177. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State1
366. Subject: Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan: Some Suggestions. Ref: State 12427.2
1. (S—Entire text)
2. Begin summary: As the Department ponders over possible next moves to make the Soviet occupation more costly, and how the Soviets [Page 503] might be induced to withdraw, I have two thoughts to throw into the hopper. One is that, if the Soviets and DRA continue to disregard the UN resolutions (as is likely),3 the Department try to persuade UNHQ to withdraw its aid missions from Afghanistan. The other is that, were the Soviets ever to appear to realize their presence in Afghanistan is too costly for them, the Department should consider approaching Waldheim or Indian PM Gandhi to propose a face-saving exodus by substitution of UN troops for Soviet forces, conditional on the holding of new supervised elections. End summary.
3. We at Embassy Kabul have been delighted with the strong response of Washington to the Soviet occupation of this country. We applaud the steps Washington has so far taken and share the widespread view that the Soviets underestimated the degree of Western and world reaction. Suspecting that the Dept is considering what additional steps might be taken, I offer here two suggestions.
4. As we reported last week, the puppet Babrak regime has refrained from telling its people about the Security Council and UNGA votes.4 Instead, it has tried to obfuscate the issue by saturating the media with allegations of U.S. and “imperialist” treacherousness and our alleged close ties with “monster” Hafizullah Amin. While supressing what happened in the UN, the DRA has nonetheless not attacked the institution of the UN itself, and so far as we can tell still holds it in respect. This is important in the context of my recommendations.
5. First recommendation. As of this time, we are unaware of any UNHQ emissary coming to Kabul to investigate whether the DRA and the Soviets are complying with the UN resolutions. But whether any emissaries come or not, the Western Embassies here are unanimous in believing that the Soviets are not about to pull out their forces. (Were they to do so, the Babrak govt would instantaneously collapse.) On the contrary, there are many signs that the Soviets are digging in to stay for a long time. Their forces are building military bastions about Kabul, and their logistic arrangements point to their establishing or taking over permanent lodging quarters.
6. Assuming that the Soviets have no intention of complying with the UN resolutions, it seems to me that the least the UN itself can do is to withdraw its UN economic aid missions here. Were this done, this would be a severe psychological and discrediting blow to the DRA—an action much more effective than all the measures the Western Embassies here in aggregate could do. A withdrawal of UNDP and [Page 504] associated economic missions would confirm in the eyes of the Afghan public, in a most telling way, the lack of legitimacy of the Babrak regime. It would be a humiliating blow to the DRA. I hope, therefore, that the Department will give serious weight to this recommendation—and if possible, get it implemented by, say, the end of Feb.
7. Were though the Department to press such a recommendation on UNHQ, it should be aware that there are UN elements here who would resist it. One, of course, would be the Bulgarian UN res rep, Yuli Bahnev, who will use every argument Moscow and Sofia can supply him to oppose it. At the very least he will urge that a UN office be maintained with the flag boldly flying, so as to maintain an unmistakeable presence and to honor past contractual aid commitments. I think both arguments should be resisted. The UN office should be made to close and the total UN presence withdrawn. Nothing less than hauling down the UN flag is required to have the kind of political impact this govt and the Soviets deserve. As for other local UN sources of opposition, some among the UN experts would be fearful for their jobs, and for self-serving reasons would oppose the cancellation of their contracts.
8. My second recommendation, as mentioned in the summary, there may come a time when the Soviets appreciate that their involvement here is too costly and they may welcome a face-saving way to exit. If this were to occur—and it would likely only happen if the insurgents can carry on an effective fight against the Soviets and the Babrak government—then the Soviets might be amenable to some face-saving suggestions. One that occurs to me is for either UN SecGen Waldheim or the Indian Government to propose the posting of UN troops in Afghanistan to replace the Soviets. But were this done, care would have to be taken to make sure the UN troops were not here merely to sustain the despised Babrak government. Hopefully, a UN presence would be conditional on its monitoring a relatively free election to choose a new, legitimate government.
9. During a discussion this week with Indian Ambassador Jaskaran Teja (who last served as DCM in Moscow and is suspected among Western diplomats as being pro-Soviet and a Communist sympathizer), Teja said he was sure the Soviets would never accept the idea of the UN replacing its troops here. He could be right. Certainly, the success of the Soviets at the end of WW II in Eastern Europe gives them some reason to think they can get away with it again, but I still think my suggestion worth bearing in mind.
10. Comment: I hope these two basic ideas are helpful.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 5, Afghanistan: 1/22/80. Secret; Immediate, Sensitive, Exdis. Sent for information to USUN. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. The telegram was summarized in a memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, January 23. Regarding Amstutz’s recommendation that the UN withdraw its aid missions from Afghanistan, Carter wrote: “Try to do so.” In response to Amstutz’s suggestion that UN troops replace Soviet troops in Afghanistan, Carter wrote: “ok.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily CIA Brief File, Box 25, 1/21/80–1/24/80)↩
- Telegram 12427 to USUN, January 17, directed the Mission to see Waldheim as soon as possible and urge him to send UN representatives to Afghanistan “without delay.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800028–0481)↩
- See Document 136.↩
- This information was reported in telegram 291 from Kabul, January 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800028–0983)↩