143. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1
5924. For Deputy Secretary Christopher and Assistant Secretary Vaky—Caracas for Ambassador Luers only from Bowdler. Subject: Nicaragua Mediation No. 138.
1. Summary: On my return I found considerable concern being expressed on plebiscite issue by my Dominican NG colleague and by the opposition. Problem has been complicated by Karen DeYoung article2 which has led to lessening of interest by Dominican Government in the negotiations. However, Dominican FonMin Jimenez, while initially resisting plebiscite approach, became increasingly supportive in his and my approach to FAO leaders. Robelo, Calero and other opposition leaders are reluctant to go along with plebiscite, among other points fearing that FAO might break up over this issue. Nonetheless in my conversation with them tonight they came around to listing their minimum conditions for holding a plebiscite, including full restoration of civil rights and OAS supervision of the election. Group insisted that any plebiscite initiative would have to come from NG rather than FAO, and urged that NG contact FSLN to persuade latter to extend the truce [Page 385] beyond November 21. We will press ahead further tomorrow with FAO leaders on plebiscite issue. Meanwhile I suggest that President Perez be briefed fully on situation, with view to his exploring whether he can arrange further delay in FSLN armed action while we attempt to work out details of option one.3
2. On my return to Managua I have found changes in attitude on part of NG member Jimenez (I have not spoken yet with Obiols) and FAO which complicate the task of achieving agreement on option one but do not rule it out.
3. Karen De Young story has not been well received. Jimenez gave me to understand that the article was the reason for President Guzman’s desire to have him wind down his participation in NG. Story gave the impression that Washington was calling the shots on an international mediation and the other two members were window dressing. I emphasized that this was not the case. My coming to consult him on next steps was clear evidence of our cooperation effort. I proceeded to outline our thinking on the advisability of sounding out the FAO on the plebiscite idea along the lines of option one. At first he seemed highly skeptical and reticent, but as we talked he loosened up and agreed to join me in informal soundings with Alfonso Robelo and Adolfo Calero as a starter. He made clear, however, that he preferred the course contemplated in our option two with decisive action by the USG but he did not press the point. He did say, however, that he would not be able to take any formal action in the FAO–PC on the plebiscite before first getting instructions from his President. Since he has no safe communications with Santo Domingo, he said he would have to send his Assistant Padilla. I offered our communication facilities, which he may use.
3. This afternoon Jimenez and I spent three and a half hours with Robelo and Calero. The atmosphere was not good but improved somewhat as we went along. They both referred to the Karen De Young story, questioning the motives of what they referred to as “the leak”. One thing they said would have been to consult on the concept of a real plebiscite privately as we were doing. The publicity caused serious problems within the rank and file of FAO. Robelo went so far as to suggest that the Karen De Young report had prompted the G–12 communique issued by Tunnerman in Costa Rica yesterday (Managua 5919) which made things very difficult for the FAO.4
[Page 386]4. Having navigated through the initial storm, I steered the conversation toward reasonable conditions for a plebiscite. At the outset Robelo and Calero focused on reasons why the idea could not be sold to the FAO:
—A plebiscite would take too long and this would play into Somoza’s hands who is engaged in a stall operation to gain time to harvest the good crops and reslove his economic difficulties.
—Under the best of circumstances Somoza’s influence over the process could not be neutralized.
—It would split the FAO wide open, lead to its collapse, and thereby make Sandinismo the only alternative to Somoza.
—The FSLN would never buy it and without an extension of the Caracas Conclave Truce, the holding of a plebiscite would be impossible.
5. By persisting on the request for their views on reasonable conditions, first Calero, and with his help Robelo, began to focus on this aspect. After a long discussion Robelo picked up paper and pencil and began jotting down his thoughts. The piece of paper (I should add very reluctantly prepared) contains the following points:
(A) Approval of basic agreement for a plebiscite by November 21, and agreement on implementing steps by November 27.
(B) Declaration of political amnesty, and authorization of full constitutional guarantees to all citizens.
(C) Departure of Somoza’s brother and/or son, followed by Somoza’s own departure from the country for duration of the plebiscite period December 1 through January 14.
(D) National Guard troops except for those with police duties to be confined to barracks for the plebiscite period.
(E) Cancellation of obligatory 5 percent contribution by public employees to Liberal Party.
(F) Denial of use of government-owned facilities by and for the Liberal Party (and the opposition).
(G) Elimination of radio censorship code (Codigo Negro).
(H) Equal time for both Liberal Party and the opposition on radio and television to be paid for by the government.
(I) Control of national radio network by OAS during the plebiscite campaign.
(J) Full supervision and control the plebiscite by the OAS.
(K) Educational campaign on plebiscite by OAS. As we proceeded with this part of the conversation, Jimenez, who had remained aloof, began to take part and seemed to warm up to the plebiscite concept as the discussion unfolded.
[Page 387]6. Toward the end of the meeting we asked Robelo how we should proceed in taking soundings with the FAO. He described three key groups led by Rodolfo Robelo (PLI), Rafael Cordova Rivas (autentico) and Jaime Chamorro (La Prensa Group).
7. At 7:30 pm Robelo called me to ask that I join him at his house where a group of key FAO people were discussing the plebiscite idea. I immediately joined him. Present were Jaime Chamorro, Rafael Cordova Rivas, Noel Rivas Gasteazoro, and seven members of Robelo’s MDN. It was obvious that he had briefed them on our earlier conversation. They had reacted negatively as he had, and he wanted me to get an expanded exposure to FAO thinking. For the next two hours (until curfew forced everyone home) I went through very much the same conversation as Jimenez and I had with Robelo and Calero. The meeting ended up with a still highly skeptical but nevertheless more rational attitude on the part of the FAO representatives toward the plebiscite. The only new elements were: (1) a strongly held consensus that the plebiscite counter-proposal would have to emerge as a NG initiative; and (2) the NG should make every effort to contact the FSLN to persuade them to extend the truce beyond November 21.
8. Comment: We will hold talks with Rodolfo Robelo tomorrow morning (Friday, November 17) and then check back with Robelo on approaches to the FAO–PC. I would suggest that President Carlos Andres Perez be fully briefed on situation with a view to seeing whether he can obtain further delay in FSLN armed action while we attempt to work out details of option one.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2407. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Caracas.↩
- Karen DeYoung, “U.S.-Led Mediation in Nicaragua Feared Near Collapse,” Washington Post, November 14, 1978, p. A13.↩
- See Tab A, Document 140.↩
- Telegram 5919 from Managua, November 17, reported that Tunnerman had called on FAO organizations to withdraw from mediation “if by FAO deadline of November 21 Somoza and his family have not departed GON, National Guard, and the country.” The Embassy also transmitted the Spanish-language text of the Group of 12’s communiqué. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780473–0212)↩