349. Message From Joint Task Delta to 1st Special Operations Wing, 101st Airborne (Air Assault) and 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment1
SUBJECT
- Intelligence Assessment.
REF
- JCS/Snowbird/J3 Cite 0288 Subj: 60–90 Day Situation Projection2
1. (TS) This message provides a hardcopy follow-up to the intelligence assessment presented at the 29 Aug 80 JTD planning conference and is a supplement to reference.
A. The American-Iranian hostage situation remains as it did in November and during the intervening months, it is a political problem without a political solution. Political solutions are the product of compromises. In the current situation, the positions of the opposing parties the USG and the Iranian entities are non-negotiable.
B. Although a humanitarian solution is possible the political impasse is likely to continue past 4 November before a major change. [Page 918] After 4 November Iranian options include a release of some hostages while requesting concessions from the new US administration (if there is a new administration), or the continued detention of most of the hostages and the initiation of a grand jury type trial heading to the indictment of the USG and several of the hostages.
C. A major unknown in the projection equation is the health of Ayatollah Khomeini. He is currently a major stabilizing force; if he were to die of natural causes and his death acknowledged as such no significant change in the hostage situation is likely to occur as the hardline clerics now possess a far greater degree of control than they did prior to the election of the Parliament and naming of the Prime Minister. However, if Khomeini were to be assassinated or his death claimed to be the result of an American plot then chaos and confusion would result and within three–five days the lives of the hostages would be at serious risk.
2. (TS) In reviewing the threat, five entities warrant discussion.
A. The conventional Iranian military continues to deteriorate due to internal purges of the professional leadership and difficulties in maintaining some of the more sophisticated weapons systems. However the air defense network and associated alert aircraft and point defense ADA systems together with the gendarmerie reporting structure provide a persistent potential for detecting and interdicting mission aircraft.
B. The Revolutionary Guard structure is becoming more structured and is unquestionably a tool of the clerics. In the rural areas the Guard has attempted to replace the army but integration has not occurred. In the larger cities particularly Tehran reports now indicate Guard members have taken to bullying the population at the slightest opportunity and some have established a neighborhood protection payout mechanism.
C. The composition of the militants seems to have changed somewhat with the hard core radicals, many with Marxist influenced backgrounds, continuing to control the fate of the hostages, although there is no question that they have received assistance from the Revolutionary Guard and hardline clerics such as Ayatollah Beheshti.
D. The U.S. media and self proclaimed political moralists pose a significant danger to any prospects of a political solution and a tremendous threat to military planning with false leaks and compromises. Their real danger lies in their potential for creating a dangerous degree of instability in both hostage location and security.
E. The fifth threat entity is the intelligence apparatus of the USSR and its allies. The Soviet intelligence services were embarrassed by the degree of their ignorance regarding the April attempt. They do not [Page 919] want to be caught unawares again. In addition the Soviet Union is preparing to take advantage of several possible opportunities regarding Iran. It is preparing to move military forces into Iran if anarchy and chaos erupts. Similarly the USSR is preparing to react if U.S. military forces are introduced into Iran in any size, and while awaiting the advent of one of these possibilities, the USSR is busily laying the propaganda groundwork to capitalize on the above and justify a unilateral move on the pretext of countering the alleged presence of counter revolutionary forces operating in Iran against the Government of Iran and the Government of Afghanistan.
3. (TS) Hostage Situation:
A. Dispersion outside of the Embassy compound must be accepted as fact; planning must consider multiple targets. Precise locations remain unknown due to tight security and deception measures employed by militants and clerics. During the past month most hostage relatives have received a letter from their loved ones. The letters indicate long periods of small group isolation, very little outside activity, no physical abuse, allowed to receive some mail, and at least three hostages, military and civilian, have implied they plus another 6 to 9 are being held in a prison or prison-like environment.
B. Current estimates put upwards of a half probably in Tehran as follows: MFA (3), Embassy compound: Chancery 3–5, warehouse 3–5; prison/jail or villa in northern Tehran (16–18). The balance, according to [less than 1 line not declassified] reporting are apparently scattered throughout the country in groups of 3–5. A 25 Aug CIA assessment listed ten possible locations, this HQ believes the actual number is less than that, probably no more than 3–5 locations at any given time. The typical site is probably a 2-story house within a walled compound located in a quiet residential neighborhood.
4. (TS) Operational Planning. During the review and crosschecking of possible locations we have located at least one potential fixed-wing landing zone within 100NM of each of the more likely hostage detention locations, and at least one active airhead with extraction potential within 12–15 miles. Of all the locations Tehran offers the greatest number of possibilities for insertion and extraction.
A. In the city proper both Mehrabad and Doshan Tappeh [Airports] hold possibilities with D/T being within 5–6 minutes driving time of the compound and M/B within 20–25 minutes driving time.
B. In the immediate suburbs at least two additional sites have been identified as C–130 capable and two others have been identified within 30 NM.
C. Farther out Manzariyeh still holds a potential for use. In addition three fixed-wing capable sites (one C–141) have been identified in the Semman area.
[Page 920]D. The search for additional sites is continuing and field survey of the more promising sites is hoped to be started within 3–4 weeks.
5. (TS) In summary three points are important to remember during future planning and training.
A. The situation is not stable and the confirmed locations of today can be invalid tomorrow because of a militant reaction to a news rumor.
B. The second point is that the Soviets are actively seeking data on U.S. military intentions toward Iran and are preparing their forces in the border area to move into Iran when the opportunity arises. A prolonged widespread rescue operation that carried a large signature before or during the operation could provide them with the rationale to react against an “American invasion”.
C. The third and final point is that regardless of the Holloway Board’s inference that OPSEC was too restrictive during the planning for the last attempt,3 it was essential then and an absolute imperative now. Secrecy was paramount to mission success the last time, and the same is doubly true now. Secrecy is essential for mission success and for world peace. The bear is standing in wings anticipating the script and watching for his cue to enter stage north.
- Source: Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff Records, RG 218–07–0002, Records of J–3 DDSO, Box 2, Iranian Hostage Crisis 1979–1984, B270–280 Intelligence Assessment. Top Secret.↩
- See Document 341.↩
- See Document 321.↩