Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

144. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, November 18, 1978

SUBJECT

• IAHRC Report on Nicaragua

ISSUE FOR DECISION

What position should the U.S. take in the OAS regarding the IAHRC Report on Nicaragua?

We need guidance particularly on two matters:

—the timing of OAS consideration of the report, and

—what action we are prepared to support, or initiate, in the OAS on the report.

DISCUSSION

The IAHRC Report on Nicaragua is most severe. It does not include details of the GON’s comments. The report was transmitted to the OAS Secretary General November 17.² He will in turn distribute it to members, probably by early next week. The OAS will be holding its Special General Assembly on the Budget from November 20 to November 22, 1978, and a few additional days will probably be required for delegates to receive instructions. It appears likely, therefore, that the report will become an active OAS concern during the week of November 27.

The line-up of members on this issue will be similar to the situation throughout the Nicaragua crisis: Venezuela, Jamaica, Panama, Costa Rica, and probably Colombia will be pressing for the strongest possible OAS actions; with Guatemala, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Haiti, generally supportive of the Somoza regime; and the other Southern Cone countries willing to support a compromise, but at the same time reluctant to support measures which might serve to create a precedent by strengthening the IAHRC as an institution.

There will be two main areas where we will be faced with decisions:

—the mechanical question on how and when to consider the report; and

—the substantive question of what OAS action should be taken on it.

The Mechanics

Normally an IAHRC Country Report is processed through the OAS Permanent Council for consideration by the annual General Assembly. The next Regular GA, however, will not be held until late 1979. The OAS must first decide whether it wishes to abandon the normal route, and use the exceptional procedure of referring it to the open-ended MFM which is considering the Central American situation.

The only advantage in using the regular procedure is that it would keep Argentina, which has agreed to a Commission visit in May 1979, from excessive alarm and would reassure Uruguay and perhaps Paraguay about the kind of treatment they can expect to receive in their dealings with the IAHRC. This advantage is outweighed, however, by the obvious disadvantages (i.e., failing to respond to the plight of the Nicaraguan people, whitewashing the Somoza regime, etc.).

We, therefore, recommend that we be authorized to press for the fastest possible consideration of the report, taking into account that there will be considerable sentiment among members to allow the GON to make a detailed rebuttal.

The Substance

The hardline anti-Somoza nations will seek the toughtest possible MFM resolution—one which will weaken the Somoza regime. The elements of this could parallel OAS action against Trujillo in the early 1960’s: a call for suspension of diplomatic relations, and possible limited economic sanctions. Depending on the actual contents of the report, and the tone of the Nicaraguan rebuttal, our best estimate now is that these actions will have substantial support in the MFM, but will fall short of the two-thirds vote required for passage.

Pro-Somoza forces in the MFM will probably favor a moderate condemnation of the human rights abuses in Nicaragua, but will oppose sanctions.

A third possibility would be an MFM resolution: condemning past abuses, calling for immediate remedial action by the GON, recommending a follow-on IAHRC inspection within a short period of time, and holding out the possibility of additional measures (i.e., sanctions) to be taken if remedial action does not occur.

We believe that a resolution along the lines of the third alternative is an acceptable position and recommend that you authorize us to seek such action if circumstances dictate.

We believe that it may be, however, that under certain circumstances we would wish to work for the first alternative, i.e., application of sanctions. This will require additional study before we can specify what actual measures we are prepared to support. We will pursue this, and prepare for your consideration next week, a list of sanctions we could support in an OAS resolution.

Recommendations

That the U.S. join with the other OAS members who favor earliest possible consideration of the IAHRC report.³

That the U.S. seek to obtain an OAS resolution containing the elements of the third alternative above.⁴

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780176–1094. Confidential. Drafted by Yohn. Concurred in by Michael Kozak (L/ARA) and in substance by Patrick Flood (HA). Vaky initialed for both Flood and Kozak. Tarnoff also initialed the first page of the memorandum.
2. The IACHR resolution adopting the “Report of the Situation of Human Rights in Nicaragua” was dated November 17. (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, Nicaragua—IACHR Report, 11/17/78)
3. Vance placed a checkmark on the approval line. “11/20” is written in the margin next to the option.
4. Vance did not indicate his preference with respect to this recommendation.