Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

11. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 7, 1977, 2:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• President Carter/President Kjell Laugerud Garcia Bilateral

PARTICIPANTS

• GUATEMALA

  • President Laugerud
  • Foreign Minister Molina
  • Ambassador Maldonado
  • Secretary of Public Relations, Giron Lemus

• U.S.

  • President Carter
  • Vice President Mondale
  • Secretary Vance
  • Assistant Secretary Todman
  • Ambassador Boster
  • Mr. David Aaron
  • Mr. Robert Pastor, NSC

After an opening exchange of pleasantries, President Carter said he was pleased to hear that Mrs. Laugerud was feeling better, and that he looked forward to meeting her that evening. President Laugerud explained that she had been in a hospital in Houston, that her condition had been delicate, but that she was much better now, although she would have to watch her activities for some time yet.

The President referred to Guatemala’s difficulties with Panama following a statement by General Torrijos and said he had informed President Laugerud (they had just returned from a private conversation in the President’s office) that General Torrijos was eager to have normal relations restored.² He said the U.S. would like to see the problem resolved as it was not good for Panama, not good for Guatemala, and indeed not good for anyone. President Laugerud explained that in 1974 there had been a meeting with several of the Presidents in which they had agreed to mutually support each other and this had been repeated in 1975. Nevertheless, there had been the unfortunate incident with President Torrijos which had deeply hurt his people. There had been a lot of criticism, he said, in the Guatemalan press about his joining Torrijos in Washington and he had explained that his action was in support of the Panamanian people. He noted that Guatemala had never had any problems with the Panamanian people, pointing out that there were still fourteen Panamanians in one of their military schools.

The President said he hoped that the matter could be solved peacefully. He said that we would try to use our good offices without interfering in any way.

The President then invited President Laugerud to speak about Belize, which he noted was a question we were very interested in without having any desire to interfere.

President Laugerud said that he had brought some maps to help illustrate the way things were at the moment. He recalled that all Central American countries had achieved their independence from Spain in 1821 without war or bloodshed. At that time Belize was part of Guatemala, although Spain had granted Great Britain permission to cut lumber in some parts of the area many years before. Great Britain, without any authorization from Spain, had started to move inland. They had had a treaty which just enabled them to cut lumber and not establish any military outposts but they did not respect the boundaries set by Spain. By 1856 they had reached south to the Sarstun River and had moved west to the present boundary. In none of the treaties signed at that time, President Laugerud pointed out, had there been any mention about the chain of keys off the coast, neither in the treaties with Spain nor with Guatemala.

President Laugerud then presented the map made in the US at the request of the US Senate from which it could be seen that the British were settled at various points along the Atlantic Coast but that Belize was not shown as occupied.³ Nevertheless, the British now claim that they own all the territory and want to give independence to the people of Belize. We recognize, President Laugerud said, the right of human beings to decide their own destiny, but not at the expense of our own territory. We have been negotiating for twenty years and have not received a concrete proposal from the British. We have tried to negotiate and feel both sides should give something to make a compromise possible. We do not want to humiliate the British, but we do not want to be humiliated ourselves.

During the last meeting with the British in Washington in July, President Laugerud continued, the situation became very tense, and he kept in close touch with Ambassador Boster, personally and on the telephone.⁴ We received reports that Britain was going to grant independence to Belize in the first week of July, and the British thought that Guatemala was considering war. My country wants to solve this problem peacefully, the President said. Anyone can start a war, but no one knows how to end them. I am not mad, he said, and do not want to start a war.

Recalling the visit to Guatemala last year of British representatives Richards and Rowlands, he said he had been very clear with them about his desire to settle the issue with honor for both sides but that if there were a unilateral grant of independence, Guatemala would be humiliated and would have no choice but to fight. The Guatemalan constitution provides that Belize is part of Guatemala, and Guatemalan school children had been taught for years that this was so. It was deeply imbedded in the consciousness of the Guatemalan people that Belize was part of Guatemala.

Further, the Constitution said that the President was responsible for taking all actions to recover that part of their territory, and their armed forces were responsible for the honor, integrity and defense of the territory. In this day and age he was aware that Guatemala could not claim the whole territory; indeed, he was even willing to give away 4/5 of Belize to find a peaceful solution.

He noted that this possibility had not been presented to the Guatemalan people as they would have to negotiate a settlement first and then present the matter to Congress and the Council of State as only they could change the constitution, and would need then to consult the Guatemalan people. President Laugerud noted that he would need to present two options and explain that one would mean war, and the other would mean peace and dignity. But they were worried, he said, because they never seemed to get a concrete proposal from the British. President Laugerud then passed a map to the President showing the line which he said they had presented to the British in their last meeting in July, noting that this would give away 4/5 of Belize.⁵ He said he was not even sure the Guatemalan Congress would approve this line but he said they had to start in some way.

