Office of the Historian

229. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance1

Washington, March 8, 1980

In reviewing the discussion on Afghanistan which took place at the SCC meeting Friday afternoon,2 the President noted that the Soviets might eventually be willing to negotiate seriously, if there is:

—Continuing strong insurgency in Afghanistan.

—Sustained Islam outrage at Soviet actions in Afghanistan.

—Sustained and improved Western solidarity on the issue. (S)

He indicated that he agreed with the SCC’s preference for Option 2 (make clear to others the parameters for neutralization which would be acceptable to the United States and seek to shape any proposals before they are launched). He also noted agreement with SCC skepticism about Soviet willingness to negotiate seriously and concern that the uncoordinated Western approach is weakening both our solidarity and prospects for a longer run settlement.3 (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski
  1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 4, 1980 ES Sensitive, Mar 1–15. Secret. “CV” is stamped in the upper right corner, indicating that Vance read the memorandum.↩
  2. Reference is presumably to Friday, March 7, on which there was an SCC meeting where Afghanistan was one subject discussed. The summary of conclusions is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 20, SCC Meetings: #285 Held 3/7/80, 3/80.↩
  3. For the issue of possible Soviet willingness to negotiate on withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan, thereby leading to the eventual neutralization of that country, see Document 216. Carter’s skepticism squared with the dominant view of the intelligence community. For example, an interagency intelligence memorandum, March 13, concluded regarding Soviet intentions in Afghanistan: “The Soviets will continue for tactical reasons to suggest a certain receptivity to proposals for troop withdrawals. In the next two to three months, however, they will probably continue their buildup to a total force of at least eight division equivalents. Following this spring’s counterinsurgency offensive, they are likely to conclude that even more forces are needed. Regardless of their success against the insurgents, the Soviets intend to maintain a significant military presence in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future to reinforce their broader regional influence.” (Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files, IIM 80–10006)↩