Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

348. Memorandum From Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 29, 1980

SUBJECT

• Alternative Option for Iran

Stan Turner’s memo (attached)² is not, in my view, particularly perceptive or accurate in portraying our existing action policy toward Iran, in projecting the likely course of events, or in identifying the nature of the options which we are likely to face. His memo ignores the covert action strategy developed in June³ and formally approved by the President. [10 lines not declassified]

[5 paragraphs (48 lines) not declassified]

I do not believe that the attached memo spells out the present policy or our options in sufficiently complete form to permit a productive discussion at the Cabinet level. Instead, I would recommend that you discuss with Turner the possibility of a prior meeting of David’s [Aaron] Special Intelligence Group (Carlucci, Newsom, Komer, Pustay) which has previously examined covert action options prior to consideration by the SCC. I would anticipate that David’s group could sharpen the focus of the CIA proposal and flesh out a set of operationally feasible options which could then be taken up by principals. Alternatively, David’s group might determine that no further action by principals was required.

Agree that it should be vetted by the Special Intelligence Group, for recommendations to the SCC if appropriate.

No. Set up an SCC at the Muskie-Brown-Turner level.⁴

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 87, For President or Brzezinski Only File, Iran Sensitive 5/80–10/80. Secret; Sensitive.
2. Attached but not printed. Turner’s memorandum transmitted a August 27 paper prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, “Policy re Iran: Alternative Option,” which discussed the current policy and its weaknesses, [text not declassified]. The paper questioned whether the collapse of the Khomeini regime would work to advance U.S. interests since that might bring the left to power and inflame regional insurgencies. Some analysts believed a clerical state would be anti-American but also strongly anti-Soviet.
3. See Document 293.
4. The memorandum bears no indication of which option Brzezinski chose. However, Sick and Brzezinski discussed the memorandum on the evening of August 29. Brzezinski agreed that Turner’s proposal should be first discussed with the Aaron group. At the bottom of the page, Aaron wrote: “set up a meeting. DA,” with an arrow pointing to the circled information “3:00 p.m., Wed, Sept 17.” The latter was crossed out. An unknown hand wrote and circled in the margin: “Postponed to an undetermined date.” (Memorandum from Sick to Brzezinski, September 2; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 87, For President or Brzezinski Only File, Iran Sensitive 5/80–10/80)