Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

175. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy (Eizenstat) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 19, 1980

SUBJECT

• State of Union Speech

While I have provided detailed comments to Zbig, I feel strongly enough about the State of the Union speech as it now stands to make the following points:²

1. Overall, the speech is not well-organized, is neither tough nor sharp in its focus or language, and lacks coherency. It is in short “mushy”.

2. It is difficult to discern what the Carter doctrine or central message is from the draft—is it merely the aid to Pakistan—is it a broader statement that we will intervene militarily if any nation in the area is threatened or only some and if so which ones? The draft uses the phrase you aptly mentioned during our meeting on the speech—that you are drawing the line, but it is unclear where the line extends and what happens if it is breached. It is critically important that this be clearly stated and that we stress we have the staying power to protect the vital interests of the countries in the area in continued independence.

3. You strongly urged during our meeting on the speech that specific bases or facilities be announced and urged Zbig and Cy to expedite the necessary decisions. This would be the most dramatic part of the speech—clearly indicating we are stepping up our military presence in the area. Yet it is stated so obtusely and vaguely in the speech that the point and its significance is totally lost.

4. The sections dealing with Iran badly need to be reworked:

a. Parts actually seem to embrace the revolution.

b. The tone is (even before our hostages are out): We have always liked you and we still do.

c. You must repeat for the American people the tough steps already taken—cut off oil imports, frozen assets, no spare parts, Allied cooperation, refusal to bend to demands.

d. The press has widely reported (front-page New York Times yesterday) that we will cut off all trade with Iran within a few days.³ This would be an appropriate time to make the announcement so that we follow through on your promise to continue to turn the economic screws on Iran while our hostages are there.

5. The centerpiece of your new Southwest Asia policy is aid to Pakistan—yet the $400 million is already being discounted and disparaged by Pakistan. Perhaps we could mention a consortium of western aid which you have organized and pledges from our Allies could be obtained within the next few days to bolster the package. Also, I see no reason for delay in converting the Executive agreement into a treaty. It now appears we are unwilling to give Pakistan the full protection she feels necessary (see front-page Washington Star today).⁴

6. Your dramatic decisions to bolster defense spending need to be better emphasized. Having done it you should clearly explain the need and let people know the boldness of your response.

7. The portions on Russia (pages 8–9 of Draft B–5, 1/17/80) seem misguided. It appears that we are saying we are no threat to their interests and that they face a choice they have already made. We should try to steer them back to a cooperative position, but not indicate they have yet to make their choice. The whole point of the Afghanistan invasion is that it is a clear departure from their policies and that they have opted for the wrong path.

8. I am simultaneously sending to you under separate memo my suggested language for the economic/energy portion of the speech. I am also sending Charlie Schultze’s suggested version, which incorporates the comments of Secretaries Duncan and Miller.⁵

1. Source: Carter Library, Staff Offices, Counsel, Cutler, Box 108, President’s Speeches—State of the Union: 11/79–1/19/80. Administratively Confidential and Personal. Printed from an uninitialed copy.
2. Carter’s State of the Union Address, delivered on January 23, went through several drafts. The particular version Eizenstat referred to was not further identified and not found. Text of the final address is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 194–200, and in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 138. In the speech, Carter pointed out the challenges posed by the situation in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and enunciated what would become known as the Carter Doctrine: “Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”
3. See Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Plans Embargo on Iran on its Own as Allies Shun Idea,” New York Times, January 18, 1980, p. A1.
4. The article in the Washington Star was not found, but there was a front page Washington Post article on the subject that day. See John M. Goshko, “U.S. Forging Ahead on Aid to Pakistan,” Washington Post, January 19, 1980, p. A9.
5. Neither Eizenstat’s nor Schultze’s memorandum was found.