Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

244. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, April 6, 1980

SUBJECT

• NSC Meeting on Iran, April 7, 1980 (C)

There are three sets of questions which need to be addressed:

1. Should we proceed now with sanctions against Iran? If so, when should the announcement be made? (S)

2. What should be included in the text of the announcement and the communication to the allies? (U)

3. What measures of a limited military nature (if any) should we take in conjunction with the announcement, and what preparations should we take now for more stringent military activities which may become necessary later? (S)

Proceed Now With Sanctions

Barring some last-minute change in Tehran, it now appears that Bani-Sadr and his associates have been unable to achieve the kind of support within the Revolutionary Council and with Khomeini which would permit a prompt transfer of the hostages from the custody of the militants. We have postponed imposition of sanctions for a full week to give them an opportunity to make the necessary decision. All of your advisors are agreed that we have delayed as long as we reasonably can and that we must proceed with sanctions in order to sustain our credibility and in order to convince Tehran that their inability to act is costly. This view is shared by Bruce Laingen and by the French lawyers as well. (S)

The package of sanctions is ready to be announced. The timing of an announcement should take into account the need for the Department of State to notify the Iranian Embassy of the expulsion of their diplomats and for the Department of Justice to have its personnel in place to implement the order. You will wish to ask Cy and Ben Civiletti for their comments on timing. (S)

Texts of Communications

The following texts are attached and will be distributed to the participants at the NSC meeting:

Tab A—The draft text of the formal announcement which you will make. (U)

Tab B—The draft text of a message to the allies, in the form of an Aide Mémoire. (U)

Tab C—The text of an Executive Order directing revalidation of all outstanding Iranian visas. There is no difference of views on this issue, and it need not be raised at the meeting. The Executive Order amends the Order which you signed on November 26, 1979, (but which was never implemented) extending its scope to include all categories of visas.² (S)

A. Draft Announcement.³ There are three points of controversy in the text:

—Embargo on Food and Medicine. Cy supports Option A,⁴ which would limit our embargo to those items included in the UNSC sanctions vetoed by the USSR, but excluding food and medicine. Other members of the SCC have supported an extension of the sanctions to formalize what is already a de facto total embargo. (S)

—Announced Purpose of Inventory of Claims. Cy supports Option A,⁵ which is a neutral statement, leaving all future options open. Other members of the SCC favored some indication in the statement that the inventory of claims would lay the basis for satisfying claims by the hostages and their families against the Government of Iran. Options B, C, and D⁶ provide increasingly explicit commitments to proceed with disposition of claims by the hostages and their families. Option D, which commits us to proceed with formal legislation, is opposed by State and Treasury as counterproductive, on the grounds that it highlights the likelihood of major claims by the hostages and that it may eliminate any flexibility in using the frozen Iranian assets as a negotiating lever in the final negotiations for release of the hostages. Stu Eizenstat proposed Option D as a means of underlining our commitment to use the Iranian assets to compensate the hostages and their families for the ordeal they have been through. (S)

—“Refugees from Injustice.” This bracketed language in the fourth numbered paragraph⁷ is opposed by Cy on the grounds that it unduly draws attention to minority groups and will work to their disadvantage by focusing Iranian attention on them. All others supported this language as entirely consonant with U.S. policy and sufficiently general to avoid damaging minority group efforts to remain inconspicuous. (S)

B. Draft Message to Allies. Because of the technical nature of the message, it is more appropriate to send it as an Aide Mémoire rather than a Presidential message. The only item of controversy is the possible additional phrase in paragraph 14 indicating that we intend to go beyond the UN sanctions by embargoing food and medicine. (S)

Additional Measures of a Military Nature

Before turning to this subject, you may wish to reduce participation to the statutory membership of the NSC. (C)

There are a number of limited military measures which could be taken simultaneously with the imposition of economic and diplomatic sanctions which would enhance the sense of uncertainty and risk in Tehran (and with the allies) without committing us to any specific additional actions. An illustrative list of such actions is at Tab D, with a paper prepared by JCS and CIA analyzing the possible effects of such measures on Iranian military alert and possible reaction.⁸ With the exception of overflights, none of these measures would intrude on Iranian air or sea space. None is intended to do more than build credibility that we may be prepared to follow through with more stringent military measures, and thereby add urgency to the decision-making process by Iran and our allies. (S)

As we undertake a new program of pressure against Iran, we necessarily edge closer to the point where mining of Iranian harbors may be essential to demonstrate to Iran that continued holding of the hostages will severely damage Iran’s economy. You may wish to review the status of contingency planning at this point and consider the possible circumstances and timing for such a step. (S)

Finally, you may wish to reconsider with the NSC the desirability of proceeding with a rescue operation. In view of the failure of diplomatic efforts to budge Khomeini, and the bleak prospect of any improvement in the internal power struggles inside Iran, this may be the only realistic means of freeing the hostages in the next six months. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 100, Meetings File, 4/7/80 NSC Meeting re Iran. Secret. All tabs are attached but not printed.
2. A copy of Executive Order 12206, April 7 (see Document 246) and a signed copy of Executive Order 12172, November 26, 1979, are attached at Tab C.
3. For the official announcement, see Document 246. For the full text, see Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 611–612.
4. Paragraph 1, option A, of the April 6 “Draft Announcement of Decisions on Iran” at Tab A reads: “The Secretary of the Treasury will implement (a) fully the U.S. sanctions as approved.” Paragraph 1, option B, reads: “The Secretary of the Treasury will implement (b) a total embargo on U.S. trade with Iran going beyond the economic sanctions approved.”
5. Paragraph 2 of the Draft Announcement begins: “The Secretary of the Treasury will make formal inventories of the outstanding claims of American citizens and corporations against the Government of Iran and of the substantial Iranian assets frozen by my previous order.” Option A continues: “This accounting will provide the factual basis for subsequent decisions on the handling of those claims.”
6. Paragraph 2, Option B states: “This accounting will provide the factual basis for subsequent decisions on the handling of those claims, including those which may be made by the hostages or their families, and on the disposition of those assets.” Option C states: “This accounting will aid in designing a claims program against Iran for the hostages, their families and other U.S. claimants.” Option D states: “This accounting will aid in designing a claims program against Iran for the hostages, their families and other U.S. claimants. Legislation to facilitate processing those claims is in preparation.”
7. That part of paragraph 4 of the Draft Announcement at Tab A reads: “Consular officers will reissue visas or issue new visas only to qualified Iranians who require visas for humanitarian reasons [who are refugees from injustice,] or whose entry has been determined to be in our national interest.” Brackets are in the original.
8. An undated list, “Possible Limited Military Measures,” at Tab D mentions increased surveillance, spot jamming, aircraft penetration of the Persian Gulf, naval demonstrations, sonic booms, and overflights.