telegram 5950 from Managua, November 19, Bowdler informed Vaky that he would “opt for an internationally administered plebiscite rather than merely a supervised election.” He elaborated: “The GON from Somoza down to the last Juez de Mesta (essentially a combination of sheriff and justice of the peace in each canton) is controlled and staffed by the Liberal Party.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2406)
3. November 21.
4. In telegram 5952 from Managua, November 19, Bowdler proposed a schedule for the ongoing Negotiating Group program, which included several meetings and the preparation of an “NG proposal for a plebiscite.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2402)