The President asked about the British response. President Laugerud said, presenting another map, that their response would make the President laugh.⁶ He said all the British were proposing was a water corridor, which was an insult to Guatemala. This was just an assurance that Guatemala could sail its ships. The President asked if we could help. He noted that he already had enough problems but asked if President Laugerud knew any way we could be of assistance, noting that he did not have any feelings about it one way or the other.

President Laugerud replied that he hoped the British would negotiate, with the assistance of the US Government. He said that the British know that they are a nuclear power, and that we in Guatemala are a small country. “They know that they can beat the hell out of us, but we are still men and will stand for our rights.” The President said he was sure the British did not want to fight; he asked if President Laugerud thought there was any prospect of acceptance by the two Governments of a mediator, who would make a proposal on territorial lines. Should we encourage the British to negotiate or would mediation be better? the President asked.

President Laugerud said that he had thought of requesting Carter’s assistance as an intermediary because Britain has never made a constructive proposal. When Rowlands had been in Guatemala, he said he had told him very clearly that he could not go to the Congress and report to them that he had lost Belize.

The President noted that one of the international circumstances that now existed was the growing support for Belize’s independence, even among Guatemala’s own neighbors, and he felt that the longer the question was delayed the stronger would become the movement for Belize to receive independence with its present borders intact. So there was some pressure of time, the President said. He said he had heard the Moho River mentioned as a possible boundary. Was this line too far south to be considered, he asked President Laugerud. President Laugerud replied “yes;” south of the Moho was all swamp land.

The President asked how the people in the area felt; would they want to join Guatemala? Have they formed an allegiance to one country or the other? President Laugerud said that they really didn’t have a high level of national consciousness, but he believes if there were no British pressure, they would freely choose to go back to Guatemala. He noted that many of the towns such as Punta Gorda had Spanish names. He said that they had made a survey and there were no more than 10,000 inhabitants in the area south of the Monkey River. Punta Gorda was the largest and had a population of only 2,100. Of these many were Mestizos, Caribes, and blacks but there were also Quiches, a tribe of Indians from Guatemala, Hindus and Mayans. President Carter asked if Punta Gorda was most important? President Laugerud said it was important, and it could become a free port, thereby solving the problem of international waters in the Bay of Amatique, which could cause serious problems with Honduras and Belize. President Carter asked if this could be a cause of permanent tension and President Laugerud replied that it could. President Laugerud added that the British had talked of a substantial contribution for development but noted that this was a vague term. Secretary Vance said that what the British meant was a certain amount of money and that the amount could be established. President Laugerud commented that they did not want to be considered beggars.

President Laugerud recalled that Rowlands had told him that it would be very difficult for the British to explain to other countries in the Commonwealth how they could make 10,000 people move to the North. President Laugerud said he had been upset to hear this because in other places hundreds of thousands of people had been moved and he was not even sure the 10,000 in Belize would want to move. In any case, he said this would be better than burying 4,000 people if they went to war. That would be the last extreme, he said; they did not want war but they would not be humiliated.

The President asked if the language in the area was Spanish. President Laugerud explained that it was in the South, and it varied in the other parts of the country. The President asked if Punta Gorda were Spanish, and President Laugerud said that it was.

President Carter asked how the British would respond if someone like Sol Linowitz were to try to mediate and propose a solution that would enable all sides to save face. Secretary Vance suggested as an alternative that Britain and Guatemala first negotiate. After reaching agreement, they could appoint a mediator, who would legitimize the agreement, permitting both sides to save face.

President Laugerud didn’t like either idea. Foreign Minister Molina said that the British contention that the Belizean people wanted independence was a great fallacy. He pointed out that a few weeks ago the opposition party had urged in a demonstration that the people should be consulted.

The President asked if there were a delineation north of Punta Gorda, and asked whether Guatemala would be willing to abide by a referendum taken with the people in the area, perhaps under UN supervision. President Laugerud replied that he would have to consult his Congress first as he did not have that authority. He would have to go to his Congress and present options to them. He went on to say that he appreciated, however, what the President had said a little earlier about the fact that the problem was going to get more difficult with the passage of time. He noted that President Carter had solved the Panama Canal problem by acting in good faith on this difficult issue, but they had never felt that the British had acted in good faith. Their proposal about the Moho River was an insult. The Guatemalan people would never accept a solution of that nature and would force their armed forces to take action. He said that, as a soldier, he knew the terrible consequences of such an action.

