230. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
3989. Subj: (C) Ambassador’s Discussion With Arbatov on Afghanistan and U.S.-Soviet Relations.
1. (S—Entire text.)
2. Summary: I had a lengthy discussion yesterday with USA Institute Director Arbatov, who provided no fresh insights into how the Afghan problem might be solved other than to stress that the Soviets would never accept an outcome which made it appear that they were being “punished.” He said the Soviets were convinced that the U.S. had been providing significant support to the Afghan insurgents, but he also described the excesses of the Amin regime as one reason for the Soviet action. He thought stability could be brought about within a few months if outside interference stopped.
In blaming the U.S. for the deterioration in Soviet/American relations, Arbatov said that after almost all the other aspects of the détente relationship had been dismantled SALT II was left in an exposed position and therefore was also vulnerable. He was not optimistic that a relationship could be rebuilt on arms control alone, though he agreed on the urgency of getting the SALT process started again. While he had no specific suggestions on how this might be done, he mentioned the possibility of a Vance/Gromyko meeting in Vienna as a desirable beginning. End summary.
3. Mr. Arbatov came to lunch at Spaso House March 10 with his associate Mr. Zhurkin. The Acting DCM and I represented the American side. Lunch started on an exchange of pleasantries. I had met Zhurkin at an Airlie House conference which I attended with Marshall Shulman, so the atmosphere was easy and relaxed. Shortly after sitting down at the table, we began to get into matters of substance. I mentioned that we were trying to find means of changing the present very low level of Soviet-American relations and getting the relationship back on track, moving ahead, and improving again. Arbatov expressed the same general sentiments and indicated his clear understanding that if we stayed in the present mode very long, an uncontrolled arms race in the future would be impossible to avoid. He said he thought our relations could not remain even in their present very bad state for long. [Page 624] If they did not improve soon, they would get much worse. And “many people here in town” he said, are beginning to have doubts about the prospects.
[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]
5. On Afghanistan, I made very strongly the argument that the Soviet press was blaming the whole problem upon the U.S. upsetting the internal situation in Afghanistan and that we had specifically stated that we had not been interfering and had done so many times, most recently in President Carter’s letter to Tito, from which I quoted.2 Arbatov’s answer to this was, “I am not disputing your word, but perhaps the Agency has been misinforming the State Department.” He said his government was convinced that the U.S. is in fact training and sending in Afghans from Pakistan to disrupt the internal situation. He said that about three million Afghanis moved back and forth between Pakistan and Afghanistan seasonally with their flocks and that the infiltration of 200,000 armed Afghans would be relatively simple to be hidden in this migration—though he added that he had no information that this was actually happening.
6. While he stressed the role of outside interference, by the U.S. and also by China and Pakistan, Arbatov discussed the internal situation in Afghanistan as well as a reason for the Soviet action. He said the Soviets had gotten along very well with the King and with Daoud and then talked about the excesses of Amin, whom he compared with his namesake Idi Amin. He said that the elimination of the Amin regime, while in the Soviet interest, was also somewhat in the American interest because they were attempting to remove a bloody tyrant, installing a more generally popular regime, and bringing stability to the region.
7. As for how long it might take to bring about the stability they were seeking, Arbatov thought maybe only a few months—provided outside interference stopped. He did not dispute my point that the Brezhnev formula seemed like a non-starter, since it was impossible for us to pledge to stop doing something we are not doing. He did not seem much interested in talking about other formulas for getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan, although he thought the idea of having Mrs. Gandhi and a group of nonaligned nations or others work together to find some way to guarantee the Pak/Afghan border was an idea worth exploring.
[Page 625]8. The main point he made repeatedly with regard to an Afghan settlement was that the U.S. seemed intent on “punishing” the Soviet Union and that they would not under any circumstances accept a solution that made them look punished. He said that when the U.S. was willing to cease making Afghanistan a pure propaganda issue the matter could be treated seriously.
[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]
12. All in all, the luncheon which took over two hours was a quiet, unemotional exchange of views with each side claiming to understand the other but with no constructive suggestion on the part of Arbatov or Zhurkin toward a solution to break the impasse. The two points that came through most clearly were that the Soviets will not abide by an indication that they are being punished, and two, that a Vance-Gromyko meeting might be desirable as a departure point for a new relationship.
13. However, since there is no movement in the Soviet position here, I am not hopeful that we as yet have any signal of a direction for sensible movement in the future.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025–0597, N800004–0400. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. The telegram is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 266.↩
- Carter’s February 26 letter to Tito addressed how the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had changed the dynamic of détente and offered support to Yugoslavia as an independent and nonaligned country. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 22, Yugoslavia: President Josip Broz Tito, 6/79–2/80)↩