Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

243. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 5, 1980, 4:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Hector Villalon
• Henry Precht

SUBJECT

• Iran Hostage Crisis

Villalon said that the meeting between the Revolutionary Council and Khomeini had been postponed by Bani Sadr because the conditions were not right (presumably he was referring to the attack on the idea of transfer by the religious hardliners).

Villalon said that a committee had been formed, composed of Capucci, the Swiss Ambasador, Bourguet, Villalon, and the Papal Nuncio (presumably Noland). These men had met all afternoon and evening to try to find a solution to the crisis. They had worked with Ghotbzadeh and developed the proposition which Capucci planned to put to the students at 10 a.m. Sunday.²

Capucci had met for three hours with the students today and found that a large number of them seem to be willing to end the crisis. There was only a small element of hardliners who wanted to hold out. Villalon did not wish to discuss the committee’s proposition in detail. It seemed to involve the release of all the hostages to the Revolutionary Council, while the students remained on the compound. This would be a student initiative designed to preserve face rather than eventually have themselves forced to give in by the government.

At 1500 Capucci and the other clergy would conduct their religious visit to the compound. At the same time, the Revolutionary Council would meet and would consider the work of the Capucci Committee and any communication they had from the students. Villalon assumed that the Council would end at about 1730 and a delegation would then go to see the Imam for his blessing of the final proposal. One way or the other, the matter of the transfer should be finally decided tomorrow.³

Villalon said that if the decision went against the transfer, the U.S. would have made a full effort and would be justified in taking whatever steps it felt appropriate against Iran. I asked Villalon if he sensed that the Iranians wanted some further clarification from us. He said that was a dead issue and that we should not make any further move to give the Iranians anything by the way of clarification or conciliatory statement. I asked whether he knew of any reaction to the message of Ambassador Probst.⁴ Villalon had no knowledge.

Finally, Villalon commented that the major obstacle had been the weakness and lack of capacity of Bani Sadr. He lacked the courage to act, or had acted ineptly throughout the recent critical days.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 31, Iran 4/1/80–4/18/80. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Precht. Villalon and Precht talked by phone. According to an attached April 5 covering memorandum from the White House Situation Room to Brzezinski, the memorandum of conversation was sent to Carter on the evening of April 5 at Aaron’s request.
2. April 6.
3. On April 6 Villalon reported to Precht that a four-man delegation composed of Bani-Sadr, Ghotbzadeh, Moinfar (an Oil Minister with good religious credentials) and an unnamed mullah, would visit Khomeini the morning of April 7. Villalon told Precht that in view of past experience, “he was not optimistic about the outcome of the meeting tomorrow.” (Memorandum of conversation; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 31, Iran Update 6/80)
4. See Document 240.