Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

350. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia (Ames) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci)¹

NFAC–6021–80

Washington, September 3, 1980

SUBJECT

• SCC Meeting of 29 Aug 1980:² Security Framework

1. Action Required: None; the following is for your information. [portion marking not declassified]

2. Background: The 29 Aug 1980 SCC meeting chaired by Dr. Brzezinski was another in the series of meetings held on the Security Framework of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. This meeting focused on the DoD paper on possible responses to a Soviet threat to invade Iran.³ [portion marking not declassified]

3. Dr. Brzezinski stated he believed the paper was a good one and would serve as a useful starting point for discussion on how to deter the Soviet threat. Most of the discussion centered on the methods that could be used to signal our determination to the Soviets to oppose any incursion. Secretary Brown stated that since the Soviets could bring 16–20 divisions into Iran while we could only bring two, indicated that we must go the deterrence route. While we would use those two divisions, we should insure the Soviets knew of our determination. [portion marking not declassified]

4. Brzezinski said that he believed we must develop a horizontal escalation capability⁴ since we did not have a meaningful vertical escalation capability. We could close the Black and Baltic seas, blockade Murmansk and Vladivostok, challenge their fleet at sea and levy proxy penalties by involvement in PDRY, Cuba, Ethiopia, Libya and Angola. The Soviets must be made to realize that Iran would not be a limited conflict. Secretary Muskie said this all sounded like World War III—a view not shared by the Europeans. If we assessed the CPX in such drastic terms we should share these views with the Europeans. If we did, this would get out and might provoke the Soviets. [portion marking not declassified]

5. Brzezinski stated that in the past we had a kind of unwritten understanding with the Soviets—neither side moved directly into the “other’s” area. The Soviets might have some ambiguity over Iran because of our acquiescence to events there and the question is how do we let them know our position without provocation? Should we send them a secret message that says, “we have no designs on Iran, but if you move in we’ll counter you?” A statement such as this does not impose any limits on our actions. The DCI said that perhaps we should not consider such a message because if the Soviets are not ready to enter Iran such a message might indicate we have a plan of our own and cause them to move. If they do have a plan, such a message, without any teeth in it, could cause them to discount it. We should give more thought to this idea of a message. [portion marking not declassified]

6. Muskie reiterated that if we are confident that our CPX assessment indicates probable Soviet action, we have to get Europe on board. Newsom added that Europe still does not accept that the loss of the Gulf to the Soviets would put them under Soviet control. They must be made to see that. Brzezinski did not believe we should go to the Europeans yet. The message should be to the Soviets and it should be clear: their involvement in the Gulf will set them on a collision course with us. We must make sure that the Soviets do not miscalculate our determination—we must minimize Soviet uncertainty. DoD should have a look at horizontal options given the fact that the Soviets do not have any exploitable external weaknesses such as the Persian Gulf is to the West. [portion marking not declassified]

7. We must consider what we want to say to the Soviets and how. We cannot give the Soviets “expressions of concern.” These are no longer credible. Aaron suggested that when Muskie meets Gromyko he should say something along the following lines: “In my short time in office I have come to realize that among the differences between us, nothing is more likely to lead to World War III than your miscalculation of our determination to keep the Persian Gulf for the West.” Muskie can also hand Gromyko a non-paper on this matter. It was agreed that the Newsom/Aaron/Carlucci/Komer group would work on some language for this statement and paper. [portion marking not declassified]

8. For the Friday meeting (5 September) the following items will be reviewed:

a. Horizontal actions we can take;

b. What we can tell our allies and how we might get this message to Iran; and

c. Gen. Jones briefings—are there any action add-ons to these briefings.

CIA was also asked, during the course of the meeting, to prepare a paper on European and regional reactions to a Soviet invasion. [portion marking not declassified]

Robert C. Ames

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 13, Folder 1: C–372 Iran. Secret.
2. An unknown hand crossed out “2 September 1980” and replaced it with “29 Aug” both here and in the first sentence of the Background section. This appears to have been done in error, as the SCC met on September 2 to discuss the Security Framework. The Summary of Conclusions of this meeting is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 91. This meeting was originally scheduled for August 29, as indicated in an August 28 memorandum from Dodson to Denend. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 22, SCC Meeting #337 Held 9/2/80)
3. The DOD working paper, “Military Strategies,” is attached to an August 28 memorandum from Dodson to Mondale, Muskie, Brown, McIntyre, Jones, and Turner. According to this memorandum, Brown had not yet reviewed the paper. The paper included sections on Deterrence Strategy and Warfighting Strategies, with the latter subdivided into sections on Border Strategy, Gulf Outer Ring and Gulf Inner Ring. Also attached to Dodson’s memorandum were talking points for holding discussions with Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, SCC Meeting #337 Held 9/2/80)
4. In their August 29 conversation, Turner and Brzezinski discussed horizontal escalation in connection with Iran, that is, “what forms of military action could we take against the Soviets outside of Iran if they invaded Iran—things like a war at sea or closing the Baltic or closing the Black Sea, blockading Cuba, mining the Soviets in their harbor at Dalak, mining Aden, knocking out the Soviet air force contingent at Aden, etc.” See footnote 4, Document 348.