216. Editorial Note
In telegram 2964 from Moscow, February 22, 1980, the Embassy reported on a speech delivered by Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. With regard to Afghanistan, the Embassy surmised the speech signaled that the Soviets were possibly “looking for a way out” of Afghanistan or, on the other hand, perhaps Brezhnev was making an “attempt to shift the blame to others—especially the U.S.—for a prolonged Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.” The Embassy went on to quote Brezhnev: “The United States loudly demands the withdrawal of Soviet troops, but in fact it is itself doing everything to make this possibility remote: it is continuing and building up its interference in the affairs of Afghanistan. I want to state very definitively: we will be ready to commence the withdrawal of our troops as soon as all forms of interference from outside directed against the Government and people of Afghanistan are fully terminated. Let the United States, together with the neighbors of Afghanistan, guarantee this. And then the need [Page 596] for Soviet military assistance will cease to exist.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR and East/West, Brement, Subject File, Box 46, Afghanistan: 2/80)
In a memorandum to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, February 22, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs H. Allen Holmes analyzed Brezhnev’s speech, noting that it was the latest in a string of Soviet statements to the effect that the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops once “US-supported aggression from Pakistan has terminated.” The memorandum offered four reasons to be “skeptical” of Brezhnev’s pledge: 1) it was possibly a ploy to shift the responsibility for the crisis in Afghanistan to the United States; 2) Soviet offers to negotiate with the United States might have to be focused on bilateral issues outside the Afghanistan issue; 3) the ideological basis for the intervention in Afghanistan would preclude Soviet willingness to withdraw because it “would mean the collapse of the Karmal regime and the establishment in Afghanistan of a government hostile to the Soviet Union;” and 4) the Soviets had recently rebuffed calls by both Carter and the European Community for the establishment of a neutral Afghanistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800054–1440)
The conclusion of this memorandum was echoed in a memorandum from National Security Council Staff member Marshall Brement to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski, February 25, suggesting that the string of Soviet statements on Afghanistan “does not represent a genuine negotiating proposal by the Soviets, but is rather a propaganda attempt to shift the blame for the continuing Soviet presence in Afghanistan onto the shoulders of the US and, to a lesser extent, China and Pakistan.” In the upper right corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “Basically I agree. But it is important to make the Soviets look as if they were rejecting bona fide proposals for withdrawal.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 2/80)
That same day, President Jimmy Carter sent a handwritten note to Vance about Brezhnev’s speech, stating: “Cy—I do not attach much importance to Brezhnev’s ‘olive branch.’ As I said on the phone, the worst thing we could do would be to waffle. We must respond immediately to any allegation by the Soviets that we are involved in or caused the SU/Afghan invasion. Our not answering Brezhnev gave them a propaganda victory for 24 hours, and some of our ‘allies’ are very receptive to this. J.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, Afghanistan: Negotiating Proposals)
Finally, an intelligence information cable prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, April 18, relayed comments on the speech made [Page 597] by Viktor Komplektov to a U.S. businessman: “it is not an invitation to negotiate the status of the Government of Afghanistan, but it does not exclude a political settlement.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 9, Afghanistan: 4/10–18/80)