Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

10. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 31, 1977

SUBJECT

• Peace-Keeping

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Guatemala.]

2. Belize-Guatemala

Our most recent intelligence reports from Guatemala indicate that President Laugerud wants to settle this issue before leaving office at the end of his term in March 1978. He apparently may bring maps with him to Washington to use in his discussions with you.

NSC supports State’s recommendation that you strongly encourage Laugerud to accept the British proposal to accept the territory south of the Moho River as the price for Belizean independence.² The alternative for Guatemala is increased international isolation. This may be a major issue at the UN this fall, as it was at the OAS in June.³ You may want to hint that as support for Belizean independence in these organizations grows, it will be increasingly difficult for the U.S. to adhere to a position of neutrality.

Belize will hardly be happy to give up any land, but we are supporting the British proposal because we understand the need for a country like Guatemala to save face. A decision by Laugerud to accept the British proposal would signify a breakthrough to 100 years of tension.⁴

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Guatemala.]

Tab 2

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁵

Washington, undated

PEACEKEEPING: BELIZE-GUATEMALA

ISSUE FOR DECISION

What formula should the President adopt for promoting a settlement of the Belize dispute?

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

Territorial cession is the core problem of this dispute, which has lasted more than 100 years. If it can be solved, both parties believe other troublesome issues—oil rights and revenues, territorial sea boundaries, economic relations, Belizean neutrality—can be settled.

For Guatemala, territory is indispensable to a settlement. Its value is primarily symbolic: it allows the military to save face, but it also guarantees access to the Caribbean from the Bay of Amatique. Incumbent Belizean politicians believe that any territorial cession would be political suicide. Great Britain has been most reluctant to force Belize to give up any territory. Belize enjoys strong support and its supporters plan to raise the matter again at this year’s UNGA.

Secretary Vance told David Owen in June that a peaceful settlement would require some sort of territorial deal.⁶ He has also told Guatemala’s Foreign Minister that their demand for territory south of the Monkey River is totally unrealistic.⁷ Partly as a result of our pressure, in July the British “floated” with the Guatemalans the possibility of cession of land south of a line at or near the Moho River.⁸ Guatemala has not yet responded to the offer, but our Ambassador reports they believe the Moho would not be saleable at home, particularly during a Presidential election year.⁹

THE OPTIONS

1. Continue our policy of “neutrality,” which we have maintained ever since the collapse of our 1965–68 mediation effort. We would encourage both sides to address the crucial issues, but avoid taking sides to compel a solution.

Pro:

—Keeps the burden of the negotiations on the parties concerned.

—Keeps us out of the middle of this long and difficult dispute.

Con:

—Will not prevent the parties from reaching an impasse on the territorial issue.

—Both sides would like us to be more involved.

2. Pressure the British to make a slightly more generous, and firm, territorial offer than the line at or near the Moho.

Pro:

—This is what the Guatemalans would like us to do; it would increase chances of a lasting settlement if the British agreed.

Con:

—The British would have great difficulty offering any more territory; they believe they have already been more than generous.

3. Press the Guatemalans to accept the line floated by the British. If the Guatemalans accept, insure that the British do not renege.¹⁰

Pro:

—This is the course of action most likely to please the British.

—It would have “shock therapy” value for Guatemala to realize that time is of the essence if they expect to get anything.

Con:

—Given the Presidential election campaign, it might be difficult for Guatemala to accept regardless of our encouragement.

4. Pressure both parties to submit the territorial issue to binding international arbitration or adjudication—through the International Court of Justice or a special arbitral panel.

Pro:

—Keeps the U.S. out of the middle in the dispute but moves the parties along the road to peaceful settlement.

Con:

—In previous contacts the British in particular have been most unenthusiastic about this formula.

Recommendations:

That you approve Option 3, to press the Guatemalans to accept the British offer of a line at or near the Moho.¹¹

ALTERNATIVELY, that we pressure the British to offer Guatemala slightly more territory.

ALTERNATIVELY, that we stay out of the middle as long as the parties are talking to each other.

ALTERNATIVELY, that we support binding international arbitration or adjudication.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Subject Files, Box 65, Territorial Disputes: 4/77–12/78. Confidential. The date is handwritten on the memorandum. Tab 1 is attached but not printed.
2. Carter underlined the phrase “south of the Moho River.” In a August 27 action memorandum from Stedman to Vance, sent through Habib, Vance indicated his approval, on August 29, of Option 3: “Tell Guatemala there seems to us to be no chance for anything more than a line drawn at or near the Moho.” Vance deleted the following phrase, “and that if Guatemala rejects this offer we will be forced to reassess our position of ‛neutrality’ on this issue.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770150–1482)
3. See Document 5.
4. Brzezinski wrote “(Tab 2)” in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.
5. Confidential.
6. Telegram 144622 to London, June 21, included the text of a letter from Vance to Owen which stated that “an embittered revanchist Guatemala would certainly not be the most noble birthright for Belize,” and urged Owen “to give the most serious consideration to the possibility of making a territorial offer which Guatemala could accept.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770222–0142) In telegram 10383 from London, June 23, the Embassy confirmed delivery of Vance’s letter to Owen’s Private Secretary Ewen Fergusson on June 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770224–0955)
7. See Document 5.
8. See Document 6.
9. In telegram 5332 from Guatemala City, August 23, Boster reported that he had urged Molina to settle the Belize dispute during President Laugerud’s term. Molina replied that “it got down to the question of what the administration could sell to Guatemalan public opinion, and the President did not think that the Moho line could be sold to public opinion here.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770304–1182)
10. An unknown hand circled the number of this paragraph and placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to it.
11. Carter indicated his approval of Option 3 and initialed in the margin next to it.