President Carter noted that this was a very serious problem. He asked President Laugerud if he would prefer to see a solution reached while he was still in office. President Laugerud said that he would. Noting that the problem had existed for years, he said he realized that the buck stops with him. He said he could postpone the problem, but that it was the problem of the past, and he did not want to do that. He would face his responsibilities, he said, but he would have to present a solution which could be accepted by the Congress and the people. The President said the Congress presumably did not want to take a position without knowing the options. President Laugerud noted that these possibilities, which they had been discussing, had not been revealed to the Guatemalan people, and the people would need to know. President Carter said that he gathered that as far as most Guatemalans were concerned, all Belize was part of Guatemala. President Laugerud said this was so, and, therefore, with President Carter’s help, he must find a way to solve the problem with the British. He added that he did not want to humiliate the British.

Secretary Vance noted that the British felt constrained in giving away land that Belize felt was theirs. For the British, therefore, the easiest way was to throw the question to the United Nations. He said that he had urged them not to do that, but instead to stay with the negotiations with Guatemala. He said the problem was to get a realistic offer on the table.

The President noted that the British were willing to concede the territory south of the Moho. Guatemala responded that the line should be on the Monkey. Therefore, the important question was how the people in between these two lines felt. If these people wanted to be part of Belize, that would be an important factor in the eyes of the world. Another important factor might be the question of a financial contribution, but he gathered that President Laugerud felt this was not so important and would be embarrassing. He thought that a blunt discussion without restraint between the British and the Guatemalans should help toward a solution. He mentioned the possibility that someone, from the United Nations or perhaps a distinguished representative from the US, might try to mediate; perhaps he would come up with a compromise which all sides could say they didn’t like, but that was the best they could do. President Laugerud said that he could think of one man to which no one could object as a mediator—President Carter. He went on to note that twice they had tried to go to the international courts on this issue, but the British had never agreed because they knew they would lose. They preferred to take the matter to the UN where it was treated as a political issue; however, the issue was really a legal question and not a political question. The President said he had not talked to the British, but thought they not only wanted to save face, but also had to consider Belize’s interests. President Laugerud said the British wanted to leave because there was nothing left in Belize; they had taken all the wood, all the mahogany.

Secretary Vance asked whether the date for the next meeting with the British was on September 27. Foreign Minister Molina confirmed that it was, and that it would be held in New York with Foreign Secretary Owen. The President said it might be good if President Laugerud would permit Secretary Vance to discuss this with the British and try to expedite a solution. He said we had no desire to be mediator but if they should think it desirable in the future that someone should be a communicator who could try to help delineate the problem, we could talk about it. He said he thought that President Laugerud had acted very constructively.

President Laugerud said that he had told a group of Panamanian newsmen last night that the Panama Canal problem had been solved because President Carter had had the moral courage to take a difficult decision. If the British had similar good faith, the two sides could reach a solution.

President Laugerud then recalled the crisis in July and noted that in his meetings and telephone conversations with Ambassador Boster, he had responded very fast to President Carter’s suggestions. The President said he had monitored these discussions, and appreciated Guatemala’s restraint. The President closed the conversation by asking that the talk be held very confidential.

NOTE:

During the ride back from the White House to the Guatemalan residence, Foreign Minister Molina commented to President Laugerud that they would have to think very seriously about President Carter’s suggestion about a “communicator, an honest broker.” He asked Ambassador Boster if he thought the President had any one particularly in mind. Ambassador Boster said not as far as he knew.⁷

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 24, Guatemala: 2/77–12/78. Secret. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room and lasted from 2:55 to 3:40 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Laugerud and Torrijos were in Washington for the Panama Canal Treaty signing ceremonies.
2. No memorandum of this conversation was found. Relations between Guatemala and Panama soured after Panama voted in favor of Belizean independence at the 1976 UN General Assembly. Torrijos visited Belize on May 8 and offered comments supporting Belizean independence. According to telegram 3146 from Guatemala City, May 19, Guatemala suspended diplomatic relations with Panama on May 19, one day after the Mexican newspaper El Universal quoted Torrijos saying to a group of journalists: “Yes, I have stuck my hands into Belize and I’m not going to take them out . . . ever since Laugerud learned this he is angry with me. I am going to help George Price because he is a mystic (sic) and needs it and it doesn’t matter to me that Kjell Laugerud is angry.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770179–0610)
3. Map not found.
4. See Documents 6 and 7.
5. Map not found.
6. Map not found.
7. Telegram 5829 from Guatemala City, September 14, reported that Laugerud considered his September 7 meeting with Carter to be a “substantial success” and that he “realized that the President could not make a commitment to settle the Belize issue, but he thought he would try to help.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770334–0056)