228. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting1
SUBJECT
- Iran/Afghanistan
PARTICIPANTS
-
State
- Secretary Cyrus Vance
- Warren Christopher
- David Newsom
- Peter Constable
- Nelson Ledsky
-
OSD
- W. Graham Claytor
-
JCS
- General David Jones
- Lt. Gen. John Pustay
-
Justice
- John Shenefield
-
Treasury
- Robert Carswell
-
Energy
- John Sawhill
-
White House
- Henry Owen (Chairman)
- Jody Powell
- Lloyd Cutler
- Hedley Donovan
-
NSC
- Gary Sick
- William Odom
- Jerrold Schecter
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]
4. Chemical Warfare. Admiral Turner said there is growing evidence that the Soviets have used chemical warfare in Afghanistan, but as yet it is not possible to confirm adequately that this has gone beyond the use of riot control agents.2 The Soviets have decontamination equipment [Page 621] in Afghanistan, but we believe that is part of their normal equipment. General Jones said the JCS would like to send a team of experts to Pakistan to debrief refugees who have experienced or witnessed the use of chemical agents. Admiral Turner said the Pakistanis will not permit direct contact of U.S. personnel with the refugees in order to prevent refugees from being tortured and stating that such direct contacts had occurred while they were in Pakistan. However, indirect contacts were possible. It was agreed that CIA and JCS would cooperate on a high priority basis to accumulate the best available information on use of chemical warfare and report back to the SCC next week. We do not want to make any charges which could be disproved and thereby cast doubt on the credibility of future evidence. Mr. Christopher noted that we also have a large body of evidence of use of chemical agents in Southeast Asia, although the Afghanistan situation is the first directly relating the Soviets to use of these agents.3 (S)
With regard to public revelation, it was agreed that State would contact the Red Cross in Geneva and Pakistan, as well as the UN High Commissioner on Refugees, to draw their attention to possible violations and urge them to follow up on reports in the field. In the meantime, a strategy paper by State is being considered on an interagency basis.4 (S)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 109, SCC–284, 3/6/80, Iran & Afghanistan. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. In the upper right corner, Carter wrote: “Zbig, C.”↩
- This allegation was first reported in a situation report prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, March 1, based on “credible evidence” received in the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar: “Three separate reports from Afghan refugees who claim to have witnessed the attacks gave similar descriptions of gas canisters, symptoms of Afghan victims, and methods used to avoid contamination. The attacks are said to have occurred in Badakhshan, Vardak, and Takhar Provinces both before and after the Soviet invasion. The victims apparently experienced loss of control, became unconscious, or died. We have received a number of other reports of chemical warfare in Afghanistan, mainly from refugees, but these have been inconclusive and of questionable reliability.” ([report number not declassified] March 1; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—March 1980, NIDs)↩
- A reference to allegations that the Soviet Union was supplying Vietnam with chemical weapons for use in its war in Laos.↩
- For the first news report on the allegation of Soviet chemical warfare in Afghanistan, see “Chemical Warfare Hinted Against Afghan Rebels,” Los Angeles Times, January 17, 1980, p. A2. No record of a strategy paper or liaison between the Department of State and the Red Cross or UN High Commissioner for Refugees was found.↩