321. Editorial Note
On July 23, 1980, the Special Operations Review Group, chaired by Admiral J. L. Holloway, III, submitted the Final Report of the Special Operations Review Group, often referred to as the Holloway Report, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the Forwarding Statement, Holloway wrote that the report was a “professional critique” for the Joint Chiefs and not an after-action summary or a white paper. In this context and as a result of hindsight, he felt that the report would appear to be “highly critical, more so probably than a wider review from a national perspective would deserve.” But he added that the review group had “seen infinitely more to be proud of than to complain about.” The operation, he concluded, had been “risky and we knew it, but it had a good chance of success and America had the courage to try.”
The Final Report contained an Executive Summary, 5 chapters (Introduction, Chronology, Issue Analysis, Conclusions, Recommendations), and annexes. The Executive Summary listed specific and general conclusions. In the specific conclusions, the main points were: 1) that the operation had been conceptually valid and feasible, but high-risk; [Page 863] 2) that delay in implementation until March 1980 was a function of a lack of reliable information on hostage location, fluctuating political circumstances in Iran, and preparation time; 3) that operational secrecy was essential; 4) that command and control had been “excellent at the upper echelons” but more “tenuous and fragile” at the intermediate levels; 5) that mission planning had been adequate, but that a larger helicopter force and better weather contingency preparation would have improved mission success; and 6) that preparation for the mission had been adequate except for operational readiness which would have benefited from a full dress rehearsal and for weaknesses in command and control that should have been addressed. Lastly, the Review Group wrote that the siting of Desert One near a road “probably represented a higher risk than indicated by the JTF assessment.”
The Executive Summary contained two general conclusions. First, the Review Group cited the “ad hoc nature of the organization and planning” as a “fundamental concern.” They argued that “an existing JTF organization, even one with a small staff, would have provided an organization framework of professional expertise around which a larger tailored force organization could quickly coalesce.” Second, they argued that operational secrecy proved limiting: “Many things that, in the opinion of the review group, could have been done to enhance mission success were not done because of OPSEC considerations. The review group considers that most of these alternatives could have been incorporated without an adverse OPSEC impact had there been a more precise OPSEC plan selectively exercised and more closely integrated with an existing JTF organization.” These two conclusions led the Review Group to recommend that a Counterterrorist Joint Task Force be established within the Joint Chiefs, and that the Joint Chiefs give careful consideration to the formation of a Special Operations Advisory Panel. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 27, Iran Special Contingency Group 7/80)
An unclassified version of this report, with technical material excised, was released to Congress in July and made public August 23.